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In recent years, vulnerability has received increased attention within a forensic context and 
key methods of eliciting accurate and reliable recall and identification from vulnerable 
witnesses have been developed (Ministry of Justice, 2011). However, the eyewitness 
capabilities of witnesses with a mental health problem both at interview and cross-
examination are not well understood. The literature on mental health and eyewitness 
performance is extremely limited particularly regarding common problems, such as anxiety 
and depression. Also, we do not fully understand how legal professionals and jurors 
perceive witnesses with a mental health problem. The first study of this thesis explored 
legal professionals’ perceptions of witnesses with anxiety and depression and found that 
professionals frequently come into contact with such witnesses but the reliability of their 
evidence is often questioned and this is based on previous experience rather than robust 
evidence-based sources. Additionally, many felt that not only were changes needed to the 
ways such witnesses are currently interviewed, but that they should be given additional 
support and further mental health awareness training should be provided for professionals. 
The second study examined the effects of mental health on memory recall and 
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identification accuracy. Three groups emerged: sub-clinical anxiety and depression, sub-
clinical anxiety, and typical (with no mental health problems). No significant group 
differences in memory recall or identification accuracy were found. The third study 
assessed the cross-examination performance of the same three witness groups and no 
significant differences in cross-examination performance (measured by memory trace 
strength and ‘resistance’ to challenges) emerged between groups. The fourth study 
explored mock jurors’ perceptions of witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, 
and sub-clinical anxiety, compared to a typical witness with no mental health problems 
either with or without the provision of knowledge regarding the witness’s mental health 
status. The witness with sub-clinical anxiety and depression was seen to be less credible 
than the other witnesses and the mock jurors were more likely to consider the defendants 
to be not guilty after viewing the witnesses with a mental health problem. Both findings 
were irrespective of whether or not the mock jurors were informed of the witness’s mental 
health status. The findings of this thesis are discussed in relation to their real-world 
implications and directions for future research. 
Keywords: Mental health, interviewing, cross-examination, eyewitness identification, 
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Chapter 1  
Literature Review 
1.1.  General Introduction  
Within the last decade, vulnerability and its place within the Criminal Justice 
System (CJS) has become increasingly important. This is evident from recent publications of 
guidance on suggested procedures for the effective participation of vulnerable witnesses 
during the legal process (Cooper & Norton, 2017; Ministry of Justice, 2011). Due to this 
increased interest, research has developed key techniques to enhance accurate and 
reliable recall and facial identification evidence from vulnerable witnesses, such as children 
and those with intellectual disabilities (ID). It has been questioned whether witnesses 
deemed ‘vulnerable’ by the CJS are able to provide their best evidence and consequently 
such techniques are recommended in order to support them during this process (Ministry 
of Justice, 2011). However, there is a lack of understanding of the eyewitness performance 
capabilities of witnesses with a mental health problem. The literature on mental health and 
eyewitness performance, both memory recall and identification lineup performance, is 
extremely limited and more research needs to be conducted particularly regarding 
common problems, such as anxiety and depression. Furthermore, we do not fully 
understand how professionals working with this group perceive them as witnesses or 
indeed how jury members perceive their evidence in a court of law. Further research into 
these issues may help improve the ways in which such witnesses are supported and may 
ultimately lead to a greater number of successful convictions and prosecutions.  
The principal aims of this thesis are 1) to explore legal professionals’ attitudes towards and 
perceptions of vulnerable witnesses with anxiety and depression, 2) to examine the effects 
of anxiety and depression on memory accuracy (at interview) and identification accuracy 
(on identification lineups), 3) to assess the effects of anxiety and depression on memory 
accuracy and cede performance at cross-examination, and 4) to explore mock jurors’ 
perceptions of witnesses with anxiety and depression. These aims will enhance our 
understanding of 1) how such witnesses are perceived at different stages of the criminal 
justice process and 2) their capabilities of providing accurate and reliable witness evidence.  
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This chapter will review the literature that is relevant to this thesis. Firstly, it will describe 
the importance of witnesses within the CJS and outline the cognitive processes involved in 
eyewitness memory, including relevant psychological theories of memory. It will then 
discuss the impact of vulnerability on eyewitness performance before introducing mental 
health as a specific vulnerability. The effects of anxiety and depression on general memory 
will be described first, followed by the impact that they have on eyewitness performance 
more specifically. This will include a discussion of the interviewing techniques and 
identification procedures used with vulnerable witnesses, and the psychological theories 
underpinning such techniques. Then, cross-examination will be introduced and research on 
vulnerability and cross-examination will be reviewed. Finally, literature on the perceptions 
of vulnerable witnesses will be discussed, specifically with reference to the perceptions of 
jurors and legal professionals.  
1.2.  Importance of Witnesses in the Criminal Justice System  
In England and Wales, the Criminal Justice System (CJS) is the term used to describe 
“the institutions and agencies which respond officially to the commission of offences” 
(Hucklesby & Wahidin, 2013, p. 5). These agencies include: the police, the courts, the Home 
Office, the Ministry of Justice, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), the Law Officers, the 
Serious Fraud Office, Her Majesty’s Court Service, and Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation 
Service. They are interdependent and rely on one another to contribute to the criminal 
justice process. The main aims of the system are 1) to detect and prevent crime, 2) to 
rehabilitate and punish offenders, and 3) to support victims and witnesses of crime 
(McMurran, Khalifa, & Gibbon, 2009).  
During any criminal investigation, there are two primary investigative questions that police 
officers aim to answer: 1) what has happened and 2) who is responsible for the crime 
(Milne & Bull, 2006). In order to answer these questions, certain information is required 
and one important source of such information is witnesses (Kocsis, 2009). Published 
research in the USA has shown that witnesses are a central and important feature of a 
criminal investigation (Sanders, 1986). This has been mirrored in the UK (Kebbell & Milne, 
1998) with research suggesting that they are the cornerstone of criminal investigations as 
often there is no other forensically relevant information to assist with the case (Milne & 
Bull, 1999). Not only do witnesses provide central leads within an investigation and prompt 
further lines of enquiry (Berresheim & Weber, 2003) but they also reveal other potential 
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sources of information (Heaton-Armstrong, Shepherd, Gudjonsson, & Wolchover, 2006). 
Furthermore, witness evidence is often regarded by the prosecution as being more 
significant to a case than an offender’s own confession (Wolchover & Heaton-Armstrong, 
1996). However, the success of any investigation relies heavily on the detail and accuracy of 
witness statements (College of Policing, 2013b; Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1990) and 
consequently it is vital that witness evidence presented at interview and court is as 
accurate as possible to prevent miscarriages of justice. Yet, human memory is fragile and 
often fallible which has significant implications for the CJS when considering the use of 
eyewitness accounts (Milne & Bull, 1999). These implications will now be discussed in 
relation to eyewitness memory.  
1.3.  Eyewitness Memory  
Memory is an active process that involves the reconstruction of an event, an 
object, or a person (Davies, Hollin, & Bull, 2008). This process is typically divided into three 
distinct stages: 1) encoding, during which a memory is created by the observer, 2) 
retention, during which the memory is stored for later retrieval, and 3) retrieval, during 
which the memory is accessed (Smith, Ryder, & Flowe, 2018). Memory is critical for 
eyewitness performance and the three stages of memory are central to understanding how 
a witness remembers a crime (Smith et al., 2018). When a witness is asked to identify a 
perpetrator or recall details of an event, they will access information stored in memory to 
reconstruct the person or event. The encoding of information takes place when the witness 
first observes the crime and physical and sensory information from the environment enters 
into the memory, such as the perpetrator’s appearance. Once this material has entered the 
memory system, it is stored for later use in the retention stage. At interview and/or court, 
the witness may be required to describe the perpetrator’s appearance and so attempts are 
made to recover this detail (Milne & Bull, 1999; O’Donohue & Levensky, 2004).  
With regard to the encoding stage, it is important to briefly discuss the difference between 
intentional and incidental encoding. Intentional encoding occurs when we make a 
conscious attempt to encode information about an event or a person. We may, for 
example, try to encode the name of a person with whom we have just met for the first 
time. Incidental encoding, however, occurs when we encode details without being 
consciously aware that we are doing so (Radvansky, 2017). It is incidental encoding that is 
more pertinent to eyewitness memory as, in most cases, a witness will not consider that 
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they may be asked about the crime at a later stage and/or they may not realise that they 
have witnessed a crime and consequently will not intentionally encode details about the 
event in their memory whilst it is taking place. However, for ethical reasons, it is often 
necessary to inform participants in eyewitness research about the nature of the research 
and the types of questions that will be asked and so it can be difficult to replicate incidental 
encoding. With regard to the retrieval stage, it is important to distinguish between two 
forms of memory: implicit and explicit. Implicit memory is regarded as an unconscious 
process and represents our overall knowledge of the world. It is a more general form of 
memory that is context-free (Rovee-Collier, Hayne, & Colombo, 2001). Explicit memory, on 
the other hand, is often referred to as our ‘everyday’ memory as we use this form of 
memory for recall and recognition of events and persons (Rovee-Collier et al., 2001). With 
explicit memory, we are consciously aware of retrieving a memory of a past experience or 
person and it is this form that is particularly relevant to this thesis. Since eyewitness 
memory relies heavily on the ability to recall details of an event and/or recognise a 
perpetrator, explicit memory is essential (Girod, 2015). Furthermore, there are three main 
memory systems: semantic, episodic, and procedural. Semantic memory is memory for 
facts and general knowledge about the world, such as remembering a capital city of a 
country. Episodic memory is a person’s unique memory of a specific event and is 
sometimes referred to as ‘autobiographical’ memory. Procedural memory enables us to 
remember how to do things and perform certain actions, such as riding a bicycle 
(Hasselmo, 2012). For eyewitness performance, episodic memory is crucial as a witness 
must be able to recall information about a specific one-off event.  
Memory is a constructive process that is prone to error and heavily influenced by the 
environment (Griffiths & Milne, 2010). A witness’s memory of an event can be easily 
contaminated causing recall to be imperfect (Schacter, Guerin, & St Jacques, 2011). In 
forensic enquiries, there are a number of regulations that help to protect a forensic scene 
but it is very difficult to prevent the contamination of human memory due to its high 
degree of fragility (Davies, Hollin, & Bull, 2008; Milne & Bull, 1999). It is best to obtain 
immediate recall from a witness in order to preserve the memory of the event. However, 
this rarely happens in the real world as often witnesses come into contact and discuss the 
event with other persons before the police have arrived at the scene. Sometimes, a witness 
may have left the scene and it may be weeks or even months before their recall is 
obtained. With this in mind, as well as the fact that human memory is already fragile, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that a witness’s memory can be easily distorted. Research has shown 
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that inaccurate information provided by co-witnesses is commonly integrated into the 
witness’s evidence (Gabbert, Memon, & Allan, 2003; Gabbert, Memon, Allan, & Wright, 
2004) and further research has revealed that such information is more likely to be recalled 
by the witness than misleading information presented during questioning (Paterson & 
Kemp, 2006a, cited in Paterson, Kemp, & Ng, 2011). Other research has demonstrated that 
an opportunity for early recall enhances recollection and protects the memory against the 
negative effects of inaccurate information presented after the event (Gabbert, Hope, 
Fisher, & Jamieson, 2012).  
1.3. 1. System and Estimator Variables 
Two of the most widely documented types of variables known to affect eyewitness 
performance are system and estimator variables (Wells, 1978). System variables are 
variables that the CJS has control over, such as interview methods and lineup instructions 
(Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006) and these variables have the potential to reduce 
eyewitness inaccuracies. Estimator variables are variables that influence eyewitness 
performance but cannot be controlled for by the CJS, such as witness characteristics (Wells 
et al., 2006). Much of the research has focused on system variables which are often used to 
enhance identification methods (Davies et al., 2008). This is not to say that estimator 
variables are less important. In fact, such variables are significant in assessing the likely 
performance of eyewitnesses in certain circumstances. However, regulating these variables 
in real-life situations can prove challenging. Examples of estimator variables that have been 
known to impact eyewitness memory include: age (Yarmey, 2001), gender (Shaw & 
Skolnick, 1994), and race (Wright, Boyd, & Tredoux, 2001). This also appears to be the case 
with certain situational variables, such as stress (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, & 
McGorty, 2004; Koopman, Classen, & Spiegel, 1994) and trauma (Risan, Binder, & Milne, 
2016). A further variable that has the capacity to impact eyewitness memory is 
vulnerability. Whilst the present research is focusing on one particular vulnerability (mental 
health), there are other areas of vulnerability that are outside the scope of this thesis such 






1.4. Vulnerability and Eyewitness Performance  
As previously mentioned, there are certain variables that have the capacity to 
influence the quality and quantity of eyewitness evidence. However, witness vulnerability is 
a variable that is less understood in relation to eyewitness performance, although advances 
have been made to the ways in which evidence is obtained from individuals deemed 
vulnerable in recent years (Davies, 2016). The current official guidance, Achieving Best 
Evidence (ABE) in Criminal Proceedings (Ministry of Justice, 2011), is a set of 
recommendations that was produced in England and Wales to “assist those responsible for 
conducting video-recorded interviews with vulnerable, intimidated and significant 
witnesses, as well as those tasked with preparing and supporting witnesses during the 
criminal justice process” (Ministry of Justice, 2011, p. 1). Whilst this guidance is advisory 
rather than mandatory, there must be a strong justification put forward at court if its 
recommendations are not followed (Davies & Westcott, 2018). According to the ABE 
guidance, there are four types of vulnerable witness which include: children under 18 years 
of age, witnesses who have a mental disorder as defined by the Mental Health Act (1983, 
as amended by the Mental Health Act, 2007), witnesses significantly impaired in relation to 
intelligence and social functioning (witnesses who have a learning disability), and witnesses 
who have a physical disability (Ministry of Justice, 2011). It has been estimated that 
approximately 54% of witnesses who produce statements are deemed vulnerable (Smith & 
Tilney, 2007) and it is therefore vital that the eyewitness performance of vulnerable 
witnesses is clearly understood.  
Research exploring the accuracy of eyewitnesses has addressed two separate components 
of eyewitness performance: 1) the ability of the witness to recall details of the crime 
(eyewitness memory) and 2) the ability of the witness to recognise the perpetrator of the 
crime (eyewitness identification). There is evidence within the literature to suggest that 
vulnerability can impact both. In terms of eyewitness memory, it has been found that 
memory recall is influenced by age with children in early years of development 
demonstrating poorer recall than older children (e.g., La Rooy et al., 2009; Lewy, Cyr, & 
Dion, 2015). It has also been revealed that children with ID are worse than typically 
developed children at remembering details (e.g., Henry & Gudjonsson, 2003; Henry & 
Gudjonsson, 2004; McCrory, Henry, & Happé, 2007) and similar findings have been 
demonstrated in adults with ID (e.g., Gudjonsson & Henry, 2003; Maras & Bowler, 2014; 
Ternes & Yuille, 2008). Furthermore, an additional group that is often considered 
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‘vulnerable’ is elderly witnesses and it has been shown that eyewitness memory of adults 
in older age is worse than younger adult witnesses (e.g., West & Stone, 2014). Whilst there 
is some research to suggest that eyewitness memory skills are not always influenced by 
vulnerability (e.g., Collins & Henry, 2016), the general consensus within the literature is 
that vulnerability poses problems when it comes to gathering reliable memory recall from 
vulnerable witnesses. Moreover, it seems that a witness’s vulnerability is not only capable 
of impacting memory performance but also identification performance. Within the 
literature, there are a number of eyewitness studies involving adults with ID (e.g., Henry & 
Wilcock, 2013) and elderly adults (e.g., Erickson, Lampinen, & Moore, 2016; Havard & 
Memon, 2009; Wilcock & Bull, 2010) that have demonstrated that identification 
performance of witnesses deemed vulnerable is reliably worse than that of their typical 
counterparts. The findings of previous research that has explored memory enhancing 
interviewing techniques and identification methods used with vulnerable witnesses will be 
discussed later in this thesis.  
1.4.1. Mental Health 
One type of psychological vulnerability that has received very little attention with 
regard to eyewitness performance is mental health. The Mental Health Act (2007) defines 
‘mental disorder’ as “any disorder or disability of the mind” (Mental Health Act, 2007, 
Chapter 12, p. 6). According to the Mental Health Foundation (2019), one in six people in 
the UK experience a mental health disorder of some kind each week (Mental Health 
Foundation, 2019a); however, despite its importance, literature regarding mental health in 
relation to eyewitness performance is sparse and as a result the witness capabilities of 
vulnerable persons with a mental health disorder are unclear. There is, however, a larger 
body of research on mental health in relation to general memory and cognition, and such 
research will be discussed in the next section. This thesis will be looking at sub-clinical cases 
of mental health for which a mental health diagnosis has not been given but due to there 
being limited literature on sub-clinical mental health problems, most of the literature that 
will be reviewed has explored clinical mental health disorders. 
1.5. Mental Health and General Memory 
Cognition refers to the intellectual skills that allow us to acquire, store, and 
transform information (Eysenck, 2012). As the range of mental health disorders is wide, the 
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impact that they have on cognition varies. For example, schizophrenia and other psychotic 
disorders are associated with abnormalities such as delusions, hallucinations, and 
disorganised speech (American Psychiatric Association (APA), 2013), whereas depressive 
disorders are associated with symptoms such as severe irritability, diminished ability to 
think or concentrate, and sometimes recurrent thoughts of death (APA, 2013). 
Furthermore, it has been found that individuals with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
experience cognitive deficits on tasks of sustained attention and working memory 
(Vasterling et al., 2002) and also find it difficult to retrieve specific autobiographical 
memories (McNally, Lasko, Macklin, & Pitman, 1995).  
Memory is affected by mental health in various ways depending upon the individual mental 
health disorder but a common factor that is evident across the studies described above is 
that memory and cognition can be impacted. This is likely to have significant implications 
for the criminal justice process if and when an individual with a mental health problem is 
required to provide evidence as an eyewitness at interview and/or court. However, there is 
only a limited number of studies that have examined the effects of mental health on 
eyewitness memory and identification performance. This thesis will explore this issue with 
a focus on anxiety and depression; two of the most prevalent mental health disorders.  
1.5.1. Anxiety and Depression 
Anxiety and depression are amongst the most prevalent mental health disorders in 
the UK, and mixed anxiety and depression is the most common (Mental Health Foundation, 
2019b). Research has revealed that the prevalence rate for anxiety in adults over the age of 
16 is 5.9% whilst the prevalence rate for depression is slightly lower at 3.3% (Stansfeld et 
al., 2016). For both combined, the prevalence rate is higher at 7.8% (Mental Health 
Foundation, 2019b).  
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – Fifth Edition (DSM-5) defines 
and classifies a range of mental health disorders, and includes criteria intended to facilitate 
the reliable diagnosis of each disorder (APA, 2013). According to this latest edition, anxiety 
disorders “share features of excessive fear and anxiety and related behavioral 
disturbances” (APA, 2013, p. 189) and examples of such disorders include: generalized 
anxiety disorder, separation anxiety disorder, social anxiety disorder, panic disorder, and 
agoraphobia (APA, 2013). Anxiety can be separated into two distinct forms: state and trait. 
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Carducci (2009) defines state anxiety as “a temporary change in anxiety in response to an 
external threat” (p. 578) and trait anxiety as “an enduring characteristic of the individual’s 
personality” (p. 578). It is the latter form of anxiety on which this thesis is focusing as its 
aim is to explore the effects of an in-built, permanent form of anxiety. In terms of the 
neural bases of anxiety disorders, functional brain-imaging studies involving emotional 
tasks have shown that there is a strong association between anxiety and changes in the 
amygdala and the anterior cingulate cortex within the brain (e.g., Kim & Whalen, 2009; 
Melcher, Falkai, & Gruber, 2008). One may argue that this is to be expected considering 
that anxiety is a disturbance of emotion and these brain areas play a key role in emotional 
regulation (Mayberg et al., 2005).  
According to the DSM-5, a common feature of depressive disorders is “the presence of sad, 
empty, or irritable mood, accompanied by somatic and cognitive changes that significantly 
affect the individual’s capacity to function” (APA, 2013, p. 155), and examples of such 
disorders include: disruptive mood dysregulation disorder, major depressive disorder, 
persistent depressive disorder, and substance/medication-induced depressive disorder 
(APA, 2013). The emotional states associated with depressive disorders vary from everyday 
moods of sadness to psychotic episodes with increased risk of suicide (Davidson, 2000). It 
appears that the hippocampus is one of the main brain areas most affected in depression 
(Dillon & Pizzagalli, 2018) and memory deficits associated with depression can potentially 
be explained by hippocampal abnormalities which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
The literature on the effects of anxiety and depression on general memory will now be 
discussed. Much of the research particularly regarding depression has focused on severe 
cases. This thesis is examining less severe cases due to the fact that many mental health 
problems in the UK go undiagnosed (Open Access Government, 2019) but because the 
literature surrounding sub-clinical mental health problems is limited, the majority of the 
literature reviewed below is oriented towards more severe cases. 
1.5.2. Anxiety and General Memory 
Overall, research has revealed memory problems associated with anxiety (e.g., 
Buodo et al., 2011; Burriss, Ayers, Ginsberg, & Powell, 2008; Plana, Lavoie, Battaglia, & 
Achim, 2014). However, there is a very small body of research arguing that anxiety has no 
consistent adverse effect on any aspect of memory functioning (e.g., Kizilbash, 
Vanderploeg, & Curtiss, 2002) and this is supported by the Yerkes-Dodson Law (Yerkes & 
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Dodson, 1908). This theory proposes a U-shaped relationship between anxiety and 
performance, suggesting that performance increases with physiological or mental arousal 
but only up to a point as high levels of anxiety can result in poor performance. Indeed, the 
majority of research within this area has shown that anxiety can significantly impair 
memory performance. For example, Lucas, Telch, and Bigler (1991) found that subjects 
with panic disorder demonstrated overall visual memory impairment and poor visual and 
verbal recall compared to typical controls, although they were no different from controls in 
overall verbal memory or ability to concentrate. Moreover, Buodo et al. (2011) 
demonstrated that symptoms of PTSD, a recognised major anxiety disorder, are associated 
with a number of cognitive and emotional dysfunctions including attention and 
concentration abilities, and memory. Other studies examining PTSD have found similar 
results (e.g., Burriss et al., 2008; Plana et al., 2014). Furthermore, Pacheco-Unguetti, 
Acosta, Lupiáñez, Román, and Derakshan (2011) employed a task that assessed the 
efficiency of three attentional networks: orientating, alerting, and executive control. Their 
findings demonstrated that anxiety is related to both reduced effectiveness of the 
executive control network and difficulties in disengaging attention from invalid cues, even 
when using emotionally neutral information. The relationship between these attentional 
networks and anxiety may in part explain the problems in the day-to-day functioning of 
individuals with anxiety (Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2011). Other research has explored the 
use of complex and attentionally demanding tasks. Using a letter detection task, Tallis, 
Eysenck, and Matthews (1991) asked a group of controls and a group of clinically anxious 
individuals to specify whether a target letter was present or absent on a computer screen. 
Whilst there was no difference between the groups when the target letter was present, the 
anxious group took significantly longer to make a decision when the target letter was 
absent (Tallis et al., 1991), suggesting that not only is the decision-making process 
considerably longer for anxious individuals but they seem to only attend successfully to 
tasks that require them to make categorically correct decisions. This finding is particularly 
pertinent for police identification lineups in which the police suspect may or may not be 
the actual perpetrator of the crime. Furthermore, research has revealed that anxiety is 
associated with a memory bias for emotionally valenced material. For example, it has been 
shown that individuals with high trait anxiety remember more negative (threat-related) 
material than those with medium and low trait anxiety (Eysenck & Byrne, 1994). Similarly, a 
study examining memory for facial emotional expressions revealed that anxious individuals 
exhibit a memory bias for negative versus non-negative facial emotional expressions (Foa, 
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Gilboa-Schechtman, Amir, & Freshman, 2000). Such findings are relevant to this thesis as 
one would expect witnessing a crime to be emotional, at least some of the time.  
1.5.3. Depression and General Memory 
With regard to depression, whilst it has been claimed that depression has no 
significant influence on memory performance (e.g., Grant, Thase, & Sweeney, 2001), the 
majority of the research suggests that it does affect cognition and memory (e.g., Austin, 
Mitchell, & Goodwin, 2001; Gallassi, Morreale, & Pagni, 2001; McDermott & Ebmeier, 
2009). One aspect of memory that seems to be particularly affected is episodic memory 
which is critical for eyewitness memory. The dual-process model of memory proposes that 
episodic recognition memory is made up of two independent processes: familiarity (a sense 
of recognition in the absence of specific detail or context) and recollection (vivid 
reinstatement of detail and contextual features) (Yonelinas, 2001). Research has shown a 
specific deficit of recollection in depression, with familiarity left intact (e.g., Drakeford et 
al., 2010). Of particular relevance to eyewitness identification is evidence of this 
recollection deficit in a study using neutral face stimuli in which patients with major 
depressive disorder displayed significant impairments in recognition memory and 
recollection for neutral faces (Drakeford et al., 2010). This recollection deficit has also been 
shown in individuals with sub-clinical depression (Ramponi, Murphy, Calder, & Barnard, 
2010) which is particularly relevant to this thesis. Furthermore, overgeneral 
autobiographical memory (OGM) is one of the primary memory biases associated with 
depression. This is the tendency for depressed individuals to have difficulty recalling 
specific autobiographical episodes. Instead, they tend to remember a general category of 
events extending over time (e.g., Williams et al., 2007). Both overgeneral memory and 
reduced recollection can potentially be explained by hippocampal abnormalities in 
individuals with depression with research demonstrating reduced hippocampal volumes in 
depressed adults (e.g., Dillon & Pizzagalli, 2018). This may explain why episodic memory, 
which relies heavily on the hippocampus, is affected in individuals with depression 
(Zakzanis, Leach, & Kaplan, 1998). 
In fact, research has shown that low episodic memory performance should be considered a 
potential marker of depression. Airaksinen, Wahlin, Forsell, and Larsson (2007) defined low 
episodic memory performance as the sum of free and cued recalls of organisable words 
and, even when controlling for differences in factors such as demographics and 
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socioeconomics, low episodic memory performance was reliably associated with 
depression (Airaksinen et al., 2007). This finding is supported by McDermott and Ebmeier 
(2009) in their meta-analysis of depression severity and cognitive function. Their study 
revealed significant correlations between depression severity and cognitive performance in 
the areas of episodic memory, executive function, and processing speed but not visuo-
spatial or semantic memory (McDermott & Ebmeier, 2009). Additional research has looked 
at the differences between explicit and implicit memory with regard to the effects of 
depression. Ellwart, Rinck, and Becker (2003) compared memory performance between 
severely depressed inpatients (with major depressive disorder) and healthy controls. Whilst 
implicit memory was unimpaired, the two groups differed in explicit memory performance 
with the depressed inpatients displaying greater memory deficits. This implies that memory 
is impaired in individuals with depression in situations during which they are required to 
consciously retrieve information about an event (Ellwart et al., 2003) which is of particular 
relevance to this thesis. Furthermore, research has demonstrated that depressed 
individuals exhibit a memory bias for emotionally valenced material. It appears that they 
remember more negative and less positive material than non-depressed individuals (e.g., 
Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005) which is similar to individuals with 
anxiety. Again, this is relevant to this thesis as the witnessing of a crime is likely to be 
emotional. The crime shown in this thesis is a distraction burglary and, whilst it is mild in 
nature, it nevertheless depicts a negative event.  
1.5.4. Anxiety, Depression, and Eyewitness Performance  
Despite their considerable prevalence rates, the impact of anxiety and depression 
on eyewitness memory has been scarcely explored and the findings of studies that have 
examined the possible effects of these mental health problems are ambiguous. In the past, 
studies have looked at the effects of arousal (e.g., Clifford & Hollin, 1981; Clifford & Scott, 
1978) but there are limits to how far the findings of arousal studies can be generalised to a 
permanent state of anxiety (trait). To date, there has only been a very small number of 
studies that have looked at trait anxiety within an eyewitness capacity. Ridley (2003) 
examined the impact of trait (and state) anxiety on eyewitness memory accuracy but found 
no effects. However, Dobson and Markham (1992) demonstrated that individuals with high 
trait anxiety were unable to provide as many correct responses as those with low trait 
anxiety when asked to identify details of an event. The researchers provided anxious and 
non-anxious participants with anxiety-arousing instructions at encoding and/or retrieval. It 
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was found that those who were given the instructions at encoding and retrieval, and also 
scored high on a test for trait anxiety, were less accurate on an eyewitness task than those 
who scored low on the test (Dobson & Markham, 1992). Yet, Mitte (2008) showed that 
anxiety can play a beneficial role in the recall of threatening information. Both implicit and 
explicit memory biases were investigated, and an effect of anxiety on explicit memory was 
revealed. Explicit memory bias was examined in recognition and recall paradigms and it 
was found that anxiety influenced the recollection of previous experiences with anxious 
individuals displaying a preference for threat-related information (Mitte, 2008). With the 
current thesis in mind, this is significant as explicit memory is fundamental for witness 
recall (Girod, 2015).  
The one problem with eyewitness experiments is that they do not induce the stress that 
would normally be experienced by those involved in crime, whether that be the victim or 
the witness. It is very difficult to generalise laboratory-based eyewitness experiments to 
real-life crimes if factors such as stress and their effects on memory performance are not 
understood. One study that has attempted to measure the effects of anxiety in a more real-
life context was conducted by Valentine and Mesout (2008) who focused on the impact on 
eyewitness identification rather than memory. They tested the ability of London Dungeon 
visitors to identify an individual with whom they had previously encountered in the Horror 
Labyrinth, either via a lineup or photo identification parade. State anxiety was measured by 
means of subjective self-reports and through the use of a heart rate monitor which 
recorded participants’ heart rates whilst in the labyrinth. It was found that the former was 
a reliable predictor of the latter; higher state anxiety was associated with a higher heart 
rate. The findings revealed that 75% of those who scored below the median on the state 
anxiety scale made accurate identifications whereas only 17% of those who scored above 
the median accurately identified the individual, allowing the researchers to conclude that 
eyewitness identification was dramatically impaired by high state anxiety (Valentine & 
Mesout, 2008). Similar findings have been found in studies that have examined the effects 
of highly intense stress on eyewitness performance. Morgan et al. (2004), for example, 
compared eyewitness identification performance in high and low stress conditions. In the 
high stress condition, participants were confronted face-to-face with an interrogator in a 
well-lit room for 40 minutes. In the low stress condition, participants were still challenged 
by an interrogator but this condition did not involve physical confrontation. It was found 
that participants in the high stress condition were significantly worse at correctly 
identifying the perpetrator than those in the low stress condition (Morgan et al., 2004). 
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With regard to trait anxiety, Valentine and Mesout (2008) found no effect of trait anxiety 
on eyewitness identification. Given that there is only a limited number of studies examining 
the effects of trait anxiety specifically on eyewitness performance, additional research is 
essential in order to gain further clarity.   
Regarding depression, literature on its effects on eyewitness memory and identification is 
extremely limited. There is some research to suggest that individuals with depressive 
symptoms are able to automatically process information about the eyes which is a key area 
in facial recognition (e.g., Rutherford, Clements, & Sekuler, 2007) and more accurate at 
recognising basic and complex emotions in others (e.g., Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, 
Chowdrey, & Chen, 2005). Findings such as these may suggest that witnesses with 
depressive symptoms are at an advantage due to having certain perceptual abilities. 
However, other research has demonstrated that individuals with depressive symptoms are 
less able to inhibit irrelevant negative stimuli (e.g., Goeleven, De Raedt, Baert, & Koster, 
2006) and improvements in depressive symptoms are associated with enhanced 
identification accuracy (e.g., Rounding, Jacobson, & Lindsay, 2014). Rounding et al. (2014) 
conducted an eyewitness study which comprised two phases. In the first phase, they 
showed 173 participants twelve target faces. In the second phase (two to four weeks later), 
they asked the participants to identify these faces from a series of lineups. At both 
sessions, participants completed measures of anxious and depressive symptomatology. It 
was found that participants whose depressive symptomatology improved between the two 
phases were more accurate at correctly identifying the target faces than those whose 
depressive symptomatology had stayed the same or worsened (Rounding et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, the dual-process model of memory and overgeneral memory bias described 
earlier suggest that depression is associated with both reduced recognition and reduced 
recall; two key components of eyewitness performance.  
From the studies discussed above, it is evident that the effects of anxiety and depression 
on eyewitness performance are ambiguous. However, there is strong evidence for the 
impact of both on general memory and although the research focuses on more severe 
cases, it nevertheless provides some insight into the potential effects of such mental health 
problems on eyewitness performance. Given their high prevalence rates (Mental Health 
Foundation, 2019b), it stands to reason that many eyewitnesses may be suffering from 
either anxiety or depression, or both, when they witness a crime. Consequently, further 
research on their capabilities is very much needed. 
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1.6. Eyewitness Interviewing  
Interviewing witnesses is central to the success of an investigation (College of 
Policing, 2013a). Within the literature, a well-recognised and influential memory enhancing 
technique for investigative interviewing across many countries is the Cognitive Interview 
(CI). This method was developed after police officers and legal experts requested an 
effective approach that they could use to interview witnesses. It is exclusively concerned 
with the retrieval of information from memory (Memon & Bull, 1991) and recognised for 
increasing both the quantity and quality of information obtained from eyewitnesses (Fisher 
& Geiselman, 1992). The current interview procedure used in the UK is based on the CI 
(Ministry of Justice, 2011). Before it is discussed, three psychological theories of memory 
upon which the CI is based will be described.  
1.6.1. Psychological Theories of Memory relating to the Cognitive Interview 
The first theory is the Encoding Specificity Hypothesis (Tulving & Thompson, 1973) 
and the idea underpinning this theory is that successful retrieval depends upon the degree 
of similarity between the target memory trace and the retrieval environment. For a 
retrieval cue to be effective, it must be specifically encoded at the time of learning (Tulving 
& Osler, 1968). With regard to eyewitness memory specifically, this theory encourages a 
witness to mentally recreate the psychological and physical environment which existed at 
the time of the event (known as mental reinstatement of context (MRC)). Godden and 
Baddeley (1975) provide underpinning support with their research conducted with divers 
who learnt a list of words either on land or underwater. Their findings revealed that recall 
was enhanced when the encoding and retrieval conditions matched (Godden & Baddeley, 
1975). This context-dependency effect has been replicated in other studies (e.g., Grant et 
al., 1998; Marian & Neisser, 2000).  
The second theory is the Multiple Trace Theory (Bower, 1967) and the idea underpinning 
this theory is that memory traces comprise a series of coded representations and 
consequently there are multiple ways of accessing a memory. According to this theory, if 
we are unable to remember something using one technique, we may be able to access it 
using a different technique. We may try, for example, to remember a person’s name via 
different techniques and this is likely to result in better recall. Regarding eyewitness 
memory, this may involve recalling an event from different starting points and thus 
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changing the temporal order. It seems that different forms of memory retrieval (schematic 
versus non-schematic) require a change in the temporal order of recall (reverse versus 
forward) in order to obtain best evidence (Geisleman & Callot, 1990). At interview, an 
eyewitness may be encouraged to report what happened during the event from back to 
front starting with the last thing that they can remember.  
The third theory is the Schema Theory (Schank & Ableson, 1977). A schema is an organised 
structure that captures our knowledge and expectations of some aspect of the world 
(Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979) and can affect how we remember (Schank & Abelson, 
1977). Whilst schemas are formed by our experiences, we may also have schemas for 
things that we have never experienced and these derive from expectations of typical 
everyday events (script-based knowledge) (Schank & Abelson, 1977). Such schemas fill gaps 
in human memory and, whilst the individual is often unaware of this process, it allows 
them to make sense of new concepts. Although schemas guide the encoding and retrieval 
of information as well as combine current and past information, the use of script-based 
knowledge has the potential to be problematic as a person may be unable to discriminate 
between remembered information and new information (Davies et al., 2008). As a result, 
recall performance may be hindered as a person may recall information that is different to 
what they actually experienced. This is particularly pertinent to eyewitness memory 
(Schank & Abelson, 1977) for which memory accuracy is vital. 
1.6.2. Cognitive Interview 
The original CI comprises four cognitive components. The first component is mental 
reinstatement of context (MRC) which involves the reconstruction of the physical and 
personal features of an event and is based on the Encoding Specificity Hypothesis (Tulving 
& Thompson, 1973). The witness is instructed to form a mental picture of the environment 
in which the event took place. They are encouraged to think about the physical aspects of 
the event as well as their personal mental state at the time of the event in terms of their 
thoughts and emotions. The second component is report everything. Here, the witness is 
encouraged to recall as much information as possible, including unimportant and partial 
details. It has been argued that this is an effective technique for two reasons: 1) because 
witnesses may only report what they personally consider to be relevant without an 
understanding of what information has investigative value and 2) because recall of partial 
details may lead to the subsequent recall of additional relevant information and help police 
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officers to piece together witness accounts (Memon & Bull, 1991). The third component is 
change in temporal order which is based on the Multiple Trace Theory (Bower, 1967). After 
an account has been provided, the witness is encouraged to recall the event again but this 
time in any order they wish. The rationale here is that the witness may remember 
additional details by recalling the event from a different starting point. The fourth 
component is change perspective. This technique encourages a witness to recall 
information from an alternative perspective in the hope that this will trigger further 
memory traces. Typically, this involves asking the witness to recall the event from the 
perspective of another person present during the event (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992) and is 
aimed to limit script-based recall (Schank & Ableson, 1977).   
1.6.3. Enhanced Cognitive Interview 
The fundamental objective underlying each of the four cognitive components of 
the CI is to retrieve as much detail as possible whilst at the same time preserving the 
quality of the information (Memon & Bull, 1991). Early research with the CI found that it 
was a useful investigative technique for enhancing memory in an eyewitness context by 
eliciting correct information but not at the cost of increasing incorrect recall (e.g., Fisher, 
Geiselman, & Amador, 1989; Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland, 1985; Geiselman, 
Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland, 1986). In 1992, Fisher and Geiselman developed the original 
CI by incorporating new strategies and techniques that focus on improving communication 
between the interviewer and the witness as well as the flow of information during the 
interview, and this led to the development of the Enhanced Cognitive Interview (ECI; Fisher 
& Geiselman, 1992). These additional techniques include: establishing rapport, explaining 
the aims of the interview, initiating a free report, questioning, varied and extensive 
retrieval, summary, and closure. The ECI provides a clear structure for the interview with 
each phase contributing towards the overall success of the interview.  
Research has demonstrated that this interview technique is effective at increasing the 
amount of correct detail recalled by a witness (e.g., Rivard, Fisher, Robertson, & Hirn 
Mueller, 2014) and for this reason the ECI is known widely to be one of the most successful 
interviewing procedures for enhancing witness recall (Paulo, Albuquerque, & Bull, 2013) 
with different groups of witnesses, such as children (e.g., Milne & Bull, 2003; Verkampt & 
Ginet, 2010) and older adults (e.g., Wright & Holliday, 2006). However, there is some 
evidence to suggest that police officers have had difficulty implementing the procedure in 
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practice (e.g., Brown, Lloyd-Jones, & Robinson, 2008; Clarke & Milne, 2001; Dando, 
Wilcock, & Milne, 2008) and it has been argued that this may be due to the procedure 
being too time-consuming and demanding for many less serious crimes (e.g., Clarke & 
Milne, 2001; Kebbell, Milne, & Wagstaff, 1999). Dando, Wilcock, Milne, and Henry (2009) 
were interested in whether substantial modifications to the original CI procedure would 
enhance its forensic practicability but, at the same time, retain its superiority. The change 
perspective and change in temporal order components were excluded and comparisons 
were made between the modified version and the original CI model, and it was found that 
the modified version was just as effective as the original model. However, the modified 
version was significantly shorter in length and consequently less demanding for the 
interviewer, allowing the researchers to conclude that this version is an effective practical 
alternative for frontline investigators (Dando et al., 2009).  
1.6.4. Eyewitness Interviewing of Vulnerable Witnesses  
As briefly mentioned earlier, there is a set of recommendations known as the ABE 
guidance (Ministry of Justice, 2011) in England and Wales and this was developed in line 
with the ECI described above. The guidance outlines good practice in interviewing 
vulnerable witnesses and preparing them to give their best evidence. It describes 
vulnerable adult witnesses as “those who have a mental disorder, learning disability or 
physical disorder/disability that is likely to have an impact on the quality of their evidence” 
(Ministry of Justice, 2011, p. 28) and emphasises that, whilst having a mental health 
disorder does not preclude the provision of reliable evidence; there is a need to protect the 
witness and provide support to enable them to give their best evidence (Ministry of Justice, 
2011). According to the guidance, anxious witnesses may wish to please the interviewer 
and provide them with information that they believe they wish to hear to compensate for 
loss of memory. The evidence provided by depressed witnesses may be influenced by 
feelings of guilt, helplessness, or hopelessness (Ministry of Justice, 2011) and so the 
guidance reinforces the importance of proper preparation of the witness for the interview 
at the initial stages prior to formal questioning (Davies & Westcott, 2018).  
Furthermore, the ABE guidance suggests the use of a phased interview structure for all 
witnesses (Ministry of Justice, 2011). The first phase is Establishing Rapport. This phase 
typically involves the interviewer asking some brief neutral questions that are unrelated to 
the event to ensure that the witness feels comfortable and familiar with the interviewer. 
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According to the guidance, effective rapport can improve both the quantity and quality of 
recall during the interview and is therefore essential (Ministry of Justice, 2011). The second 
phase is Free Narrative Account. This phase typically involves the interviewer initiating and 
supporting an uninterrupted free narrative account of the event from the witness by means 
of an open-ended invitation. The guidance stresses the importance of the interviewer being 
confident and competent in their approach at this stage as vulnerable witnesses may be 
cautious of authority figures and so it is important that the witness is reassured that the 
interviewer can be relied upon (Ministry of Justice, 2011). The third phase is Questioning. 
This phase typically involves the interviewer asking suitable questions based on the 
information that the witness has provided during the free narrative phase with the aim of 
achieving further recall. The guidance recommends commencing with open-ended 
questions and proceeding to specific-closed questions, if necessary. The use of 
leading/misleading questions is discouraged (Ministry of Justice, 2011). Vulnerable adults 
may have limited strategies for retrieving the relevant information from their memory and 
it is therefore crucial that the interviewer understands this and endeavours to overcome 
such limitations (Milne & Bull, 2006). The fourth phase is Closing the Interview. This phase 
typically involves the interviewer summarising the witness’s account and ensuring that the 
witness feels that they can add new information if they wish as this can lead to further 
retrieval. It is the interviewer’s responsibility to ensure that the interview ends 
appropriately and this is especially important for vulnerable witnesses in order to ensure 
that they do not leave the interview feeling distressed (Ministry of Justice, 2011). The 
research presented in this thesis uses an ABE compatible interview.  
In addition, there is a range of measures collectively known as ‘special measures’ that were 
introduced to facilitate the gathering and giving of evidence by vulnerable witnesses 
(Davies & Westcott, 2018; Ministry of Justice, 2011). These include: screens, live TV link, 
evidence in private, removal of wigs and gowns, video-recorded evidence in-chief, 
intermediaries, and communication aids. The decision to use a special measure(s) is based 
upon whether or not a witness has the capacity to provide their best evidence without 
assistance and the court determines which special measure(s) is most appropriate 
depending on the circumstance of each individual case (Smith & Tilney, 2007). There is 
evidence to suggest that such measures have helped witnesses to feel more confident (e.g., 
Burton, Evans, & Sanders, 2006) and improved witness satisfaction with the CJS (e.g., 
Hamlyn, Phelps, Turtle, & Sattar, 2004). In terms of the effectiveness of the ABE guidance, 
including special measures, there is a limited body of research to suggest that compliance 
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with the guidance is poor with respect to victims, such as child victims of sexual abuse 
(Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2014). However, very little literature has evaluated its 
effectiveness with vulnerable adults. The ABE interview is currently the standard interview 
protocol used with vulnerable witnesses in practice (Ministry of Justice, 2011) and will 
therefore be used in this thesis to explore the eyewitness capabilities of witnesses with 
anxiety and depression.  
1.7. Eyewitness Identification  
As well as relying on effective interviewing techniques, a successful investigation 
also relies heavily on effective lineup identification methods (Wells & Seelau, 1995). As 
described earlier, methods of showing lineups is a system variable that can be controlled by 
the CJS. In the UK, under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), there is a code 
of practice (Code D) for the identification of persons by police officers which outlines two 
main objectives of identification procedures: 1) to test the witness’s ability to identify the 
suspect as the person they saw on a previous occasion and 2) to provide safeguards against 
mistaken identification (Home Office, 2017). The code defines three main identification 
procedures. The first is a sequential video identification which involves the witness viewing 
a set of moving images of the suspect, together with similar images of others who resemble 
the suspect. The second is an identification parade which involves the witness viewing the 
suspect in a line of others who resemble the suspect. The third is a group identification 
which involves the witness viewing the suspect in an informal group of people. In practice, 
video identification is the preferred method of establishing identification in England and 
Wales (Davies & Griffiths, 2008). It is important to distinguish between perpetrator present 
(PP) and perpetrator absent (PA) lineups as comparisons are often made between the two 
in eyewitness research. A PP lineup includes the true perpetrator and a number of foils 
whereas a PA lineup comprises a perpetrator ‘replacement’ who closely resembles the 
actual perpetrator and a number of foils (Wells & Turtle, 1986). For many years, research 
has stressed the importance of including PA lineups in experimental designs as, in real-life 
cases, the true perpetrator may not be present in the lineup because the police suspect is 
innocent (Wells & Turtle, 1986). Consequently, it is important that eyewitness identification 
experiments use both PP and PA lineup conditions to ensure that the effects of 
experimental variables are clarified under both of these possible states (Brewer, Weber, & 
Semmler, 2005) and thus both lineup conditions will be used in the current thesis.   
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Within the legal system, eyewitness identifications play an important role with correct 
identifications providing major advances in criminal investigations (Wells & Loftus, 2013). 
Over the years, a large body of research has examined eyewitness identification procedures 
(e.g., Horry, Halford, Brewer, Milne, & Bull, 2014; Horry, Memon, Wright, & Milne, 2012; 
Wells, 1993; Wells et al., 1998). Traditionally, lineups were presented simultaneously in 
which the suspect and foils are presented at the same time; known as the simultaneous 
lineup. However, it has been argued that this type of lineup encourages the witness to 
make comparisons between the lineup members and subsequently base their decision on 
who best fits their original memory; an approach known as the relative judgement strategy 
(Wells, 1984; Wells & Seelau, 1995). This strategy leads to higher rates of false 
identifications, especially for PA lineups (Lindsay & Wells, 1985). Consequently, an 
alternative method of lineup presentation was put forward which involves each lineup 
member being presented separately; known as the sequential lineup (Lindsay & Wells, 
1985). With this type of lineup, it is more difficult for the witness to make relative 
comparisons between the lineup members. Instead, it encourages the witness to make an 
absolute judgement decision as they are more likely to compare each lineup member 
separately with their memory for the perpetrator (Hope & Sauer, 2014). There is a large 
body of research to suggest that sequential presentation significantly enhances 
identification accuracy (e.g., Clark, Howell, & Davey, 2008; Goodsell, Gronlund, & Carlson, 
2010; Kneller, Memon, & Stevenage, 2001; Lindsay et al., 1991; Steblay, Dysart, & Wells, 
2011) as a result of reducing false identifications from PA lineups. However, a recent study 
conducted in the United States has revealed that sequential lineups are not necessarily 
superior to simultaneous lineups due to a reduction in positive identifications, and that the 
reverse is more likely to be true (Wixted, Mickes, Dunn, Clark, & Wells, 2016). 
Nevertheless, in the UK, video lineups presented sequentially are the principle 
identification procedure under PACE (1984) Code D (Home Office, 2017) and consequently 
video lineups will be used in the current thesis (for full details regarding the sequential 
presentation of PACE Code D video lineups see page 121).  
1.7.1. Eyewitness Identification Performance of Vulnerable Witnesses 
Within the literature, attempts have been made to explore the identification 
performance of vulnerable groups. For example, it has been argued that the age of the 
witness plays a role with research reporting that younger adults are superior to older adults 
in identification accuracy (e.g., Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001; Yarmey, 2001). 
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Studies have found that older adults (aged over 60 years) make fewer correct 
identifications and more false identifications on PP lineups and fewer correct rejections and 
more false identifications on PA lineups (e.g., Memon & Bartlett, 2002; Memon, Bartlett, 
Rose, & Gray, 2003; Rose, Bull, & Vrij, 2003; Searcy, Bartlett, & Memon, 1999). More recent 
research has revealed that older adults are worse than younger adults at identifying a 
young perpetrator; however, they are no worse than their counterparts at identifying an 
older perpetrator (Wilcock, Bull, & Vrij, 2007). In certain circumstances, it may therefore be 
possible for older adults to perform at an equivalent level to younger adults. Research has 
also been conducted with adults with ID, although the literature is very limited. The most 
recent study to date explored the identification performance of adults with and without ID 
on both a PA and a PP photo lineup, and found that adults with ID demonstrated poorer 
performance across both lineup types (Wilcock & Henry, 2013). In particular, those with ID 
made fewer correct identifications of the perpetrator and more false identifications on PP 
lineups, and fewer correct rejections and more false identifications on PA lineups which 
support the findings of previous studies (e.g., Ericson & Issacs, 2003; Ternes & Yuille, 2008). 
With regard to child eyewitnesses, both field and laboratory studies have shown that 
children are more likely than adults to make a false identification (e.g., Pozzulo & Balfour, 
2006; Pozzulo & Warren, 2003). However, this error seems to be more apparent in PA 
lineups with studies revealing that children perform as accurately as adults in PP lineups 
(e.g., Pozzulo & Balfour, 2006; Pozzulo & Lindsay, 1998).  
With the current thesis in mind, literature on identification accuracy and the vulnerability 
of mental health is extremely sparse. The only study to have explored this was conducted 
by Ridley (2003) who found a small improvement in identification accuracy in individuals 
with high state anxiety, albeit only on PP lineups. This is significant within a forensic context 
given that police identification lineups may or may not include the actual perpetrator and 
so it is crucial that a witness is able to make a correct decision on both PP and PA lineups. 
With regard to trait anxiety, there was no effect found of high trait anxiety on identification 
performance for either lineup type, suggesting that trait anxiety does not negatively impact 
identification accuracy. However, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions based on just one 
study. With this in mind, as well as the fact that there is no research examining the lineup 
performance of witnesses with depression, further research on mental health and its 





When it comes to assessing the credibility of witness evidence, the method of 
cross-examination is often used. In a court of law, cross-examination is conducted with the 
purpose of challenging the credibility of a witness’s original evidence in order to reveal the 
facts (Bettenay, Ridley, Henry, & Crane, 2014). It is a strategy employed to weaken the 
evidence and undermine the witness (Munkman, 1991). The advocate may seek to attack a 
witness on a number of grounds. They may imply, for example, that the witness is mistaken 
or has exaggerated or is generally a dishonest character and therefore should not be relied 
upon (Stone, 1995). Concerning vulnerable witnesses, it has been argued that cross-
examination techniques traditionally deployed within the legal system can confuse 
vulnerable witnesses, reduce their ability to understand the issues, and diminish the 
accuracy of their testimony (Keane, 2012). Consequently, guidance has been produced in 
England and Wales to protect vulnerable witnesses during the criminal justice process 
(ABE; Ministry of Justice, 2011) and support advocates when preparing for trial in cases 
involving a vulnerable witness (The Advocate’s Gateway, 2016). This thesis will explore the 
effects of cross-examination on the memory accuracy of witnesses with a sub-clinical 
mental health problem. Before reviewing the literature on cross-examination and 
vulnerability, it is important to discuss a number of psychological theories and concepts of 
memory that are pertinent to cross-examination. 
1.8.1. Suggestibility 
A concept that is particularly relevant to cross-examination is suggestibility, defined 
as “the influence of one person on another without his or her consent, the implanting of an 
idea, possessing a submissive tendency, and appealing to the unconscious” (Marcuse, 1976, 
cited in Ridley, Gabbert, & La Rooy, 2013, p. 2). Within a forensic context, all witnesses can 
be suggestible (Davies & Westcott, 2006). There are two forms of suggestibility that can 
impact eyewitness memory: interrogative and investigative. Whilst interrogative 
suggestibility arises when the individual is exposed to coercive questioning under 
interrogative pressure, investigative suggestibility occurs when the individual is incidentally 
exposed to false information about a past event (Ridley et al., 2013). At cross-examination, 
a witness is subjected to interrogative suggestibility which is “the extent to which, within a 
closed social interaction, people come to accept messages communicated during formal 
questioning, as the result of which their subsequent behavioural response is affected” 
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(Gudjonsson & Clark, 1986, p. 86). It is also important to make the distinction between 
immediate and delayed suggestibility. Immediate suggestibility is the “immediate 
acceptance of misleading information contained in a leading question” (Ridley et al., 2013, 
p. 86) whereas delayed suggestibility is “exposure to misleading information that is 
incorrectly reported in a subsequent test” (Ridley et al., 2013, p. 86).   
1.8.2. Misinformation Effect 
A well-known experimental paradigm in eyewitness memory research concerning 
suggestibility is the misinformation effect which is the idea that misleading post-event 
information presented during formal questioning is capable of contaminating eyewitness 
memory and thus the accuracy of memory recall (Loftus, 1975). The standard procedure in 
research for investigating the misinformation effect involves the witness being exposed to 
a crime event and then being questioned about the event in either a neutral way (in which 
no misleading questions are used) or a suggestive way (in which misleading questions are 
used) before their memory of the event is tested (Ridley et al., 2013). Research examining 
both immediate and delayed suggestibility has shown that misleading questions can 
significantly impair memory with witnesses often recalling details that represent the 
misinformation rather than the details of the actual event (e.g., Ayers & Reder, 1998; 
Jaschinski & Wentura, 2002; Zaragoza, Belli, & Payment, 2007). Research suggests that 
witnesses are more likely to integrate misleading information into their own testimony 
when, for example, the information is being provided by a credible expert (Williamson, 
Weber, & Robertson, 2013) or when the cost of disagreeing is high (Wright, Memon, 
Skagerberg, & Gabbert, 2009). Further research has shown that misleading information 
effects are more profound in vulnerable persons, such as those with ID and child 
eyewitnesses (e.g., Gudjonsson & Henry, 2003; Kebbell, Hatton, & Johnson, 2004; Ridley, 
Clifford, & Keogh, 2002).  
The findings of previous studies with vulnerable groups are particularly relevant to the 
current thesis as it may be that vulnerable witnesses with a mental health problem also 
suffer the consequences of misleading information to a greater degree than typical 
witnesses. Whilst there has been some effort to explore the effect of misleading 
information on mental health, the literature is limited and the findings are mixed. Ridley 
(2003), for example, found an overall effect of misleading post-event information with 
misinformed groups being more suggestible than their counterparts. Yet, anxiety 
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moderated this effect with high state anxiety being associated with reductions in 
suggestibility, indicating that state anxiety may protect against misinformation. In contrast, 
trait anxiety was associated with higher levels of suggestibility (Ridley, 2003). Ridley and 
Clifford (2004) looked at state anxiety only and provide support for the diminished effect of 
state anxiety on suggestibility. Within the misinformed group, those who were exposed to 
state anxiety were less affected by misleading questions (Ridley & Clifford, 2004). Whilst 
such studies have revealed some interesting results, it is difficult to generalise the findings 
to trait anxiety as this differs quite considerably from state anxiety. As previous research 
has shown, trait anxiety in fact elicits higher levels of suggestibility (Ridley, 2003) which is in 
line with other studies demonstrating that misleading post-event information can 
contaminate memory to a greater degree in vulnerable persons (e.g., Gudjonsson & Henry, 
2003; Kebbell et al., 2004; Ridley et al., 2002). However, literature on the effects of 
misinformation on anxiety is limited and non-existent regarding depression hence the need 
for further research.   
1.8.3. Psychological Theories of Memory relating to Cross-Examination  
There are two further psychological theories of memory that are fundamental to 
cross-examination. The trace decay theory of memory defines forgetting as the result of 
the automatic decay or fading of the memory trace and argues that memory accuracy is 
determined by the length of time between learning and recall rather than the influence of 
events that have taken place in between (Henderson, 2005). This theory has been tested in 
an eyewitness capacity with vulnerable groups. Henry and Gudjonsson (2004) were 
interested in whether the manipulation of memory trace strength in children with and 
without mild and moderate ID benefited those with ID to a greater degree than those 
without ID on an eyewitness memory task. It was revealed that the performance of those 
with ID was not enhanced in the stronger trace strength condition with open-ended recall; 
however, performance was significantly improved in this condition when closed misleading 
questions were used (Henry & Gudjonsson, 2004) which are typically employed at cross-
examination. The cross-examination of a witness often takes place several months after 
their evidence has been gathered at interview (Rossetti, 2015) and consequently it is likely 
that their memory trace of the event will have naturally decayed. In contrast, the 
interference theory of memory defines forgetting as the result of certain traces interfering 
with the retrieval of others, causing the memory trace to be no longer accessible 
(Henderson, 2005). This may be ‘proactive’ when old information interferes with the 
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learning of new information, or ‘retroactive’ when new information prevents the 
remembering of old information (Henderson, 2005). Within an eyewitness capacity, there is 
a risk of interference occurring between witnessing an event and being questioned at 
cross-examination as new information that has entered the memory system since the 
event may interfere with the old memory trace of the event (retroactive interference). 
Both theories are pertinent to this thesis as the mock cross-examinations will be conducted 
several months after the evidence gathering stage and therefore interference and trace 
decay may play a role.  
1.8.4. Cross-Examination of Vulnerable Witnesses  
With regard to vulnerability and its relation to cross-examination, research has 
shown that cross-examining vulnerable groups can significantly influence the consistency of 
their evidence. Zajac, Gross, and Hayne (2003), for example, found that 75% of the children 
in their study, who were crucial witnesses in sexual abuse cases, altered at least one aspect 
of their account at cross-examination. In fact, a number of the children withdrew 
allegations of abuse entirely (Zajac et al., 2003). Furthermore, Turtle and Wells (1988) 
cross-examined a group of eight to twelve-year olds and every child provided a less 
accurate account at cross-examination compared to the initial interview. However, it has 
since been argued that the delay between initial interview and cross-examination did not 
represent the average delay in real court proceedings (Bettenay et al., 2014). 
Consequently, Bettenay et al. (2014) assessed how children with a range of cognitive 
abilities fared during a mock cross-examination using a representative delay of ten months. 
They found that 98% of all children altered at least one response from their initial interview 
when challenged. However, when age and memory for event details were controlled for, 
group differences in performance (recorded by total number of changed responses and 
‘resistance’ to challenges) were not significant, suggesting that children with and without 
ID do not significantly differ in performance at cross-examination. Furthermore, it has been 
shown that the use of coercive questioning strategies by advocates at court can have a 
detrimental impact on the testimonies of individuals with learning disabilities (e.g., Kebbell, 
Hatton, Johnson, & O’Kelly, 2001). Indeed, this is supported by psychological research that 
has revealed that closed leading questions have the potential to be particularly influential 
for such individuals (e.g., Clare & Gudjonsson, 1993; Kebbell & Hatton, 1999). Additional 
research has revealed that witnesses with ID are more likely to agree with a leading 
question than typical witnesses (Kebbell et al., 2004) and elderly adults are significantly less 
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accurate than younger adults in response to cross-examination style questioning about a 
videotaped crime (e.g., Brimacombe, Jung, Garrioch, & Allison, 2003). However, the effects 
of cross-examination on mental health have not been explored.   
Given that the studies outlined above clearly indicate that the cross-examination of 
vulnerable witnesses significantly influences the accuracy of their evidence, one may argue 
that the memory accuracy of witnesses with a mental health problem may also be impaired 
in a similar way. Yet, there is no research to date that has looked at mental health which, 
given previous findings with other vulnerable groups, is a concern. Consequently, this thesis 
will explore the effects associated with cross-examining witnesses with a sub-clinical 
mental health problem and whether the use of leading and misleading questions at cross-
examination reveals an effect of suggestibility. The literature would suggest that those with 
a mental health problem may be more likely to cede to cross-examination style questioning 
(i.e., accept that they are wrong about their original evidence). 
1.9. Perceptions of Vulnerable Witnesses 
An area of research relevant to this thesis that has received interest, particularly in 
recent years, is perceptions of vulnerable witnesses. A large body of research has looked at 
juror perceptions with respect to witness testimony and suggests that mock jurors perceive 
those with a vulnerability to be less credible than typical witnesses (e.g., Allison, 
Brimacombe, Hunter, & Kadlec, 2006; Bruer & Pozzulo, 2012; Henry, Ridley, Perry, & Crane, 
2011). Research has also examined legal professionals’ perceptions albeit to a lesser extent 
(e.g., Reavey, Wilcock, Brown, Batty, & Fuller, 2016). The findings of such studies will be 
discussed below.  
1.9.1. Perceptions of Jurors 
Within the literature, jurors’ perceived credibility of witness testimony has been 
explored with a number of vulnerable groups; one being children. Overall, research has 
shown that adult witnesses are perceived with more integrity than child witnesses (e.g., 
Bruer & Pozzulo, 2012; Newcombe & Bransgrove, 2007; Pozzulo & Dempsey, 2009) and 
children with ID are perceived with less credibility than typically developing children (e.g., 
Henry et al., 2011; Peled, Iarocci, & Connolly, 2004). Peled et al. (2004) found that the mere 
knowledge of a child witness having an ID can bias jurors’ perceptions of the credibility of 
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their testimony, regardless of the quality of their witness statement. This finding 
demonstrates that pre-existing biases or stereotypes can influence how jurors perceive 
witness credibility and this is an important finding as jurors in real-life may or may not be 
aware that a witness has a vulnerability when asked to evaluate their evidence. However, 
the mock jurors in the study just described did not represent the range of individuals who 
are likely to be called for jury service in the UK as they were all students. As a result, Henry 
et al. (2011) conducted a similar study using a more representative sample. Again, it was 
found that mock jurors perceived the testimonies of children with an ID to be less credible 
than typically developing children. Yet, research conducted on adults with an ID has shown 
that mock jurors perceive them to be fundamentally credible, although they are reluctant 
to rely on their evidence (Stobbs & Kebbell, 2003). Further research with elderly adults has 
revealed that they are perceived as being less believable (Allison et al., 2006) and less 
competent but more honest (Kwong See, Hoffman, & Wood, 2001) than their younger 
counterparts. 
The literature on juror perceptions of witnesses with a mental health problem is non-
existent hence the inclusion of a juror perception study in this thesis. The current research 
on generic perceptions of mental health may suggest that jurors are likely to view 
vulnerable witnesses with a mental health problem differently to witnesses without a 
mental health problem. In the UK, there is a strong social stigma attached to mental health 
with approximately nine out of ten people with a mental health problem experiencing 
stigma in their lives (Corker et al., 2016). It seems that such individuals experience 
discrimination due to society having stereotypical views about mental health and how it 
affects people (Mental Health Foundation, 2019c). Research has shown that individuals 
with a mental health problem are perceived to be unpredictable and difficult to 
communicate with (e.g., Crisp, Gelder, Rix, Meltzer, & Rowlands, 2000) and such beliefs are 
held by a wide range of people within society, regardless of whether they have knowledge 
and experience of mental health or know a person with a mental health problem (Crisp et 
al., 2000). In light of such research, as well as previous findings with other vulnerable 
groups, it would seem likely that jury eligible individuals who are members of society will 
hold stigmatised views of witnesses with a mental health problem and thus their 




1.9.2. Perceptions of Legal Professionals 
On reviewing the available literature regarding legal professionals’ perceptions of 
vulnerability, it is apparent that the body of research is small and further work is required. 
It seems that the majority of the research has examined the attitudes towards and 
perceptions of suspects rather than witnesses (e.g., Teplin & Pruett, 1992). However, there 
is some literature that has looked at how professionals involved with the legal system 
evaluate child witnesses with research revealing that police officers and psychiatrists have 
more belief in their capacities than judges, psychologists, prosecutors, and defense lawyers 
(e.g., Melinder, Goodman, Eilertsen, & Magnussen, 2004). Further research exploring child 
abuse cases has revealed that judges and police officers believe that children are capable of 
remembering and reporting details about the event but are prevented from doing so by 
emotional factors (e.g., Leander, Christianson, Svedin, & Granhag, 2007). Additionally, 
research has shown that over 50% of police officers perceive elderly adults as less accurate 
witnesses than younger adults (e.g., Wright & Holliday, 2005). It seems that elderly 
witnesses are perceived positively in cases that place emphasis on honesty but negatively 
when their ability to remember is accentuated (e.g., Kwong See et al., 2001). With regard 
to legal professionals’ perceptions of mental health, the literature is limited. The findings of 
one study revealed that police officers perceive witnesses with a mental health disorder to 
be inherently less credible than those without a mental health disorder (Watson, Corrigan, 
& Ottati, 2004) and the findings of a more recent study found that professionals encounter 
difficulties in identifying witnesses with a mental health problem, unless the witness 
displays profound signs of mental distress (Reavey et al., 2016). This could be attributable 
to professionals not having sufficient knowledge of mental health or that the knowledge 
they do have derives mainly from media sources or their own intuition which cannot be 
easily measured (Reavey et al., 2016).  
At present, the literature surrounding jurors’ perceptions of mental health is non-existent 
and there is very little literature upon which to draw in order to understand the 
perceptions of legal professionals. As there is a large deficiency in knowledge regarding 
eyewitness memory of typical witnesses amongst jurors and legal professionals (Benton, 
Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas, & Bradshaw, 2005), one may argue that their knowledge of 
vulnerable eyewitness memory may be even less given that there is very little literature on 
vulnerable eyewitness memory capabilities. As a considerable percentage of witnesses who 
produce statements are deemed vulnerable (Smith & Tilney, 2007) and mental health 
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problems are so prevalent (Mental Health Foundation, 2019a), the likelihood of legal 
professionals and jurors being exposed to such witnesses is high. It is vital therefore that 
their attitudes and perceptions are better understood.  
This thesis will initially explore how mental health is perceived by legal professionals 
working at various stages of the criminal justice process. It will then examine the 
eyewitness capabilities of witnesses with a sub-clinical mental health problem at interview, 
on identification lineups, and at cross-examination. Finally, it will explore how they are 

















Study 1: Legal Professionals’ Perceptions of Eyewitnesses with Anxiety and Depression 
Abstract  
In the UK, witnesses with a mental health disorder are considered to be ‘vulnerable’ by the 
Criminal Justice System and consequently a number of measures have been put in place to 
support such individuals during the legal process. However, it is not clear how mental 
health, anxiety and depression specifically, impact the accuracy and credibility of witness 
evidence. This study aimed to explore how legal professionals working at different stages of 
the legal process in England and Wales perceive witnesses with these mental health 
disorders, and their evidence. One hundred and thirteen legal professionals including; 
police officers, barristers, judges, registered intermediaries, solicitor-advocates, and a 
group labelled ‘other’ completed an online questionnaire which examined their personal 
perceptions of and attitudes towards vulnerable witnesses with anxiety and depression as 
well as their experiences of working with such witnesses. The findings revealed the extent 
to which professionals come into contact with witnesses with anxiety and depression, the 
interview procedures used with such witnesses, their perceptions of the Achieving Best 
Evidence guidance, their level of exposure to support and training, their level of knowledge 
about mental health, and whether changes should be made to ensure that the legal 
process is appropriate for witnesses with anxiety and depression. The implications of these 
findings are discussed.   
2.1. Introduction 
As outlined in Chapter 1, mental health is a growing public health concern (Mental 
Health Foundation, 2019a) and as a consequence many individuals with a mental health 
disorder come into contact with the CJS (Prison Reform Trust and Rethink Mental Illness, 
2013). This suggests that the frequency of contact between legal professionals and 
witnesses with a mental health disorder is likely to be significant. As previously discussed, 
the ABE guidance considers such witnesses to be ‘vulnerable’ within the judicial system 
(Ministry of Justice, 2011); however, due to the fact that research on their capabilities as 
eyewitnesses is non-existent, professionals working closely with this group have limited 
knowledge of their ability to provide accurate and reliable witness testimonies (Reavey et 
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al., 2016). The present study focuses on anxiety and depression; two of the most prevalent 
mental health disorders (Mental Health Foundation, 2019b).  
Before research can be conducted on the potential impact of anxiety and depression on 
witness accuracy, it is critical that an in-depth exploration of the perceptions of legal 
professionals is performed in order to gain further insight into how witnesses with a mental 
health disorder are regarded within the CJS. Due to a lack of robust evidence on the 
capabilities of such witnesses, it is possible that professionals working closely with this 
group view them and/or their evidence with bias. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 
outlines that witnesses with a mental health disorder have the same right to access to 
justice as any other witness and prosecutors should make their decisions free from 
assumptions or stereotypes (Crown Prosecution Service, 2009). Presently, however, it is 
unclear whether the attitudes and perceptions of professionals are impartial. Furthermore, 
as mentioned in Chapter 1, the ABE guidance advises a number of measures to protect 
vulnerable witnesses when giving evidence (Ministry of Justice, 2011), yet little is known 
about the awareness and effectiveness of these measures with regard to their use in 
current practice in relation to mental health.   
Within the literature, there has been some effort to explore CJS professionals’ perceptions 
of vulnerable witnesses. Watson et al. (2004) revealed that police officers perceive 
witnesses with a mental health disorder to be less credible than witnesses without a 
mental health disorder. This study, however, only looked at schizophrenia, restricting the 
extent to which its findings can be applied to anxiety and depression. Furthermore, the 
limited literature has tended to focus solely on police officers and overlooked other CJS 
professions. Given that most witnesses come into contact with a range of professionals 
during the investigative process, it is important that the perceptions of all professionals are 
understood. Additionally, the majority of the current research focuses on perceptions of 
the suspect rather than the witness. For example, Teplin and Pruett (1992) examined police 
handling of suspects with a mental health disorder and the decision-making framework 
used to manage vulnerable suspects within the community. Again though, the extent to 
which findings of studies involving suspects can be extended to witnesses is restricted as 
suspects and witnesses are likely to have diverse experiences and behave differently within 
an investigation. As well as enhancing our knowledge of the attitudes and perceptions of 
legal professionals, it is also important to understand the level and effectiveness of current 
training regarding mental health. Although previous research suggests that police officers 
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do not receive adequate training and information about mental health in some countries 
such as Greece (e.g., Psarra et al., 2008), evidence relating to this issue is limited with 
regard to policing in England and Wales. Consequently, further investigation is required 
with professionals working at all stages of the legal process in England and Wales.  
In terms of recent research regarding perceptions of mental health, the most relevant 
piece of research to date in England was conducted by Reavey et al. (2016). In their study, 
legal professionals including; police officers, judges, magistrates, and detectives took part 
in a semi-structured interview and their knowledge and experience of working with 
witnesses with a mental health disorder was explored. Their findings highlighted that such 
professionals were not equipped with adequate knowledge about mental health and how 
to deal with mental health disorders, particularly with regard to the production of witness 
statements. It was revealed that the level of knowledge was too basic and professionals 
were reluctant to address mental health concerns because they preferred to be personally 
and socially detached from the issue. Not knowing how to engage with mental health 
issues was a concern for a number of professionals in relation to obtaining accurate and 
reliable witness evidence (Reavey et al., 2016). Although Reavey and colleagues focused on 
perceptions of the witness, their research used semi-structured interviews and data were 
collected from a total of 20 participants. Whilst the purpose of a qualitative study is not 
usually to reach a large sample size, the present study nevertheless extends the findings of 
Reavey at al. (2016) through the use of an online questionnaire as this method allows for a 
larger and more representative sample. The main aim of the present study was to obtain a 
rich body of material on the perceptions, attitudes, and experiences of legal professionals 
working within various roles and at different stages of the CJS, e.g., police officers, 
barristers, judges, solicitor-advocates, and registered intermediaries. Registered 
intermediaries play an important role within the justice system as they support two-way 
communication between vulnerable adults and those professionals involved at the 
investigation and trial stages of a case (The Advocate’s Gateway, 2019). The present study 
explored how often professionals come into contact with witnesses with anxiety and 
depression, whether they consider evidence provided by such individuals to be accurate 
and reliable, and how effective they believe the current measures to be in protecting 
vulnerable witnesses with a mental health disorder. In order to ensure that information 
was gathered from a variety of perspectives operating across a wide range of legal 
activities, data were obtained from police officers, barristers, judges, solicitor-advocates, 
and registered intermediaries. There was an additional group labelled ‘other’ consisting of 
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various other legal roles such as Paralegal Assistants and Police Community Support 
Officers (PCSOs).      
2.1.1. The Present Study 
Based on previous literature that has explored the perceptions of legal 
professionals, it was expected that the professionals completing the questionnaire in this 
study would hold biased perceptions of vulnerable witnesses with anxiety and depression 
in terms of how they perceive the accuracy and reliability of their evidence. As there is 
currently a lack of research on the eyewitness capabilities of such witnesses, it was 
hypothesised that professionals would report not having sufficient knowledge of mental 
health and its implications for witnesses.  
2.2. Method  
2.2.1. Design 
An online questionnaire consisting of 61 questions was conducted over a ten-
month period between July 2016 and April 2017 in England and Wales.  
2.2.2. Participants 
A total of 113 legal professionals completed the questionnaire on a voluntary basis 
(53 female, 60 male; minimum age range = 18-24; maximum age range = 55-60). The age 
ranges and number of participants in each range were: 18-24 (1), 25-34 (31), 35-44 (35), 
45-54 (30), and 55-60 (16). The sample size was considered by looking at the one published 
study that has looked at mental health and a range of legal professions (Reavey et al., 
2016) which used a sample size of 20 for a more qualitatively based study. Participants 
were recruited via e-mail, telephone, or social media from five police forces and one police 
organisation (Hampshire Constabulary, Leicestershire Police, West Midlands Police, Kent 
Police, Avon and Somerset Police, and the College of Policing), law firms, criminal courts, 
and professional organisations located across England and Wales. There were 32 police 
officers (8 female, 24 male), 32 barristers (16 female, 16 male), 6 judges (all male), 22 
solicitor-advocates (12 female, 10 male), and 13 registered intermediaries (12 female, 1 
male). During data analysis, a further group emerged labelled ‘other’ which comprised: 
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Crown Advocates (2), Paralegal Assistants (2), PCSOs (2), Police Staff member (1), and 
Witness Care Officer (1) (5 female, 3 male).  
Police Officers. The group labelled ‘police officers’ comprised: Police Constables (18), 
Detective Constables (11), and Detective Sergeants (3). The officers worked in the following 
areas of policing: Uniform General Patrol (13), General CID (4), Public Protection (4), Child 
Abuse Investigation (3), Crime Prevention and Problem Solving (1), Major Crime (4), Priority 
Crime (1), Serious Crime (1), and Specialist Operations (1).  
Barristers, Judges, and Solicitor-Advocates. The barristers, judges, and solicitor-advocates 
worked in the following areas of practice: Crime (33), Personal Injury/Clinical Negligence 
(6), Family (14), Employment (3), Civil (1), Housing (1), Planning and Environment (1), 
Commercial (1), Education Law (1), Immigration (1), and Regulatory (1). Some worked in 
multiple areas of practice.  
2.2.3. Materials 
Online Questionnaire. Data were collected using a web-based software (Qualtrics). 
The questionnaire was based on previous research (Crossland, Kneller, & Wilcock, 2018) 
and practitioner feedback from a police officer, barrister, and registered intermediary to 
ensure that the questions were clear and appropriate. These individuals did not complete 
the questionnaire. It comprised a total of 61 close-ended and scaled-response questions 
measuring personal perceptions, attitudes, and experiences (see Appendix A). Close-ended 
questions allowed specific information to be obtained quickly and efficiently, and the 
majority of the questions were presented in this form. Scaled-response questions 
measured the intensity of attitudes towards vulnerable witnesses with a mental health 
disorder. The questions were presented in the same sequence for all participants; however, 
some questions were omitted depending upon the individual participant as these items 
were irrelevant for certain professions. Additionally, the number of questions varied 
between participants as some items were dependent upon the responses given to previous 






Ethics. The present study was approved by the University of Winchester Ethics 
Committee. In order to ensure that participants did not consider themselves to be under 
duress, they were informed at the beginning that they had the right to withdraw from the 
study within 14 days with no adverse consequences (see Appendix A). If a participant 
wished to withdraw, they were assigned a unique four-digit identification code that acted 
as an identifier and this was to be used to anonymously remove their data from the study; 
however, this was never found to be the case. It was ensured that no names were attached 
to the data and only the researchers directly involved in the study had access to the data. 
Participant details were coded and no identifiable personal information was stored. 
Completion of Questionnaire. The questionnaire took approximately 15-20 minutes to 
complete and followed a simple procedure for responding. At the beginning, participants 
were provided with information about the study in a clear and appropriate form (see 
Appendix A). If they were happy to take part, they were asked to give informed consent 
(see Appendix A). Initially, they provided demographic details such as age and gender. They 
were then asked questions about 1) length of time in profession in terms of number of 
years, 2) contact and experience in terms of how often they came into contact with and 
experienced situations involving witnesses with anxiety and depression, 3) witness 
capabilities in terms of their perceptions of how competent such witnesses were of 
providing accurate evidence, 4) interview procedures in terms of how such witnesses were 
interviewed and whether they felt the procedures were appropriate, 5) ABE guidance in 
terms of the appropriateness and suitability of particular aspects such as special measures, 
6) support and training in terms of their level of training regarding mental health and how 
they perceived such training, 7) knowledge in terms of their level of understanding of 
mental health, 8) legal process in terms of whether they felt the process could be improved 
for vulnerable witnesses, and 9) witness demographics in terms of their perceptions of the 
demographic makeup of witnesses with anxiety and depression. Participants were 
debriefed at the end of the questionnaire (see Appendix A) and provided with the 





2.3. Results  
Due to different sized groups of participants, group responses are displayed in 
percentages.  
2.3.1. Length of Time in Profession 
Initially, participants were asked how many years they had worked within their 
profession. The time period with the largest percentage of participants in each group was 
13 to 16 years for police officers, more than 20 years for barristers, judges, and solicitor-
advocates, 1 to 4 years for registered intermediaries, and 9 to 12 years for the group 
labelled ‘other’ (see figure 2.1).  
 
Figure 2.1. Number of years in profession 
2.3.2. Contact and Experience 
Participants were then asked how often they came into contact with witnesses 
with anxiety (see figure 2.2) and depression (see figure 2.3) within a typical month. The 
results show that most groups interacted with both anxious and depressed witnesses 
often. Witnesses with anxiety were encountered more frequently compared to witnesses 








Figure 2.3.  Frequency of contact with witnesses with depression 
 
Participants were also asked how easy/difficult it was to identify witnesses with anxiety 
(see figure 2.4) and depression (see figure 2.5). On the whole, participants in all groups 





Figure 2.4. Ease of identifying anxiety  
 
 
Figure 2.5.  Ease of identifying depression  
When asked if there were occasions when they suspected that a witness had a mental 
health disorder even if they had not been informed of a formal diagnosis, 94% of police 
officers, 97% of barristers, 100% of judges, 95% of solicitor-advocates, 100% of registered 
intermediaries, and 88% of the group labelled ‘other’ reported yes.  
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When asked how often they suspected that a witness experienced a mental health 
disorder, the most common response by all groups was sometimes (see figure 2.6). Very 
seldom did any group say rarely with only 3% of police officers, 6% of barristers, and 10% of 
solicitor-advocates.  
 
Figure 2.6.  Frequency of suspected mental health cases 
2.3.3. Witness Capabilities 
Subsequently, participants were asked about their perceptions of the capabilities of 
witnesses with anxiety (see figure 2.7) and depression (see figure 2.8). When asked how 
capable they thought such witnesses were of providing evidence when no additional 
support was available, the most common response by most groups for both disorders was 
moderately capable or slightly capable. For anxiety, 6% of police officers, 5% of solicitor-
advocates, and 23% of registered intermediaries stated not capable at all. However, only 





Figure 2.7.  Perceived capabilities of witnesses with anxiety  
 
 
Figure 2.8.  Perceived capabilities of witnesses with depression  
 
Participants were also asked about the accuracy of evidence given by witnesses with 
anxiety (see figure 2.9) and depression (see figure 2.10). For both disorders, the majority of 
groups most commonly reported not knowing. In general, the pattern of results was similar 
for both cases with all groups reporting moderately accurate and slightly accurate. 
However, 9% of solicitor-advocates reported evidence provided by anxious witnesses to be 




Figure 2.9.  Perceived accuracy of evidence provided by witnesses with anxiety 
 
 
Figure 2.10.  Perceived accuracy of evidence provided by witnesses with depression  
 
Participants were then asked how able witnesses with anxiety and depression were of 
giving evidence in court with no additional support (see figures 2.11 and 2.12). For both 
disorders, the most common response was moderately able by barristers, judges, and 
solicitor-advocates, slightly able by police officers, and I don’t know by the group labelled 
‘other’. 50% of registered intermediaries reported slightly able and 50% did not know. 3% 
of police officers, 5% of solicitor-advocates, and 23% of registered intermediaries reported 
that anxious witnesses were not able at all but only 3% of police officers and 15% of 




Figure 2.11.  Perceived ability of witnesses with anxiety to provide evidence  
 
 
Figure 2.12.  Perceived ability of witnesses with depression to provide evidence  
 
Additionally, participants were asked how it was decided that a witness with anxiety or 
depression was sufficiently competent to give evidence through the use of an open-ended 
question. The following responses were given: assessment by professionals (44%), 
assessment by expert witness (4%), use of test of competence (8%), use of medical 
assessments (19%), witness’s own decision (5%), all witnesses should be considered 




Participants were also asked about witness credibility and the results were fairly similar for 
both anxiety and depression (see figures 2.13 and 2.14). In general, all groups reported 
anxious and depressed witnesses to be credible but the degree of credibility varied. 
Barristers were the only group to report not credible at all for both disorders (3%).  
 
Figure 2.13.  Perceived credibility of witnesses with anxiety  
 
Figure 2.14.  Perceived credibility of witnesses with depression  
 
Participants were then asked whether prior knowledge of a witness’s mental health 
disorder influenced how they perceived their evidence. The responses were fairly evenly 
spread across yes and no responses. 44% of police officers, 53% of barristers, 50% of 
judges, 41% of solicitor-advocates, 38% of registered intermediaries, and 50% of the group 
labelled ‘other’ reported yes, and 14% of solicitor-advocates and 15% of registered 
intermediaries stated I don’t know. Those who answered yes were subsequently asked how 
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prior knowledge influenced their perceptions through the use of an open-ended question. 
The following responses were given: allows decisions to be made as to whether a witness is 
capable of giving evidence (15%), provides insight into witness’s behaviour (17%), provides 
insight into witness’s cognitive functioning (19%), allows greater understanding of the 
needs of a witness (17%), and causes one to question evidence reliability (32%).  
 
Furthermore, participants were asked how often cases involving a witness with anxiety or 
depression progressed to court if there was no other evidence (see figure 2.15). The most 
widely held response by police officers, registered intermediaries, and the group labelled 
‘other’ was I don’t know. However, barristers most commonly reported often whilst 
solicitor-advocates most commonly reported often and I don’t know. Judges’ responses 
were evenly spread between sometimes, often and I don’t know.  
 
Figure 2.15.  Frequency of mental health cases reaching court  
 
The questionnaire also explored juror perceptions. Participants were asked to what extent 
they thought jurors found a witness with anxiety or depression to be credible (see figure 
2.16). The most widely held response by most groups was I don’t know. However, solicitor-
advocates most commonly reported moderately credible. 9% of police officers, 13% of 
barristers, 17% of judges, and 9% of solicitor-advocates reported entirely credible and 6% of 





Figure 2.16.  Attitudes towards jurors’ perceptions of witness credibility  
 
Additionally, participants were asked to what extent they felt that prior knowledge of a 
witness’s mental health disorder influenced jurors’ decision making (see figure 2.17). Police 
officers, barristers, registered intermediaries, and the group labelled ‘other’ most 
commonly reported not knowing whilst the most common response by judges and 
solicitor-advocates was a moderate amount. Barristers were the only group to report not at 
all (3%).  
 






2.3.4. Interview Procedures 
Questions relating to interview procedures were answered only by police officers, 
solicitor-advocates, and registered intermediaries because these groups are involved with 
the interviewing of witnesses. Participants were asked whether the standard procedures 
for interviewing witnesses with anxiety and depression were the same as, or different 
from, the procedures used with typical witnesses with no mental health disorders (see 
figure 2.18). A comparison between interview procedures used with typical and vulnerable 
witnesses showed a larger percentage of participants in all groups reporting the procedures 
to be different.  
 
 
Figure 2.18.  Comparison between interview procedures used with typical and 
vulnerable witnesses 
 
Those who stated that the procedures were different were asked how they differed 
through the use of an open-ended question. The following responses were given: use of 
special measures in general (19%), presence of a registered intermediary (23%), additional 
breaks (4%), presence of an appropriate adult (17%), use of video-recorded interview (9%), 
changes to questioning style (11%), additional time allocated to witness (13%), and 




All participants were then asked how effective the standard interview procedures were at 
obtaining useful information from witnesses with anxiety and/or depression. All groups 
reported the procedures to be effective but to varying degrees with 10% of police officers 
and 40% of registered intermediaries stating that they did not know (see figure 2.19).  
 
 
Figure 2.19.  Perceived effectiveness of interview procedures used with witnesses with 
anxiety and/or depression  
 
When asked if they would make any changes to how witnesses with anxiety and/or 
depression were interviewed, 31% of police officers, 55% of solicitor-advocates, and 85% of 
registered intermediaries stated yes. With regard to how the interview procedures could be 
changed, the following responses were given: better use of ABE interview and special 
measures (7%), better questioning style (7%), better screening for mental health issues 
(5%), more rapport building (12%), allow more time for interview (17%), better mental 
health awareness training for professionals (29%), compulsory use of a registered 
intermediary (9%), interview to be conducted outside of police station environment (7%), 
and keep witness well informed of the process (7%).   
 
Subsequently, participants were asked how easy or difficult it was dealing with witnesses 
with anxiety and depression (see figures 2.20 and 2.21). The pattern of results is similar for 
both disorders in that the responses ranged from moderately difficult to moderately easy. 
However, 3% of police officers reported extremely difficult but for depression only. All 
63 
 
groups reported not knowing for depression but only police officers provided this response 
for anxiety.  
 
Figure 2.20.  Ease of dealing with witnesses with anxiety 
 
 
Figure 2.21.  Ease of dealing with witnesses with depression  
2.3.5. ABE Guidance 
In order to understand how the ABE guidance was regarded, all participants were 
asked how appropriate it was for eliciting evidence from witnesses with anxiety and/or 
depression (see figure 2.22). The most widely held response by the majority of groups was 
moderately appropriate except for police officers who most commonly reported extremely 
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appropriate and the group labelled ‘other’ who most commonly reported neither 
appropriate nor inappropriate, moderately appropriate, and extremely appropriate.  
 
Figure 2.22.  Perceived appropriateness of ABE guidance for witnesses with anxiety 
and/or depression  
 
Participants were also asked how effective special measures were at supporting witnesses 
with anxiety and/or depression to give their best evidence (see figure 2.23). The most 
widely held response across groups was moderately effective. However, police officers also 
reported very effective to the same degree.  
 
Figure 2.23.  Perceived effectiveness of special measures for witnesses with anxiety 




As shown in figure 2.24, the most effective special measure commonly reported by police 
officers and barristers was video-recorded interview. However, judges reported live link and 
screens, solicitor-advocates reported live link and video-recorded interview, registered 
intermediaries reported examination of the witness through an intermediary, and the 
group labelled ‘other’ reported screens, live link, and video-recorded interview.  
 
 
Figure 2.24.  Type(s) of special measures perceived to be most effective   
2.3.6. Support and Training 
In addition to special measures, participants were asked if there were other types 
of support for witnesses with anxiety and/or depression through the use of an open-ended 
question. The following responses were given: appropriate adult (5%), regular breaks 
(18%), supportive adult (family member/friend/support worker) (12%), pre-recorded cross-
examination (1%), pre-court familiarisation visits (22%), therapy dogs in courtroom (5%), 
witness care/support service (31%), and mental health professional (6%).  
 
Participants were then asked if they would like to make any changes to how witnesses with 
anxiety and/or depression were supported. 38% of police officers, 50% of barristers, 67% of 
judges, 59% of solicitor-advocates, 92% of registered intermediaries, and 38% of the group 
labelled ‘other’ stated yes. When asked how they would change the support for such 
witnesses, the following responses were given: better organisation of trial locations/dates 
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(10%), use of non-court setting for presentation of evidence (5%), better support services 
(20%), better identification of mental health disorder (5%), more appropriate questioning of 
witness (3%), better pre-trial visits (5%), better understanding of the issues surrounding 
mental health disorders (7%), reduce waiting times at court (5%), introduce witness to all 
advocates and court staff prior to giving evidence (4%), improve live-link technology (3%), 
better mental health training for legal professionals (20%), better communication between 
professionals (3%), pre-recorded evidence and cross-examination (7%), and more support 
from mental health specialists (3%).  
 
In terms of training, participants were asked if there was mental health awareness training 
within their profession for dealing with witnesses with anxiety and/or depression. 53% of 
police officers, 31% of barristers, 33% of judges, 36% of solicitor-advocates, 46% of 
registered intermediaries, and 25% of the group labelled ‘other’ stated yes with a further 
22% of police officers, 41% of barristers, 33% of judges, 27% of solicitor-advocates, 23% of 
registered intermediaries, and 50% of the group labelled ‘other’ not knowing.  
 
Those who were aware of such training were then asked if this training was mandatory and 
the responses varied across professions. 53% of police officers, 10% of barristers, and 50% 
of judges stated yes with 100% of participants in the remaining groups stating no. The only 
group to report I don’t know was police officers (18%).  
 
Additionally, 71% of police officers, 10% of barristers, 100% of judges, 63% of solicitor-
advocates, 83% of registered intermediaries, and 50% of the group labelled ‘other’ had 
completed this training. In terms of the effectiveness and relevance of training, all 
participants who had completed the training reported it to be effective and relevant (see 
figures 2.25 and 2.26). However, there were differing perceptions of the degree of its 





Figure 2.25.  Perceived effectiveness of mental health awareness training  
 
 
Figure 2.26.  Perceived relevance of mental health awareness training  
2.3.7. Knowledge 
Those who had received formal mental health training were asked if they had any 
additional knowledge about anxiety and/or depression. 50% of police officers, 100% of 
barristers, 100% of judges, 80% of solicitor-advocates, 80% of registered intermediaries, 
and 100% of the group labelled ‘other’ reported yes.  
Those who had not received formal training were asked if they had any knowledge about 
these specific disorders. 90% of police officers, 94% of barristers, 100% of judges, 94% of 
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solicitor-advocates, 100% of registered intermediaries, and 86% of the group labelled 
‘other’ reported yes.  
 
 
All participants with knowledge of anxiety and/or depression were subsequently asked 
about the source(s) from which they had received this knowledge (see figure 2.27). The 
most common response by all groups was professional experience.  
 
 
Figure 2.27.  Sources from which knowledge about anxiety and/or depression derived  
 
Participants were then asked to what extent this knowledge affected their perceptions of 
witnesses with anxiety and/or depression (see figure 2.28). All participants in all groups 
reported it to have impacted on their perceptions but to varying degrees.  
 
Figure 2.28.  Extent to which knowledge affected perceptions of witnesses with anxiety 
and/or depression  
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2.3.8. Legal Process 
Participants were asked if there was anything that they felt could be changed in the 
future in order to improve the legal process involving witnesses with anxiety and/or 
depression. 63% of police officers, 59% of barristers, 50% of judges, 68% of solicitor-
advocates, 85% of registered intermediaries, and 50% of the group labelled ‘other’ 
reported yes.  
 
 
When asked which aspects could be changed, the most common response by barristers, 
solicitor-advocates, and the group labelled ‘other’ was general training about mental 
health. However, police officers most commonly reported specific training relating to 
individual mental health conditions and general support for vulnerable witnesses. 
Registered intermediaries most commonly reported general training about mental health 




Figure 2.29.  Aspects of the legal process believed to need change 
 
Participants also had the option to select ‘other’ and the following responses were 
provided under this category: understanding of professionals, directions to a jury if issue is 
raised in court, disclosing mental health issue to judge and legal professionals, disclosing 
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mental health issue to jury, public awareness, better management of court dates and times, 
more funding, and changes to the adversarial nature of the criminal justice process.  
2.3.9. Witness Demographics 
Finally, participants were asked to describe the demographics that they felt were 
most likely to represent witnesses with anxiety and depression. These included: gender, 
age, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status. Overall, participants did not feel that anxiety or 
depression were more or less likely to be present in any particular gender, age, ethnic, or 
socioeconomic group.  
2.4. Discussion 
This is the first questionnaire study to explore how legal professionals in England 
and Wales perceive the evidence of vulnerable witnesses with anxiety and depression. The 
study explored the extent to which professionals come into contact with witnesses with 
anxiety and depression, the interview procedures used with such witnesses, their 
perceptions of the ABE guidance, their level of exposure to support and training, their level 
of knowledge about mental health, and whether changes should be made to ensure that 
the legal process is appropriate for witnesses with these disorders. The decision to collect 
data from five legal professions was based on the fact that the limited research exploring 
this issue previously has largely looked at police officers only (Watson et al., 2004) and 
disregarded other key professions that are also involved in the investigative process such as 
barristers, judges, solicitor-advocates, and registered intermediaries.  
The results of the present study revealed that, in a typical month, professionals in all 
groups came into contact with both witnesses with anxiety and witnesses with depression. 
The majority of responses ranged from sometimes to very often and this finding is in line 
with previous research which has found that police officers have greater contact with 
individuals with a mental health disorder due to more mental health related issues within 
the community (Lamb, Weinberger, & DeCuir Jr, 2002) and a rise in community living for 
individuals with mental health difficulties (Reavey et al., 2016). Additionally, research 
conducted in 2007 found that more than 50% of witnesses who provided statements were 
deemed vulnerable (Smith & Tilney, 2007) and this is likely to be even greater today for the 
reasons outlined above. It is somewhat unsurprising therefore that professionals in the 
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present study reported frequent interactions with witnesses with anxiety and depression. 
Interestingly, they reported interacting with anxious witnesses more frequently than 
depressed witnesses which is consistent with a further finding from this study that anxiety 
was found to be more common than depression.  
With regard to credibility, professionals on the whole perceived witnesses with anxiety and 
depression to be credible. This finding challenges previous literature which argues that 
individuals with a mental health disorder are perceived to be less credible (Watson et al., 
2004). However, previous studies have tended to look solely at police officers’ perceptions 
of witness credibility regarding mental health and so it is difficult to compare the findings 
to other professions. Nonetheless, when looking only at the police officers’ responses to 
the questions about credibility in the present study, over 65% of officers reported evidence 
from both groups of witnesses to be either entirely or moderately credible which 
contradicts previous findings that police officers perceive their testimonies to be 
untrustworthy. Previous research within this field has also focused on other disorders, such 
as schizophrenia (Watson et al., 2004), and the perceptions of suspects with a mental 
health disorder rather than witnesses (Teplin & Pruett, 1992). The findings of such studies 
cannot be matched to the findings of the present study because 1) mental health disorders 
vary considerably and so professionals may view witness evidence differently depending 
upon the witness’s particular disorder and 2) suspects and witnesses may be perceived 
entirely differently given that they have different roles within the legal process.   
Moreover, a large percentage of professionals in each group reported that prior knowledge 
of anxiety and depression, emanating mainly from professional experience, influenced their 
perceptions of witnesses with these disorders. There is a lack of research on this matter 
currently within the literature. However, this finding is important as professionals’ 
understanding of anxiety and depression may not be accurate and this could significantly 
affect how a witness’s evidence is perceived in terms of accuracy and reliability. Indeed, a 
further finding from this study suggests this to be the case. Professionals who believed that 
prior knowledge of a witness’s mental health disorder influenced how they perceived their 
evidence reported that this pre-existing knowledge caused them to question the reliability 
of the evidence. With regard to jury members, professionals in all groups believed that 
such knowledge also influenced how jury members perceived the witness’s evidence. This 
finding is in line to a certain degree with previous research that has revealed that jurors 
hold negative perceptions of witnesses with learning disabilities (e.g., Stobbs & Kebbell, 
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2003) and ID (e.g., Peled et al., 2004). Yet, a limitation of the present study is that the 
findings do not allow inferences to be made with regard to how jurors themselves actually 
perceive such witnesses hence the inclusion of a juror perception study in this thesis.  
Furthermore, it emerged from the study that more than 80% of professionals in all groups 
suspected that a witness had a mental health disorder even if they had not been informed 
of a formal diagnosis. This finding is to be expected to some extent as it appears from 
previous literature that a witness’s vulnerability may not be disclosed until later in the 
investigative process, if at all (Reavey et al., 2016), which may explain the reason for 
professionals making their own assumptions early on. This is, however, rather concerning 
as such perceptions could affect how the witness is supported during the investigative 
process. Such findings raise the question of whether further training is required to equip 
professionals with the knowledge and understanding of mental health. Past research has 
revealed that police officers often report that they do not receive enough training and 
information about mental health (e.g., Psarra et al., 2008) and police training is inadequate 
at preparing officers for managing mental health cases (e.g., Borum, 2000). The present 
study supports these findings to some extent as approximately 45% of professionals in each 
group did not know about mental health awareness training. Yet, this finding does not 
suggest that the training is unavailable as it may be that professionals are just not aware of 
the training that is available to them. In fact, of those who knew about the training, 50% or 
more in most groups had completed it and all of those who had received such training felt 
that it was effective and relevant, albeit to varying degrees. It is difficult to compare these 
findings to previous literature as the majority of the research to date has focused on 
training for front line staff only (e.g., Borum, 2000; Lamb et al., 2002; Wells & Schafer, 
2006). Interestingly though, police officers were the only group in the present study to 
report the training to be extremely effective which contradicts previous findings that 
training for police officers is inadequate (Borum, 2000). However, one may argue that there 
could be a sample issue with this study as the respondents to the questionnaire may have 
been more aware than others in their profession about mental health training.  
Nevertheless, according to 31% of police officers, 55% of solicitor-advocates, and 85% of 
registered intermediaries, changes need to be made to the ways in which witnesses with 
anxiety and depression are currently interviewed. It seems therefore that improvements 
need to be made to the investigative interviewing of witnesses with these specific 
disorders. It was revealed that mental health awareness training for interviewers in 
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particular requires improvement. However, the present study provides support for the ABE 
guidance which recommends a number of measures to protect vulnerable witnesses when 
giving evidence and ensure that they provide reliable and credible witness statements 
(Ministry of Justice, 2011). Overall, most groups regarded this guidance to be appropriate 
for witnesses with anxiety and depression, particularly police officers. In addition, the use 
of special measures as a way of supporting such witnesses was held in relatively high 
regard by most groups and again particularly by police officers. Yet, previous research has 
found that very few cases involving witnesses with a mental health disorder meet the 
requirements for the use of special measures which are rarely used in police interviews and 
court (Charles, 2012). It is possible therefore that the professionals in the present study 
had not been exposed to the use of these measures in practice on a regular basis at the 
time of completing the questionnaire and so the findings must be considered with this in 
mind. Interestingly, a considerable percentage of professionals in each group stated that 
they would make changes to the current support for witnesses with a mental health 
disorder which suggests that the support for such witnesses is not entirely appropriate or 
sufficient. Specifically, professionals expressed the need for better support services and 
better mental health training for legal professionals.  
To conclude, at least 50% of professionals in each group believed that changes need to be 
made in order to improve the legal process for vulnerable witnesses. A range of changes 
were put forward with the most common being general training about mental health, 
specific training relating to individual mental health conditions, and general support for 
vulnerable witnesses. It appears that mental health training is a key aspect of the 
investigative process requiring change, specifically within the context of interviewing. It is 
also clear that the current support for vulnerable witnesses is not satisfactory. However, 
before changes to the investigative process can be considered, additional research is 
required in order to explore the capabilities of witnesses with a mental health disorder so 
that we can identify their level of competency at providing accurate and reliable evidence. 
To date, there are no empirical studies exploring the specific psychological functioning in 
witnesses with a mental health disorder during the investigative process. It is vitally 
important that further eyewitness research is conducted with anxiety and depression 
specifically given that the findings of the present study have revealed a common 
occurrence of witnesses with these disorders. The necessity is even greater for anxiety as it 
has emerged that professionals encounter witnesses with this disorder more frequently, 
perhaps because anxiety is a more common disorder within the population (Stansfeld et al., 
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2016). Further research will enable us to equip professionals with informed knowledge and 
reduce as much as possible prejudiced beliefs that they may have about witnesses with 
anxiety and depression. Having access to robust knowledge will allow professionals to 
understand the needs of such witnesses and put the correct support in place for them, if 
required, at an appropriate stage of the investigation to allow them to give their best 
evidence. The findings of this study provide a clear and valid justification for the study in 
Chapter 4 exploring the eyewitness capabilities of witnesses with a mental health problem. 
The next chapter (Chapter 3) describes the process involved in classifying the witness’ 

























The aim of this chapter was to classify participants’ levels of anxiety and depression as well 
as measure their general memory functioning and degree of suggestibility. Fifty-seven 
adults completed a range of psychometric, memory, and suggestibility measures. The 
results of the psychometric measures revealed three separate groups: anxiety and 
depression, anxiety only, and typical (with neither anxiety nor depression). The results of 
the memory and suggestibility measures revealed no significant effect of group on either 
general memory functioning or levels of suggestibility. The implications of these findings 
are discussed.  
3.1. Introduction  
As the study in Chapter 4 is exploring the effects of anxiety and depression on 
witness memory and identification performance, psychometric measures were required in 
order to classify participants’ levels of anxiety and depression. The present chapter has 
been included as a distinct chapter in this thesis as it was considered important to clearly 
outline the procedures used to measure the participants’ levels of anxiety and depression 
prior to presenting the study in Chapter 4. Participants were allocated to the various 
conditions (anxiety, anxiety and depression, or typical) based on their scores on the anxiety 
and depression measures, and all testing was carried out individually. The anxiety measure 
consisted of two categories: presence of anxiety and absence of anxiety. The depression 
measure comprised four categories: minimal, mild, moderate, and severe depression. 
These will be explained in greater depth later. F-tests were conducted in order to confirm 
that there were differences in participants’ scores on these tests in each group. The results 
of these tests showed that the allocation of participants to the different groups based on 
anxiety and depression was successful, i.e., the manipulation had worked. The State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), Beck 
Depression Inventory-2 (BDI-2) (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), and Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-5 Disorders – Clinical Version (SCID-5-CV) (First, Williams, Karg, & 
Spitzer, 2016) were selected to classify the participants’ levels of anxiety and depression. In 
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addition, it was necessary to measure participants’ general memory functioning through 
standardised tests of memory. These included the Facial Memory (FM) and Memory for 
Stories (MFS) subtests of the Test of Memory and Learning – Second Edition (TOMAL-2; 
Reynolds & Voress, 2007). It was also necessary to test their level of suggestibility using the 
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale-2 (GSS-2) (Gudjonsson, 1997). The relevance of these 
measures will now be discussed in relation to this thesis.   
With regard to the STAI, this measure includes two subscales: State Anxiety Scale and Trait 
Anxiety Scale (Spielberger et al., 1983). The first (state) evaluates a person’s current state 
of anxiety using items that measure subjective feelings, such as apprehension and worry. 
The second (trait) evaluates relatively stable aspects of anxiety, such as general states of 
calmness, confidence, and security. The inventory comprises 40 items: 20 state items and 
20 trait items. Whilst there are other measures available to assess a person’s level of 
anxiety, such as the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) (Beck & Steer, 1993), these measures are 
less appropriate for the purpose of this thesis. The BAI, for example, has a limited capacity 
to measure a wide range of anxiety symptoms and consequently a number of key 
symptoms are overlooked (Julian, 2011). Also, and more importantly, this measure does 
not account for the distinction between state and trait anxiety. Given that this thesis is 
examining the accuracy of eyewitness memory in individuals with general anxiety 
symptoms that are relatively fixed and remain constant across most situations, rather than 
the temporary changes in their emotional state, it was important to distinguish between 
state and trait anxiety. The STAI has the capacity to make this distinction. The current thesis 
aims to explore whether individuals are more susceptible to memory distortions if they 
display this relatively stable personality trait, irrespective of the nature of the witnessed 
crime, and therefore an instrument that can measure trait anxiety in isolation was 
essential. It is important to acknowledge that the crime situation (state) may affect 
individuals with trait anxiety differently to those without trait anxiety. However, the 
likelihood of the event itself having an effect was reduced as much as possible as the crime 
shown to participants in this thesis was non-violent and shown on video. The STAI has been 
recognised for its high degree of validity (Spielberger, 1989) and widely used in various 
settings including eyewitness research (e.g., Krans, Näring, Speckens, & Becker, 2011; 
Ridley, 2003; Ridley et al., 2002). It is simple to administer and the process of scoring and 
interpreting the data is neither costly nor time-consuming (Julian, 2011). Furthermore, the 
STAI is used for both clinical and non-clinical levels of anxiety (Ridley, 2003) and it was 
therefore considered an appropriate measure for the population employed in this thesis 
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who did not have a clinical diagnosis of anxiety. The STAI includes mean scores for working 
adults and university students; the two populations from which the participants in the 
current thesis were employed. 
In terms of depression, there have been many attempts over the years to measure its 
symptoms and severity with different groups (e.g., Radloff, 1977; Zigmond & Snaith 1983). 
However, the BDI-2 (Beck et al., 1996) is one of the most widely recognised measures. It is 
a 21-item self-report instrument for measuring the severity of depression in adults and 
adolescents aged 13 years or older. It is a developed version of the original Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI) (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) which was recognised for 
its high internal consistency and high content validity (Richter, Werner, Heerlein, Kraus, & 
Sauer, 1998). The original version was also accepted for its effectiveness in distinguishing 
between depressed and non-depressed individuals (Richter et al., 1998) and has been used 
previously in eyewitness research (e.g., Ridley, 2003). It seemed therefore that the up-to-
date version (BDI-2; Beck et al., 1996) was an appropriate measure to use for the purpose 
of this thesis.  
In addition to the anxiety and depression measures described above, the SCID-5-CV (First et 
al., 2016) was used in this thesis to form a greater understanding of the participants’ 
psychological functioning. The SCID-5-CV served as an additional measure to support the 
symptom-related data obtained from the STAI and BDI-2, allowing the researcher to 
identify whether a participant had more profound symptoms than those identified on the 
initial anxiety and depression measures. This measure has been shown to provide valid and 
reliable diagnostics for many DSM-5 disorders (e.g., Lancaster, Teeters, Gros, & Back, 
2016). The clinical version was used in this thesis as it is a more condensed, streamlined 
form of the research version. Despite the ‘clinician’ designation, it could be used for the 
purpose of this thesis as anxiety and depression are amongst those included in the SCID-5-
CV (First et al., 2016). It was considered appropriate for use in the current research as it 
was personally recommended by a clinical psychologist with experience in both a clinical 
and research capacity.  
In order to measure participants’ general memory functioning, the TOMAL-2 (Reynolds & 
Voress, 2007) was administered which has been used previously in eyewitness research 
with vulnerable witnesses (e.g., Henry, Crane et al., 2017; Henry, Messer et al., 2017). The 
original Test of Memory and Learning (TOMAL; Reynolds & Bigler, 1994) was introduced to 
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provide professionals with a standardised measure of different memory functions for 
children and adolescents. The second edition was introduced to extend the age range to 
adults up to 59 years and consequently this version was used for the current research in 
which it was necessary to test the memory functioning of adults. The TOMAL-2 comprises a 
number of different subtests; however, two subtests were adopted for the purpose of this 
thesis which included Memory for Stories (MFS) and Facial Memory (FM) (Reynolds & 
Voress, 2007). The MFS subtest was selected as participants were asked to recall details 
about an event which could be seen to be comparable to recalling a story. Naturally, if not 
prompted otherwise, individuals recall information about an event like a story from 
beginning to end and so it was necessary to incorporate a baseline memory measure that 
assessed meaningful recall. This was a verbal test during which participants recalled aloud 
as much information about the story as they could to the researcher. The FM subtest was 
selected as participants were asked to identify a perpetrator from identification lineups and 
therefore a measure of their memory for faces was necessary. This nonverbal subtest 
assessed participants’ recognition and identification of faces from a set of distractors who 
were of various ages, both genders, and various ethnic backgrounds.  
The GSS-2 (Gudjonsson, 1997) was used to obtain a baseline measure of suggestibility by 
assessing the extent to which participants gave in to negative feedback and leading 
questions (interrogative pressure). The Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales (GSS) (Gudjonsson, 
1997) were designed for a wide range of groups including individuals with mental health 
problems (Gudjonsson, 1997). They have been used extensively in eyewitness research 
(e.g., Baxter & Boon, 2000; Compo et al., 2012; Liebman et al., 2002) including studies 
conducted with vulnerable groups (e.g., Gudjonsson & Henry, 2003; Henry & Gudjonsson, 
2003; Maras & Bowler, 2014; Ternes & Yuille, 2008). There are two scales (GSS-1 and GSS-
2) and the formats are identical in structure; each comprises a verbal narrative and 20 
questions about that narrative. Typically, only one of the scales is completed within the 
same session (Gudjonsson, 1997). The GSS-2 was selected for the purpose of the current 
research because it is a less complex narrative than that of the GSS-1 and consequently 
used more often in research involving vulnerable groups (e.g., Gudjonsson & Henry, 2003; 
Robinson & McGuire, 2006). The scale provides a measure of immediate memory recall, 
delayed memory recall, total confabulations, and total suggestibility. This test was relevant 
for thinking about participants’ cross-examination data in Chapter 5. The method by which 
the scores on this test are obtained is outlined in the method section of this chapter.   
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3.1.1. The Present Study 
The purpose of this chapter was to ascertain that participants with anxiety and/or 
depression obtain significantly different scores on the relevant measures to participants 
without such mental health problem(s). It was expected that 1) individuals with depression 
will obtain higher scores on the BDI-2 than their typical counterparts, 2) individuals with 
anxiety will obtain higher scores on the STAI than their typical counterparts, 3) individuals 
with both anxiety and depression will obtain higher scores on both the BDI-2 and STAI than 
their typical counterparts, and 4) individuals with anxiety and/or depression will obtain 
higher total suggestibility scores on the GSS-2 and lower scores on the FM and MFS 
subtests of the TOMAL-2 than their typical counterparts.     
3.2. Method  
3.2.1. Design 
The measures described above were all administered in study 2 of this thesis (see 
Chapter 4). Participants were administered the STAI, BDI-2, and SCID-5-CV in the initial 
statement taking stage of the study and the TOMAL-2 subtests and GSS-2 in the full 
investigative interview stage. The SCID-5-CV was administered to all participants regardless 
of their scores on the STAI and BDI-2. 
3.2.2. Participants 
A total of 57 participants (age range = 18-48, mean age = 23.42, SD = 7.29) 
comprising 48 females and 9 males completed the measures. All participants were 
recruited from the local community and the University of Winchester via e-mail, telephone, 
research participation scheme, or participant recruitment posters.  
3.2.3. Materials 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Spielberger et al., 1983). The STAI consists of 
two scales; one for state anxiety and one for trait anxiety (see Appendix B). The 
questionnaire is double-sided. One side is labelled ‘Y-1’ and measures state anxiety, and 
the other side is labelled ‘Y-2’ and measures trait anxiety. As per the instructions, Y-1 is 
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administered first when both scales are given together. This is because Y-1 was designed to 
be sensitive to the testing conditions and therefore scores on this scale may be affected by 
the emotional climate that may be generated if Y-2 is administered first (Spielberger et al., 
1983). Each scale comprises 20 items. The state anxiety scale includes items such as ‘I feel 
calm’ and ‘I feel at ease’, and participants rated the items on a 4-point scale from 1 (not at 
all) to 4 (very much so). The trait anxiety scale includes items such as ‘I feel satisfied with 
myself’ and ‘I lack self-confidence’, and participants rated the items on a 4-point scale from 
1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always). A rating of 4 indicated the presence of a high level of 
anxiety for ten of the state items and eleven of the trait items. For the remaining ten state 
items and nine trait items, the scored were reversed so a rating of 4 for these items 
indicated the absence of anxiety. An overall score of anxiety was obtained on each scale 
separately by summing the scores for the 20 items. The scores on the STAI range from 20 
(minimum) to 80 (maximum) (Spielberger et al., 1983). A score of 34.89 or above for males 
and 34.79 or above for females indicates the presence of trait anxiety.  
Beck Depression Inventory-2 (BDI-2) (Beck et al., 1996). The BDI-2 consists of 21 groups of 
statements relating to different factors contributing to depression, e.g., ‘sadness’ and ‘loss 
of pleasure’ (see Appendix C). Participants selected the statement in each group that best 
applied to them and circled the number next to the statement to indicate their choice. If 
several statements within a group applied to the same extent, participants were asked to 
select the statement with the highest number. Each item was rated on a 4-point scale 
ranging from 0 to 3 and the overall score was obtained by summing the ratings for the 21 
items. The scores on the BDI-2 range from 0 to 63 with scores of 0-13 representing minimal 
depression, 14-19 representing mild depression, 20-28 representing moderate depression, 
and 29-63 representing severe depression (Beck et al., 1996).  
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-5 Disorders – Clinical Version (SCID-5-CV) (First et al., 
2016). A condensed version of the SCID-5-CV was used for the purpose of this thesis (see 
Appendix D). The full interview includes sections relating to a large number of DSM-5 
disorders and consequently the majority of the questions were not relevant to anxiety and 
depression. Accordingly, specific sections were selected that related to anxiety disorders 
(e.g., ‘Current Generalized Anxiety Disorder’ and ‘Social Anxiety Disorder’) and depressive 
disorders (e.g., ‘Current Major Depressive Episode’ and ‘Current Mania’). If participants 
answered ‘no’ to certain questions, it was not necessary to ask any further questions within 
that section and participants were moved onto the next section. For example, if they 
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answered ‘no’ to having a current diagnosis of agoraphobia, they were then asked 
questions about social anxiety disorder (see Appendix D). The SCID-5-CV was included to 
support and provide further insight into the baseline measures of anxiety and depression 
(STAI and BDI-2), if necessary.  
Test of Memory and Learning-2 (TOMAL-2) (Reynolds & Voress, 2007). Two subtests of the 
TOMAL-2 were administered: Memory for Stories (MFS) and Facial Memory (FM) (see 
Appendix E). The MFS subtest comprises a total of six stories; however, each participant is 
administered two stories and these are selected based on their age. The age range of the 
participants in the current research was 18 to 48 so stories three and four were 
administered to those aged between 18 and 19 years and stories four and five were 
administered to those aged between 20 and 59 years. Participants’ recall for the first story 
was obtained immediately after listening to the story and the procedure was identical for 
the second story. The elements of the story did not have to be repeated in order and 
participants received one point for each element recalled correctly. The points received on 
both stories were summed to obtain a total raw score. The subtest instructions state that 
testing must be discontinued if the examinee scores 0 for the first story; however, all 
participants in the current research scored above 0.  
The FM subtest comprises a total of seven items. On each item, participants were shown a 
number of stimulus pictures (faces). The number of faces shown increased on each item 
(item 1 = two faces, item 2 = three faces, item 3 = four faces, item 4 = five faces, item 5 = six 
faces, item 6 = nine faces, and item 7 = twelve faces). The number of seconds for which the 
faces on each item were shown also increased. For items 1-4, participants were given five 
seconds to view the faces. For item 5, they were given ten seconds; for item 6, they were 
given 15 seconds; and for item 7, they were given 20 seconds. Participants received one 
point for each face identified correctly and the total number of faces identified correctly 
provided a total raw score.  
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale-2 (GSS-2) (Gudjonsson, 1997). The GSS-2 comprises a 
narrative paragraph containing a story of an event and 20 questions that are asked about 
the story (see Appendix F). Participants provided immediate recall which gave an indication 
of their attention, concentration, and memory capacity. The maximum number of ‘ideas’ 
that participants could recall was 40. They also provided delayed recall approximately 50 
minutes after immediate recall and again the maximum number of ‘ideas’ that they could 
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recall was 40. For both immediate and delayed recall, an overall memory recall score was 
obtained by calculating the number of details recalled correctly. A total confabulations 
score was also obtained which included any items of information that were added to the 
story (fabrications) or any major alterations to the story’s content (distortions). Following 
the delayed recall phase, participants were asked 20 questions about the story, some of 
which were leading. After receiving negative feedback (“You have made a number of 
errors. It is therefore necessary to go through the questions once more, and this time try to 
be more accurate”), the same questions were repeated to test for suggestibility. A number 
of scores were obtained. A yield 1 score referred to the number of leading questions to 
which participants yielded before receiving negative feedback. The maximum score that 
participants could obtain was 15. A yield 2 score referred to the number of leading 
questions to which participants yielded after receiving negative feedback and again the 
maximum score was 15. A shift score referred to the number of items where there was a 
distinct change in the participants’ responses after receiving negative feedback. The yield 1 
and shift scores were summed to provide an overall level of suggestibility.  
3.2.4. Procedure 
After taking part in the initial statement taking interview in study 2 (see Chapter 4), 
participants were given the BDI-2. First of all, participants were informed that their 
responses would be kept confidential and care was taken to ensure that they felt at ease. It 
was made clear to participants that if they had any questions, they should ask the 
researcher before completing the questionnaire. They were then given the BDI-2 record 
form and asked to provide their demographic details at the top of the form. Subsequently, 
they were asked to read the following self-administration instructions: “This questionnaire 
consists of 21 groups of statements. Please read each group of statements carefully, and 
then pick out the one statement in each group that best describes the way you have been 
feeling during the past two weeks, including today. Circle the number beside the statement 
you have picked. If several statements in the group seem to apply equally well, circle the 
highest number. Be sure that you do not choose more than one statement for any group, 
including Item 16 (Changes in Sleeping Pattern) and Item 18 (Changes in Appetite)”. Once 
the participants had filled out the questionnaire, it was collected by the researcher and the 
scores were summed to provide a total score for depression.  
83 
 
Following the BDI-2, the STAI was administered. Again, participants were informed that 
their responses would be kept confidential and told to speak to the researcher if they had 
any questions. The researcher did not use the term ‘anxiety’ when administering the 
inventory. Instead, the term ‘self-evaluation questionnaire’ was used at all times. 
Participants were informed that there were two parts of the inventory and the researcher 
emphasised that the instructions were different for the two parts. They were told that they 
must read both sets of instructions carefully. Following this, participants were asked to 
complete the Y-1 form (state anxiety) first. Initially, they provided their demographic 
details at the top of the form. Then, they read the following self-administration 
instructions: “A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are 
given below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right of 
the statement to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment. There are no 
right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the 
answer which seems to describe your present feelings best”. After completing the Y-1 form, 
participants then completed the Y-2 form (trait anxiety). The following self-administration 
instructions were given: “A number of statements which people have used to describe 
themselves are given below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number 
to the right of the statement to indicate how you generally feel”. Once the participants had 
completed Y-2, the inventory was collected by the researcher and the scores for each scale 
were summed separately to provide a total state anxiety score and a total trait anxiety 
score. 
Following the STAI, the SCID-5-CV was administered orally. This involved a verbal 
interaction between the researcher and the participants during which the participants were 
asked a range of questions about anxiety and depression. Firstly, the researcher read the 
following statement aloud: “I am going to ask you some questions about anxiety and 
depression. I don’t want to keep you here for too long so I will be quite direct at times and 
interrupt you if we need to move onto a new question. Please don’t be offended if I do this. 
It is fine to give me one-word answers”. Participants were then asked two initial questions 
to provide an indication of their mental health status which included: “Have you ever 
received a formal diagnosis for a mental health related difficulty and what was it?” and 
“Are you currently receiving treatment for a mental health related difficulty?” 
Subsequently, participants were asked about the following anxiety disorders: Lifetime Panic 
Disorder, Current Agoraphobia (past six months), Current Social Anxiety Disorder (past six 
months), Current Generalized Anxiety Disorder (past six months), Current Obsessive 
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Compulsive Disorder (OCD), and Current Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). They were 
then asked about the following depressive disorders: Current Major Depressive Episode 
and Current Mania. It was not always necessary to ask participants every question for each 
disorder. If, for example, a participant answered ‘no’ to the initial anxiety question relating 
to Lifetime Panic Disorder (“Have you ever had an intense rush of anxiety, or what 
someone might call a “panic attack”, when you suddenly feel very frightened or anxious or 
suddenly developed a lot of physical symptoms?”), there was no need to continue asking 
questions about this disorder and the interview progressed to the next disorder. Once the 
SCID-5-CV had been completed, participants were thanked for their time. All participants 
were provided with a list of mental health organisations and available support services, 
such as MIND (mental health charity) and the Samaritans. For students at the University of 
Winchester, they were made aware of Student Services. If participants asked about any of 
these tests (BDI-2, STAI, or SCID-5-CV), it was made clear to them that the tests were being 
used for research purposes and that the researcher was not qualified to make diagnoses. If 
participants had any concerns, they were advised to seek help from their General 
Practitioner. The participants’ responses to the SCID-5-CV were checked to see if more 
severe cases of anxiety or depression emerged.  
Before taking part in the full investigative interview in study 2 (see Chapter 4), participants 
were informed that they would be given a short activity. The MFS subtest of the TOMAL-2 
was administered. Two stories were selected based on the age of the participant. The first 
story was then administered and the following instructions were given: “I’m going to read 
you a story. Listen carefully, because when the story is done, I want you to tell the story 
back to me just the way you heard it. I’m going to read the first story now”. The first story 
was then read aloud, starting with the title of the story. At the end of the first story, 
participants were asked to tell the story back to the researcher the very best they could. If 
a participant stopped at any point, the researcher encouraged them to continue by saying 
“tell me more” or “what else can you recall from the story?” Following this, participants 
were informed that they would be read a second story and to remember to tell the story 
back to the researcher just the way they heard it. The second story was then read aloud. At 
the end, participants were asked to tell the story back to the researcher the very best they 
could. Their scores were recorded and a total raw score (total number of elements recalled 
correctly from both stories) was obtained.  
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After the full investigative interview, participants were administered the GSS-2. They were 
given the following instructions by the researcher: “I want you to listen to a short story. 
Listen carefully because when I am finished I want you to tell me everything you 
remember”. The story was then read aloud clearly at a reasonably slow pace. Participants 
were then told the following: “Now tell me everything you remember about the story”. The 
narrative accounts given by the participants were audio recorded and immediate memory 
recall and total confabulations scores were obtained. After a delay of approximately 50 
minutes during which participants completed a number of video identification lineups, they 
were told the following: “I am now going to read aloud the story from earlier”. The story 
was read aloud clearly at a reasonably slow pace for the second time. Participants were 
then told the following: “Now tell me everything you remember about the story”. Their 
narrative accounts were audio recorded and delayed memory recall and total 
confabulations scores were obtained. After their delayed recall, participants were told the 
following: “I am going to ask you some questions about the story. Try to be as accurate as 
you can”. Each of the 20 questions was read aloud clearly and firmly and sufficient time 
was given to allow participants to answer each question. It was ensured that the questions 
and answers could not be read by the participant. When the 20 questions had been 
answered, participants were given ‘negative feedback’ by being told clearly and firmly that 
they had made a number of errors and it was therefore necessary to go through the 
questions once more. They were asked to try to be more accurate and the 20 questions 
were then repeated. The questioning phase was also audio recorded and a number of 
scores were obtained (yield 1, yield 2, shift, and total suggestibility).   
Following the GSS-2 questions, participants were informed that they would be given a short 
activity. The FM subtest of the TOMAL-2 was administered. Firstly, participants were 
provided with a practice item. They were given a plastic chip and the practice item was 
displayed. The researcher pointed at the picture and asked participants to look at it, 
allowing five seconds for viewing time. The page was then turned over and participants 
were asked to place the chip on the person they saw. In all cases, the participant gave a 
correct response. The researcher then continued with item 1 repeating the same 
instruction (“Put the chips on the faces you saw”) but no additional help was given. For 
each item, participants were provided with the same number of chips as faces and they 
were encouraged to place all chips in each case. Their scores were recorded and a total raw 
score (total number of faces recalled correctly for all items) was obtained. On average, the 
entire procedure took approximately one hour and 20 minutes.  
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3.3. Results  
3.3.1. Baseline Measures and Condition 
From the results of the psychometric measures, three groups emerged: typical, 
sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety (Table 3.1). For all groups, the 
SCID-5-CV did not identify any further symptoms than those identified on the STAI and BDI-
2 hence why the term ‘sub-clinical’ has been used.  
 
Table 3.1: BDI-2 and STAI mean scores, SD, and range across groups  
 
The three groups were classified according to participants’ scores on the BDI-2 and STAI 
measures. Participants were classified as having sub-clinical depression if they obtained a 
score above 13 on the BDI-2 (Beck et al., 1996). The scores on the BDI-2 range from 0 to 63 
with scores of 0-13 representing minimal depression, 14-19 representing mild depression, 
20-28 representing moderate depression, and 29-63 representing severe depression. As 
per the STAI manual (Spielberger et al. 1983), both working adults and university students 
were classified as having sub-clinical trait anxiety if they obtained a score of 34.89 or above 
for males and 34.79 or above for females. Participants who obtained these scores (or 
above) on the STAI for trait anxiety and a score above 13 on the BDI-2 were identified as 
having sub-clinical anxiety and depression combined.  
The typical group (mean age = 22.53, SD = 6.27) comprised 17 females (mean age = 22.29, 
SD = 6.31, age range = 18-43), and 2 males (mean age = 24.50, SD = 7.78, age range = 19-
 BDI-2 STAI (state) STAI (trait) 
Group Mean SD Range Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 




21.55 6.74 14-36 42.60 9.50 28-65 52.90 6.51 42-66 
Anxiety 7.44 3.13 3-12 38.94 7.30 26-50 46.50 6.21 36-61 
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30). The group with sub-clinical anxiety and depression (mean age = 23.70, SD = 8.37) 
comprised 17 females (mean age = 23.12, SD = 8.55, age range = 18-48), and 3 males (mean 
age = 27, SD = 7.81, age range = 22-36). The group with sub-clinical anxiety (mean age = 
24.06, SD = 7.32) comprised 14 females (mean age = 23.50, SD = 7.73, age range = 18-44), 
and 4 males (mean age = 26, SD = 6.16, age range = 19-34). There was no effect of group 
(typical, sub-clinical anxiety and depression, sub-clinical anxiety) on age, F(2, 54) = .22, p = 
.80. 
A series of one-way ANOVAs were conducted to compare the effect of group (typical, sub-
clinical anxiety and depression, sub-clinical anxiety) on the cognitive measures and GSS-2. 
The statistical outputs for the analyses are presented in Appendix G and the mean scores, 
SD, and range are presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. An ANOVA confirmed the manipulation 
check was successful in that there was a significant main effect of group on STAI trait 
anxiety scores, F(2, 54) = 96.59, p < .001, ƞp2 = .78. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey 
HSD test indicated that there was a significant difference (p < .001) between the typical 
group (M = 28.89, SD = 3.37) and the group with sub-clinical anxiety and depression (M = 
52.90, SD = 6.51). There was also a significant difference (p < .001) between the typical 
group (M = 28.89, SD = 3.37) and the group with sub-clinical anxiety (M = 46.50, SD = 6.21), 
and a significant difference (p < .01) between the group with sub-clinical anxiety and 
depression (M = 52.90, SD = 6.51) and the group with sub-clinical anxiety (M = 46.50, SD = 
6.21).  
An ANOVA confirmed the manipulation check was successful in that there was a significant 
main effect of group on STAI state anxiety scores, F(2, 54) = 25.61, p < .001, ƞp2 = .49. Post 
hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that there was a significant difference 
(p < .001) between the typical group (M = 25.84, SD = 5.42) and the group with sub-clinical 
anxiety and depression (M = 42.60, SD = 9.50). There was also a significant difference (p < 
.001) between the typical group (M = 25.84, SD = 5.42) and the group with sub-clinical 
anxiety (M = 38.94, SD = 7.30). There was no significant difference (p = .31) between the 
group with sub-clinical anxiety and depression (M = 42.60, SD = 9.50) and the group with 
sub-clinical anxiety (M = 38.94, SD = 7.30).  
An ANOVA confirmed the manipulation check was successful in that there was a significant 
main effect of group on BDI-2 scores, F(2, 54) = 77.95, p < .001, ƞp2 = .74. Whilst the 
assumption of homogeneity was not met for the effect of group on BDI-2 (see Appendix G), 
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there was no need to transform the data as the sample sizes were not vastly different 
(Blanca, Alarcón, Arnau, Bono & Bendayan, 2017; Field, 2018). Post hoc comparisons using 
the Tukey HSD test indicated that there was a significant difference (p < .001) between the 
typical group (M = 4.11, SD = 2.71) and the group with sub-clinical anxiety and depression 
(M = 21.55, SD = 6.74). There was also a significant difference (p < .001) between the group 
with sub-clinical anxiety and depression (M = 21.55, SD = 6.74) and the group with sub-
clinical anxiety (M = 7.44, SD = 3.13). There was no significant difference (p = .08) between 
the typical group (M = 4.11, SD = 2.71) and the group with sub-clinical anxiety (M = 7.44, SD 
= 3.13).  
There was no significant main effect of group on Memory for Stories, F(2, 54) = 2.64, p = 
.08, Facial Memory, F(2, 54) = 0.22, p = .80, or suggestibility, F(2, 54) = 0.17, p = .85.  
 
Table 3.2: MFS, FM, and GSS-2 mean scores, SD, and range across groups  
 
3.4. Discussion 
When interpreting the results of the analyses that explored individual group 
differences on the baseline measures, a number of expected findings emerged. Firstly, the 
STAI scores (state and trait) for the groups with sub-clinical anxiety and depression and 
sub-clinical anxiety were significantly higher than those for the typical group. This was 
anticipated as these groups were classified as having anxiety whereas the typical group was 
not. Secondly, the BDI-2 scores for the group with sub-clinical anxiety and depression were 
significantly higher than those for the typical group and the group with sub-clinical anxiety. 
  MFS FM GSS-2 
Group N Mean SD Range Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
Typical 19 32.58 7.87 12-44 34.42 4.46 22-40 3.42 3.96 0-15 
Anxiety and 
Depression 
20 28.20 7.57 16-47 34.35 3.08 28-39 4.00 3.64 0-13 
Anxiety 18 33.72 8.23 15-46 33.72 2.68 30-40 4.11 4.19 0-14 
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Again, this was predicted as the group with sub-clinical anxiety and depression was the only 
group to be classified as having depression. However, some unexpected findings also 
emerged from the analyses. There was a significant difference revealed between the group 
with sub-clinical anxiety and depression and the group with sub-clinical anxiety with regard 
to scores of trait anxiety. One would expect the levels of trait anxiety to be the same for 
both groups, which was the case for state anxiety, given that both groups were classified as 
having trait anxiety. The STAI-trait scores were significantly higher for the group with sub-
clinical anxiety and depression, suggesting that individuals with both anxiety and 
depression combined are characteristically more anxious. Yet, there is no research to 
support this suggestion. Furthermore, a depression only group did not emerge from the 
results of the psychometric measures. This could be due to the fact that the prevalence 
rate amongst adults in the UK for depression is lower than for anxiety, and anxiety and 
depression combined is most prevalent (Mental Health Foundation, 2019b). However, it 
was unsurprising that the groups with a mental health problem were sub-clinical and did 
not show any further symptoms on the SCID-5-CV given that there is an increasing number 
of adults with undiagnosed mental health problems in the UK (Open Access Government, 
2019) and also given that the university student population, which made up most of the 
sample, commonly experience mental health problems (Education Policy Institute, 2018). 
Consequently, it is important that this thesis has focused on these groups.  
In terms of their scores on the GSS-2, FM subtest, and MFS subtest, no significant 
differences were found between the groups. This is inconsistent with the original 
expectation that the groups with sub-clinical anxiety and depression and sub-clinical 
anxiety would obtain higher scores on the GSS-2 and lower scores on the FM and MFS 
subtests than the typical group. As suggestibility can have a significant impact on 
vulnerable witnesses (e.g., Gudjonsson & Henry, 2003; Kebbell et al., 2004; Ridley et al., 
2002), it was surprising that the participants with a mental health problem in the current 
research were not significantly more suggestible than the typical participants. It was also 
unforeseen that those with a mental health problem were no worse than their typical 
counterparts at facial recognition and remembering details about a story. As memory recall 
and identification performance has been shown to be weaker in vulnerable groups (e.g., 
Erickson et al., 2016; Henry & Wilcock, 2013; Maras & Bowler, 2014; Ternes & Yuille, 
2008), significant group differences were expected to emerge from the results of these 
measures. The memory recall performance and identification accuracy of these groups will 




Study 2: Accuracy of Evidence Provided by Eyewitnesses with Sub-Clinical Anxiety and 
Depression, and Sub-Clinical Anxiety  
Abstract  
The aim of this study was to examine the relationship between mental health and 
eyewitness performance in adults. The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) and Beck 
Depression Inventory-2 (BDI-2) were administered to 57 adults to classify for anxiety and 
depression. Three groups emerged: 20 adults with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, 18 
adults with sub-clinical anxiety, and 19 adults with no mental health problems. All 
participants viewed a video clip of a crime event and took part in an initial statement taking 
interview, a full investigative interview, and two video identification lineups (one 
perpetrator present, one perpetrator absent). No significant differences in memory recall 
or identification accuracy emerged between groups. The implications of these findings are 
discussed in relation to the criminal justice process.   
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the accuracy of evidence provided by mock witnesses with 
sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety. The mock witnesses were 
classified as having these mental health problems from a range of psychometric measures 
outlined in Chapter 3. As discussed in Chapter 1, it has long been accepted that witnesses 
are a central feature of an investigation (e.g., Heaton-Armstrong et al., 2006; Kebbell & 
Milne, 1998; Milne & Bull, 1999) and the accuracy of their evidence is crucial (e.g., College 
of Policing, 2013b; Cutler et al., 1990). However, it has been shown that vulnerability has 
the capacity to impair eyewitness memory performance (e.g., Henry & Gudjonsson, 2004; 
Lewy et al., 2015; Maras & Bowler, 2014; McCrory et al., 2007; Ternes & Yuille, 2008; West 
& Stone, 2014) as well as eyewitness identification performance (e.g., Erickson et al., 
2016; Havard & Memon, 2009; Wilcock & Henry, 2013).  
Mental health is considered a vulnerability by the justice system (Ministry of Justice, 2011) 
and a large body of research has demonstrated that anxiety (e.g., Buodo et al., 2011; 
Burriss et al., 2008; Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2011; Plana et al., 2014) and depression (e.g., 
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Airaksinen et al., 2007; Austin et al., 2001; Gallassi et al., 2001; McDermott & Ebmeier, 
2009) are associated with general memory problems. Yet, very little research has examined 
the effects of these mental health problems on eyewitness memory specifically and the 
research that has is ambiguous. As highlighted in Chapter 1, there is research to suggest 
that those with high trait anxiety recall fewer correct details about an event than those 
with low trait anxiety (Dobson & Markham, 1992). However, it has also been argued that 
anxiety can aid the recall of explicit memory which is most relevant for eyewitness memory 
(Mitte, 2008). There is no literature on the effects of depression on eyewitness memory. 
Given the findings on general memory, one may suspect that memory recall performance is 
worse for witnesses with anxiety, or anxiety and depression combined, than for typical 
witnesses with neither anxiety nor depression.  
Whilst the accuracy of eyewitness memory is key for a successful investigation, accurate 
eyewitness identification is also essential (Wells & Loftus, 2013). To date, there has been 
minimal effort to explore the effects of mental health on eyewitness identification 
performance. Research findings have suggested that trait anxiety has no effect on 
identification performance (e.g., Valentine & Mesout, 2008), yet improvements in 
depressive symptoms appear to be related to better identification accuracy (e.g., Rounding 
et al., 2014). As a large body of literature suggests that identification performance can be 
impaired by a witness’s vulnerability (e.g., Kassin et al., 2001; Memon et al., 2003; Wilcock 
& Henry, 2013), one may suggest that the identification performance of witnesses with 
anxiety, or anxiety and depression combined, may be worse than the identification 
performance of witnesses with no mental health problems. In order to enhance our 
understanding of their identification capabilities, it is vitally important that further research 
is conducted. Given that the findings of the questionnaire study in Chapter 2 revealed that 
legal professionals frequently come into contact with witnesses with anxiety and 
depression, particularly anxiety, and these mental health problems are two of the most 
prevalent within the community (Mental Health Foundation, 2019b), an exploration into 
their eyewitness capabilities is very much needed. The professionals who completed the 
questionnaire stated that they did not know if the evidence provided by anxious and 
depressed witnesses was accurate which provides further support for the need for research 
on this matter. It has become clear that professionals’ perceptions of witnesses with 
anxiety and depression are based predominantly on their own personal experiences and, 
whilst their perceptions may be correct, there is still a need for robust evidence on the 
capabilities of such witnesses to reduce any potential biases. This will ensure that 
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professionals have an accurate and valid knowledge base on which to base their decisions 
which will inevitably enhance the provision of best evidence.    
The aim of the present study was to investigate the eyewitness performance of adults with 
sub-clinical anxiety and depression, adults with sub-clinical anxiety, and typical adults with 
no mental health problems when exposed to a mock staged crime. This was achieved 
through the use of an initial statement taking interview, a full investigative interview, and 
two video identification lineups. The decision to include an initial statement taking 
interview was based on the fact that little research has looked at statement taking and 
witness performance. In terms of the full investigative interview, research suggests that the 
Cognitive Interview (CI) (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992) is one of the most effective methods at 
enhancing recall performance (Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010) and the current 
interview procedure used in the UK is based on the CI (Ministry of Justice, 2011). It has 
been shown that the modified version of the CI is just as effective as the full CI but less 
demanding for the interviewer (Dando, Wilcock, & Milne, 2009) and consequently, whilst 
the full CI was not adopted for this study; some of its core elements were used, namely; 
develop rapport, report everything, and mental reinstatement of context (MRC). With 
regard to developing rapport, research suggests that interviewers should invest time at the 
beginning of the interview to develop a meaningful affinity with the witness (Collins, 
Lincoln, & Frank, 2002). In terms of reporting everything, it appears that encouraging the 
witness to do this, even reporting unimportant and partial details, is an effective way of 
improving recall performance (Pescod, Wilcock, & Milne, 2013). Regarding MRC, this 
cognitive component of interviewing is incorporated into current police training methods 
used with less serious crime (Ministry of Justice, 2011), providing justification for its use in 
the present study. Furthermore, a video lineup procedure is the current identification 
procedure used in the UK (Ministry of Justice, 2011) and therefore this procedure was used 
in this thesis. A number of eyewitness studies have found that the identification 
performance of vulnerable witnesses is affected in both PP and PA lineups (e.g., Memon et 
al., 2003; Rose et al., 2003; Wilcock & Henry, 2013), providing justification for the use of 
both lineup types. In addition, eyewitness identification confidence is regarded as an 
important indicator of accuracy (Brewer & Wells, 2006) and therefore confidence ratings 
were obtained in the present research. There is also research to suggest that unbiased 
lineup instructions are crucial for eliciting accurate identifications (Hope & Sauer, 2014) 
and, in current police practice, it is recommended that the witness is informed that the 
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perpetrator ‘may or may not be in the lineup’ (Home Office, 2017). Consequently, unbiased 
lineup instructions were administered prior to the video identification lineups in this thesis.  
4.1.1. The Present Study 
Due to a lack of previous research examining the eyewitness capabilities of 
witnesses with a mental health problem, it is difficult to form hypotheses. However, based 
on previous literature that has examined eyewitness memory in other vulnerable groups as 
well as research on mental health and general memory, it is expected that memory recall 
performance at interview of mock witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and 
sub-clinical anxiety, would be worse than that of typical witnesses. It is also hypothesised 
that their lineup identification performance would be worse. 
4.2. Method  
4.2.1. Design 
A mock witness paradigm was used to investigate witness performance during 1) a 
statement taking interview, 2) a full investigative interview, and 3) PP and PA video 
identification lineups. The study was a one-way between participants design with one 
independent variable which was mental health (sub-clinical anxiety and depression, sub-
clinical anxiety, and typical with no mental health problems). The dependent variables were 
memory recall performance (at initial statement taking interview and at full investigative 
interview) and identification performance (on video identification lineups).  
4.2.2. Participants 
A total of 57 participants (mean age = 23.42, SD = 7.29) comprising 48 females and 
9 males took part in the study on a voluntary basis or in return for research participation 
points. For a MANOVA examining the effect of the independent variable (mental health 
condition) on recall at interview (correct recall, incorrect recall, confabulations, and 
accuracy), a post hoc power analysis on the sample of 57 was conducted using the software 
package, GPower (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The recommended effect sizes 
used were as follows: small (.10), medium (.30), and large (.50; see Cohen, 1988). The alpha 
level used for this analysis was p < .05. A post hoc analysis revealed that the statistical 
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power for this study was .80. Thus, there was adequate power at the large effect size. As 
revealed in Chapter 3, there were three groups: typical (mean age = 22.53, SD = 6.27), sub-
clinical anxiety and depression (mean age = 23.70, SD = 8.37), and sub-clinical anxiety 
(mean age = 24.06, SD = 7.32). Table 4.1 presents the total number, mean age, SD, and age 
range for males and females in each group. There was no effect of group (typical, sub-
clinical anxiety and depression, sub-clinical anxiety) on age, F(2, 54) = .22, p = .80. Within 
the sub-clinical anxiety and depression group, the mock witnesses had mild (N = 12), 
moderate (N = 3), and severe (N = 5) depression. All groups were recruited from the local 
community and the University of Winchester via e-mail, telephone, research participation 
scheme, or participant recruitment posters. 
 
Table 4.1: Total number, mean age, SD, and age range for males and females in each group 
 
4.2.3. Materials 
Stimulus event. The video clip depicted a three-minute non-violent distraction 
burglary held within the Psychology building at the University of Winchester filmed 
specifically for this research. The burglary took place in a classroom and the video clip 
showed two male perpetrators who were distinctively different in visual appearance (see 
Appendix M) and a female victim. The two perpetrators were shot from close up as well as 
at a distance. The total length of time that each perpetrator was in view for was two 
minutes and 30 seconds and each perpetrator was seen in close up shots of his face for 24 
seconds. Participants were not familiar with any of the actors shown in the video clip.  
 Males  Females 
Group N Mean SD Range N Mean SD Range 
Typical 2 24.50 7.78 19-30 17 22.29 6.31 18-43 
Anxiety and Depression 3 27 7.81 22-36 17 23.12 8.55 18-48 
Anxiety 4 26 6.16 19-34 14 23.50 7.73 18-44 
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Measures of depression and anxiety. Participants were measured separately for anxiety 
and depression using two measures: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 
1983) and Beck Depression Inventory-2 (BDI-2; Beck et al., 1996) (see Appendices B and C). 
The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-5 Disorders – Clinical Version (SCID-5-CV; First et 
al., 2016) (see Appendix D) was also used to support and provide further insight into the 
baseline measures of anxiety and depression, if necessary. All three measures were 
administered immediately after the initial statement taking interview (refer to Chapter 3 
for a detailed description of these measures). 
Measures of memory. Participants completed two sub-tests of the Test of Memory and 
Learning-2 (TOMAL-2; Reynolds & Voress, 2007). These included a verbal subtest (Memory 
for Stories (MFS)) and a nonverbal subtest (Facial Memory (FM)) (see Appendix E). The MFS 
subtest provided a measure of meaningful recall which was appropriate for this study as 
participants were required to recall details of the event, like a story. The FM subtest 
provided a measure of recognition and identification of faces which was also a suitable test 
to use as participants were asked to subsequently identify the faces of the perpetrators 
shown in the event on video identification lineups (refer to Chapter 3 for a detailed 
description of these measures).   
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale-2 (GSS-2). Suggestibility was measured using the 
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale-2 (GSS-2; Gudjonsson, 1997) (see Appendix F). This scale 
assessed the extent to which participants gave in to interrogative pressure by agreeing with 
inaccurate details of an event suggested by leading questions (to yield to the suggested 
evidence being put to them) and altering their evidence in response to external pressure (a 
tendency to shift response) (Gudjonsson, 1997). Prior to the full investigative interview, 
participants listened to a story that was read aloud by the researcher and were asked to 
provide a free recall account. After the investigative interview, this process was repeated 
but this time, participants were presented with a set of 20 questions at the end (15 of 
which were leading). After receiving ‘negative feedback’ by being told that they had made a 
number of errors and it was therefore necessary to go through the questions once more, 
the same set of questions were repeated and participants were asked to be more accurate 




Interview Protocol. Participants took part in an initial statement taking interview during 
which their initial evidence was recorded akin to a statement being taken at the scene of a 
crime. This interview was conducted as soon as possible after watching the video clip to 
ensure that 1) the event was still vivid in their memory and 2) the evidence was gathered 
before participants had an opportunity to discuss the event with others. The initial stage of 
this interview allowed for free recall as participants were presented with the following 
statement: “Tell me what you remember about what you have just seen. Please provide as 
much information about the event as possible”. The researcher remained quiet to allow 
participants to recall the event at their own pace. A number of follow up questions were 
then asked based upon what was said during free recall, such as “what did they do?” and 
“what did they look like?” Although not blind to the video’s content, the interviewer 
adopted an unbiased questioning style. The interview was audio and video recorded.   
Participants took part in a full investigative interview five to nine days later which was 
conducted in a different location to the initial statement taking interview. It replicated a 
standard interview based on current police practice (College of Policing, 2013a) and in 
accordance with the ABE guidance which suggests the use of a phased interview structure 
for all witnesses (Ministry of Justice, 2011). This structure comprised four main phases: 1) 
establishing rapport, 2) initiating and supporting a free narrative account, 3) questioning, 
and 4) closure. Initially, the researcher asked participants some questions about 
themselves and offered information about herself as a way of building rapport and 
ensuring that participants felt relaxed before the interview commenced. They were then 
asked to recall as much detail as they could about the event depicted in the video clip 
shown previously. They were asked to include all details even if particular details seemed 
unimportant and informed that it was important not to guess or make anything up. In 
accordance with current police practice, MRC was brought in during the free recall part of 
the interview. Participants were asked to mentally reinstate the context in which the event 
took place. With a pause between each phase, they were asked to 1) think back to the day 
that they saw the video clip, 2) think about what they were doing on that morning, 3) think 
about the weather on that day, 4) think about what they were doing immediately before 
viewing the video, 5) think about the room in which they viewed the video, 6) think about 
the layout of the room and how it looked and smelt, 7) think about anyone else who was in 
the room at the time, 8) think about the computer screen, 9) think about how they felt 
when the video started, and 10) think about what they saw and heard. They were then 
asked to report everything that they could remember about the event. This was followed 
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by a questioning phase ten seconds later during which participants were asked one 
question about each main topic mentioned during free recall. To be compatible with the 
witness’s memory trace, the order of the questions was guided by their free recall. In 
accordance with the ABE guidance, questioning commenced with open-ended questions 
and proceeded to specific-closed questions, if necessary (Ministry of Justice, 2011). Whilst 
open-ended questions allow a witness to further freely recall the event details and have 
control over the information that they reveal, specific-closed questions ask for a narrower 
description of specific aspects of an event (Waterhouse, Ridley, Wilcock, & Bull, 2015). If 
used, specific-closed questions were kept fairly short and simple as the participants with a 
mental health problem may have had limited working memory and consequently may have 
been unable to remember complex questions in order to respond accurately. When 
answering the questions, participants were asked not to guess if they were unable to 
answer a question and it was made clear that it was entirely acceptable to say that they did 
not know the answer. The interview was audio and video recorded (see Appendix K for 
interview protocol).  
Scoring. Each item of information recalled during the initial statement taking 
interview was classified as either correct, incorrect (e.g., saying that the male’s hair was 
blonde instead of brown), or as a confabulation (mentioning a detail or event that was not 
present or did not happen). For example, the video clip showed a male wearing a white t-
shirt and blue jeans carrying a blue rucksack. When asked to recall what this male was 
wearing, a participant may say ‘the male was wearing a white (1 correct) t-shirt (1 correct) 
and black (1 incorrect) shorts (1 incorrect), and he was carrying a black (1 incorrect) 
rucksack (1 correct). Regarding the full investigative interview, each item of information 
recalled was classified as either correct repeated (a correct item of information initially 
recalled in the statement taking interview and the same item repeated again in the full 
investigative interview), correct new (a new correct item of information), incorrect 
repeated (an incorrect item of information initially recalled in the statement taking 
interview and the same item repeated again in the full investigative interview), incorrect 
new (a new incorrect item of information), as a repeated confabulation (a confabulated 
detail initially recalled in the statement taking interview and the same detail repeated 
again in the full investigative interview), or as a new confabulation (a new confabulated 
detail). All subjective statements or opinions were disregarded (Dando et al., 2009).  
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Inter-Rater reliability. A second rater coded 20% of the participants’ interviews (i.e., 
twelve initial statement taking interviews and twelve full investigative interviews). This sub-
sample was randomly selected. Inter-rater reliability was calculated for correct, incorrect, 
and confabulated details with regard to the initial statement taking interviews and correct 
repeated, correct new, incorrect repeated, incorrect new, confabulated repeated, and 
confabulated new details with regard to the full investigative interviews. A description of 
these details will be provided in the results section. The two raters’ scores were 
significantly correlated for correct, incorrect, and confabulated details: r = .95, p < .001; r = 
.90, p < .001; and r = .80, p < .05. The raters’ scores were also significantly correlated for 
correct repeated, correct new, incorrect repeated, incorrect new, confabulated repeated, 
and confabulated new details: r = .90, p < .001; r = .85, p < .001; r = .91, p < .001; r = .71, p < 
.05; r = .82, p < .05; and r = .76, p < .05. Any conflicts in scoring were resolved by discussion 
between the raters.  
Video identification lineups. Four video identification lineups were constructed (one PP 
lineup and one PA lineup for each perpetrator) (see Appendix M) by police staff at Hornsey 
Identification Suite located at Hornsey Police Station in London. The lineups were 
constructed in accordance with PACE (1984) Code D (Home Office, 2017) and the lineup 
production software used to compile the lineups was Profile Matching (PROMAT). All 
participants were shown one PP lineup and one PA lineup; the order of which was 
counterbalanced. Each lineup comprised nine individuals. The PP lineup included one of the 
actual perpetrators and eight lineup members. The PA lineup included a perpetrator 
replacement (innocent suspect) and eight different lineup members. A set of instructions 
were administered in accordance with PACE (1984) Code D (Home Office, 2017) (see 
procedure section of this chapter). In line with current police practice, each lineup was 
shown twice (Home Office, 2017). In the first instance, participants watched the sequence 
of moving images without providing a response. In the second instance, participants 
watched the sequence of moving images again and following this they were given the 
opportunity to provide a response.   
Lineup Fairness. The video clip of the crime event was piloted and the fairness of 
the lineups was analysed prior to being used in the current research. Ten participants 
comprising three males (mean age = 26.67, SD = 3.10) and seven females (mean age = 
24.43, SD = 4.35) were shown the video clip and asked to describe each perpetrator from 
the lineup image of the perpetrator using criteria based on the descriptive categories 
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currently used by the police when using the PROMAT database to create lineups. These 
categories included: gender, age, ethnicity, hair colour, and build. The descriptions 
provided by the participants were collated and one single description was created for each 
perpetrator (a modal description). This modal description was then given to 17 new 
participants who were postgraduate students at the University of Winchester comprising 
two males (mean age = 21.50, SD = .71) and 15 females (mean age = 22.07, SD = 1.62). They 
were shown the simultaneous matrix of the PROMAT PP lineup for each perpetrator and 
asked to identify the perpetrators based on the descriptions (without having seen the 
event). In terms of assessing lineup fairness, functional size (FS) was used as it is recognised 
as an important way of determining the fairness of a lineup (Wells, Leippe, & Ostrom, 
1979). The FS was calculated using n/D, where n = the total number of participants and D = 
the number of participants correctly identifying the perpetrator (Wells et al., 1979). Out of 
the 17 participants asked to identify the perpetrators, three correctly identified the 
perpetrator in each case providing a FS of 6 in both cases. Whilst a FS of 6 is not perfect, 
the lineups were ecologically valid as they were created by the police using their lineup 
production software (PROMAT). Furthermore, the position of the perpetrator in each 
lineup was counterbalanced across participants (ranging from position two to position 
eight) to control for any possible effects of perpetrator lineup position on identification 
performance.  
4.2.4. Procedure 
On arrival, participants were greeted and provided with an information sheet to 
read (see Appendix H). If they were happy to take part, they were asked to provide written 
consent (see Appendix I). They were given the opportunity to ask questions and then 
instructed to watch the video clip. In order to ensure as much as possible that the encoding 
process was incidental, no further instructions were given. Whilst intentional retrieval is 
required to recall a witnessed event in as much detail as possible, the event itself is 
experienced and encoded incidentally in most real-life situations and consequently 
incidental encoding is a more ecologically valid approach for eyewitness research. 
However, it was difficult to ensure that the event in this study was encoded entirely 
incidentally due to the fact that participants were aware that they were taking part in 
eyewitness research. Nevertheless, measures were put in place to discourage intentional 
encoding, for example; participants were provided with minimal detail about the nature of 
the event and the types of questions that would be asked.  
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After watching the video clip, the initial statement taking interview was conducted in a 
private room to create a relaxed environment. Participants were told that they were going 
to be asked some questions about the video clip that they had just seen. Initially, they 
provided a free recall account. This was followed by a number of follow up questions based 
upon what was said during free recall. Immediately after the interview, participants 
completed the BDI-2, STAI, and SCID-5-CV in order to classify their levels of depression and 
anxiety. If participants asked about these tests, it was made clear to them that the tests 
were being used for research purposes and that the researcher was not qualified to make 
diagnoses. They were told that if they had any concerns, they should seek help from their 
GP.  
Participants returned for the full investigative interview five to nine days later. They were 
greeted, thanked for attending, and asked some general questions to develop rapport. 
Initially, they completed the MFS subtest which served as a rehearsal prevention task. They 
were then reminded that they had signed a form giving their consent for the interview to 
be audio and video recorded for use in subsequent research, and it was ensured that they 
were still happy for this to happen. The purpose of the interview was explained and 
participants were asked to freely recall as much detail as they could about the event 
depicted in the video clip shown previously. Once the participants had finished their free 
recall, there was a ten-second pause before they were asked questions based on what was 
said during free recall. At the end of the interview, they were given the opportunity to add 
to or change their information and ask any questions before being thanked for their time. 
The entire interview was video and audio recorded. Following the interview, the GSS-2 was 
administered. The story was read aloud to participants by the researcher and they provided 
a free recall account of what happened. Their accounts were audio recorded for 
subsequent transcription. Following the GSS-2, participants took part in a video PP lineup 
and a video PA lineup (one for each perpetrator), as per PACE (1984) Code D (Home Office, 
2017). Participants were told that the perpetrator seen in the event may or may not appear 
in the lineup. They were asked not to make any decision as to whether the individual they 
saw on the video clip was on the set of images until they had seen the whole set at least 
twice. They were informed that they could ask to see all of the images or a particular image 
again and there was no limit on how many times they could view the whole set of images 
or any part of them. Each individual shown in the set of images was identifiable by number 
and participants were asked to use this number if they wished to make an identification. If 
an individual was selected, participants were shown that particular image again to confirm 
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the identification. If they were unable to make a positive identification, they were 
instructed to say so. It was important that care was taken to ensure that participants were 
not directed in any way to any one individual image, as such the researcher stood behind 
participants out of sight. After making a lineup decision, participants were asked to indicate 
how confident they were in their response on a 10-point Likert scale with 1 indicating ‘not 
at all confident’ and 10 indicating ‘completely confident’ (see Appendix L). Participants 
were tested individually and not able to communicate with each other about the lineup, 
and were not told whether previous participants had made an identification. Following the 
identification lineups, the GSS-2 was administered again. However, after the free recall 
phase in this instance, participants were told that they were going to be asked some 
questions about the story and to try to be as accurate as possible. The set of 20 questions 
(including 15 leading questions) were presented. After receiving ‘negative feedback’, the 
same set of questions were repeated and participants were asked to be more accurate in 
their responses. Their accounts were audio recorded for subsequent transcription. Finally, 
participants completed the FM subtest and this measure was administered after the 
identification lineups to prevent any potential interference effects. At the end of the 
session, they were debriefed (see Appendix J) and thanked for their time.  
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Effect of Condition on Memory Recall Performance at Interview  
The effect of condition (typical, sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical 
anxiety) on a number of variables relating to memory recall at interview was explored. 
Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 display the means, SD, and range for the scores obtained on 
each variable across groups. With regard to interview 1, the variables examined included: 
correct recall, incorrect recall, confabulations, and accuracy. Accuracy was calculated by 
dividing correct recall by the sum of correct recall, incorrect recall, and confabulations. 
Regarding interview 2, the variables examined included: total correct recall (new and 
repeated information), total incorrect recall (new and repeated information), total 
confabulations (new and repeated information), and accuracy. Accuracy was calculated by 
dividing total correct recall by the sum of total correct recall, total incorrect recall, and total 
confabulations. New information referred to details that participants recalled for the first 
time at interview 2 whereas repeated information referred to details that they recalled at 
interview 2 but had already recalled at interview 1. Total correct recall, total incorrect 
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recall, and total confabulations were then examined in more depth so new and repeated 
information was explored separately.  
Interview 1. At interview 1, the typical group recalled the most correct details but overall 
accuracy was highest for the group with sub-clinical anxiety and depression. The group with 
sub-clinical anxiety recalled the most incorrect details but the least number of 
confabulations.  
Interview 2. At interview 2, the typical group recalled the most correct details and overall 
accuracy was also highest for this group. Similar to interview 1, the group with sub-clinical 
anxiety recalled the most incorrect details but the least number of confabulations.  
New and repeated information. In terms of new information recalled at interview 2, the 
group with sub-clinical anxiety recalled the most new correct information but also the most 
new incorrect information. The group with the highest number of new confabulations 
recalled was the typical group. With regard to repeated information recalled at interview 2, 
the typical group recalled the most repeated correct information and the group with sub-
clinical anxiety recalled the most repeated incorrect information. The group with the 
highest number of repeated confabulations recalled was the group with sub-clinical anxiety 
and depression.  
 
Table 4.2: Mean scores, SD, and range for correct, incorrect, confabulations, and accuracy 
across groups at interview 1 
 
 Correct  Incorrect Confabulations Accuracy 
Group Mean SD Range Mean SD Range Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
Typical 47.47 14.65 20-75 2.53 1.17 0-4 1.89 1.20 0-4 91.03 3.50 85-97 
Anxiety and 
Depression 
43.50 11.09 16-60 2.35 1.98 0-7 1.75 1.12 0-3 91.67 3.55 87-97 
 
Anxiety 43.44 11.90 23-63 3.94 3.04 0-10 1.50 .86 0-3 88.55 6.36 79-96 
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Table 4.3: Means, SD, and range for total correct, total incorrect, total confabulations, and 
accuracy across groups at interview 2 
 
Table 4.4: Means, SD, and range for new correct information, new incorrect information, 
and new confabulations across groups at interview 2 
 
Table 4.5: Means, SD, and range for repeated correct information, repeated incorrect 
information, and repeated confabulations across groups at interview 2 
 Total correct  Total incorrect Total confabulations Accuracy 
Group Mean SD Range Mean SD Range Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
Typical 53.05 13.05 26-75 4.42 2.59 1-11 1.84 .96 0-3 89.49 4.49 80-98 
Anxiety and 
Depression 
48.35 8.73 34-67 4.35 2.96 0-13 1.85 1.14 0-4 88.81 5.54 71-95 
Anxiety 51.06 11.14 33-70 5.72 3.12 1-12 1.17 .99 0-3 88.17 4.43 79-95 
 Correct (new)  Incorrect (new) Confabulations (new) 
Group Mean SD Range Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
Typical 14.58 7.31 6-31 2.63 2.27 0-9 .95 .71 0-2 
Anxiety and 
Depression 
14.60 6.54 7-33 3.00 2.66 0-12 .80 .89 0-3 
Anxiety 17.06 4.65 12-25 3.17 2.38 0-9 .22 .55 0-2 
 Correct (repeated)  Incorrect (repeated) Confabulations (repeated) 
Group Mean SD Range Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
Typical 38.47 12.45 17-62 1.79 1.32 0-4 .89 .94 0-2 
Anxiety and 
Depression 
33.75 9.86 12-52 1.35 1.31 0-5 1.05 .89 0-3 
Anxiety 34.00 10.92 18-55 2.56 2.55 0-8 .94 .94 0-3 
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In order to further explore the effect of condition on memory recall at interview, a series of 
MANOVAs were conducted. The statistical outputs for the analyses are presented in 
Appendix P. The first MANOVA was conducted to examine the effect of condition on 
correct recall, incorrect recall, confabulations, and accuracy at interview 1. Although the 
assumption of homogeneity was not met for the effect of condition on incorrect recall and 
accuracy (see Appendix P), there was no need to transform the data as the sample sizes 
were not vastly different (Blanca et al., 2017; Field, 2018). In terms of interpreting the 
MANOVA results, Pillai’s trace statistic was used because it is the most powerful and robust 
(Field, 2018). Using Pillai’s trace, there was no significant effect of condition on correct 
recall, incorrect recall, confabulations, and accuracy at interview 1, V = 0.25, F(8, 104) = 
1.88, p = .07.  
The second MANOVA was conducted to examine the effect of condition on total correct 
recall (new and repeated information), total incorrect recall (new and repeated 
information), total confabulations (new and repeated information), and accuracy at 
interview 2. Using Pillai’s trace, there was no significant effect of condition on total correct 
recall, total incorrect recall, total confabulations, and accuracy at interview 2, V = 0.17, F(8, 
104) = 1.18, p = .32. 
A third MANOVA was conducted to examine the effect of condition on repeated correct 
recall, new correct recall, repeated incorrect recall, new incorrect recall, repeated 
confabulations, and new confabulations at interview 2. Although the assumption of 
homogeneity was not met for the effect of condition on repeated incorrect recall (see 
Appendix P), there was no need to transform the data as the sample sizes were not vastly 
different (Blanca et al., 2017; Field, 2018). Using Pillai’s trace, there was no significant 
effect of condition on repeated correct recall, new correct recall, repeated incorrect recall, 
new incorrect recall, repeated confabulations, and new confabulations at interview 2, V = 
0.31, F(12, 100) = 1.50, p = .14. 
4.3.2. Baseline Measures and Correct Memory Recall at Interview 
A series of bivariate correlational analyses were conducted to explore whether any 
relationships existed between participants’ scores on the baseline measures (described in 
Chapter 3) and their correct recall at interview. Correct recall referred to the total number 
of items correctly recalled. As there were two interviews, correlational analyses were 
105 
 
conducted separately for each interview. For the purpose of the results section, the 
interviews are referred to as interview 1 (initial statement taking interview) and interview 2 
(full investigative interview). The statistical outputs for the analyses are presented in 
Appendix N.  
Interview 1. There was no significant relationship between BDI-2 scores of depression and 
correct recall at interview 1 (r = -.01, p = .97). Similarly, there was no significant relationship 
between STAI scores of trait anxiety and correct recall (r = -.21, p = .11) or STAI scores of 
state anxiety and correct recall (r = -.25, p = .07). Scores on the MFS subtest of the TOMAL-
2 were not significantly related to correct recall (r = .19, p = .17); however, there was a 
significant positive relationship between the FM subtest scores and correct recall (r = .29, p 
< .05), suggesting that better facial identification performance was associated with more 
items correctly recalled. There was also a significant negative relationship between total 
suggestibility scores on the GSS-2 and correct recall (r = -.26, p < .05), suggesting that 
greater resistance to leading questions was associated with more items correctly recalled.   
Interview 2. For all baseline measures, the individual measures were not significantly 
related to correct recall at interview 2. There was no significant relationship between BDI-2 
scores of depression and correct recall (r = -.10, p = .48). There was also no significant 
association between STAI scores of trait anxiety and correct recall (r = -.26, p = .06) or STAI 
scores of state anxiety and correct recall (r = -.15, p = .28). Regarding the TOMAL-2 
subtests, scores on the MFS subtest did not significantly correlate with correct recall (r = 
.19, p = .16) and this was also true for the FM subtest (r = .25, p = .07). Finally, there was no 
significant relationship between total suggestibility scores on the GSS-2 and correct recall (r 
= -.20, p = .14).    
4.3.3. Baseline Measures and Perpetrator Identification Accuracy 
A series of bivariate correlational analyses were also conducted to explore whether 
any relationships existed between participants’ scores on the baseline measures and their 
accuracy at identifying the perpetrators on the identification lineups. As participants 
viewed two lineups relating to two different perpetrators, correlational analyses were 
conducted separately for each perpetrator. The statistical outputs for the analyses are 
presented in Appendix O. For all baseline measures, the individual measure was not 
significantly related to participants’ accuracy at identifying either perpetrator.  
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Perpetrator 1 accuracy. There was no significant relationship between BDI-2 scores of 
depression and perpetrator 1 accuracy (r = .06, p = .68). There was also no significant 
relationship between STAI scores of trait anxiety and perpetrator accuracy (r = .01, p = .95) 
or STAI scores of state anxiety and perpetrator accuracy (r = .06, p = .64). The analyses 
revealed that the TOMAL-2 scores did not significantly correlate with perpetrator accuracy 
for the MFS subtest (r = -.06, p = .65) or the FM subtest (r = -.06, p = .68). In terms of 
suggestibility, there was no significant relationship between total suggestibility scores on 
the GSS-2 and perpetrator accuracy (r = -.06, p = .68). 
Perpetrator 2 accuracy. There was no significant relationship between BDI-2 scores of 
depression and perpetrator 2 accuracy (r = -.03, p = .81). There was also no significant 
relationship between STAI scores of trait anxiety and perpetrator accuracy (r = -.02, p = .91) 
or STAI scores of state anxiety and perpetrator accuracy (r = .07, p = .59). The MFS subtest 
scores did not significantly correlate with perpetrator accuracy (r = .10, p = .48) and neither 
did the FM subtest scores (r = -.13, p = .34). Regarding suggestibility, there was no 
significant relationship between total suggestibility scores on the GSS-2 and perpetrator 
accuracy (r = .04, p = .79).  
4.3.4. Effect of Condition on Perpetrator Identification Accuracy and Confidence 
The effect of condition (typical, sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical 
anxiety) on identification accuracy was explored. Initially, a loglinear analysis was 
conducted to explore the association between three variables: condition, perpetrator 
present/perpetrator absent (PP/PA), and accuracy for each perpetrator separately. For the 
analysis to be reliable, the frequencies need to be large enough to detect a genuine effect 
(e.g., no less than 5 and greater than 1) (Field, 2018). However, the frequencies in this 
study were too small to detect a genuine effect when examining at the PP/PA level (see 























As a result, the data by perpetrator presence was collapsed (see Tables 4.8 and 4.9) and a 
Chi-square test was conducted for each perpetrator separately examining just condition 
and accuracy (see Appendix R). A Chi-square test conducted for perpetrator 1 found no 
significant association between condition and participants’ lineup accuracy, χ2 (2) = 2.99, p 
= .22. A Chi-square test conducted for perpetrator 2 found no significant association 




Condition PP PA 





Typical  5 4 1 5 4 
Anxiety and Depression 4 3 3 5 5 
Anxiety  6 3 1 7 1 
Condition PP PA 





Typical  2 2 5 7 3 
Anxiety and Depression 7 1 3 5 4 
Anxiety  5 1 2 6 4 
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Table 4.8: Accuracy frequency across groups for perpetrator 1  
 
 
Table 4.9: Accuracy frequency across groups for perpetrator 2 
 
Bivariate correlational analyses were conducted to explore whether a relationship existed 
between participants’ confidence and their accuracy at identifying perpetrator 1 and 
perpetrator 2. The statistical outputs for the analyses are presented in Appendix S. An 
accurate identification was coded as 1 and an inaccurate identification was coded as 2. 
There was a significant relationship between confidence and accuracy for perpetrator 1 (r = 
-.43, p = < .05), suggesting that the more confident participants were in their decision, the 
more accurate they were at identifying the perpetrator. There was also a significant 
relationship between confidence and accuracy for perpetrator 2 (r = -.26, p = < .05), 
suggesting that the more confident participants were in their decision, the more accurate 
they were at identifying the perpetrator.  
In order to explore whether there was an effect of condition (typical, sub-clinical anxiety 
and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety) on confidence, a one-way ANOVA was conducted 
Condition Accurate Inaccurate 
Typical 10 9 
Anxiety and Depression 9 11 
Anxiety 13 5 
Condition Accurate Inaccurate 
Typical 9 10 
Anxiety and Depression 12 8 
Anxiety 11 7 
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separately for each perpetrator. The assumption of homogeneity was met in both cases. 
The statistical outputs for the analyses are presented in Appendix T. There was no 
significant effect of condition on confidence for perpetrator 1, F(2, 54) = .78, p = .46. There 
was also no significant effect of condition on confidence for perpetrator 2, F(2, 54) = 1.57, p 
= .22. 
4.4. Discussion 
The aim of this study was to compare the eyewitness capabilities, in terms of both 
memory recall and identification accuracy, of adults with sub-clinical anxiety and 
depression, adults with sub-clinical anxiety, and typical adults with no mental health 
problems when exposed to a mock staged crime. With regard to memory recall at 
interview, it was originally hypothesised that higher BDI-2 and STAI scores would be 
significantly associated with lower recall of correct information. Yet, there was no 
significant relationship revealed between the measure of anxiety and correct recall, or the 
measure of depression and correct recall at either interview. Furthermore, there was no 
significant association revealed between the MFS subtest and correct recall at either 
interview. These findings are surprising. There is evidence within the literature to suggest 
that eyewitness memory is worse for vulnerable witnesses than for typical witnesses (e.g., 
Henry & Gudjonsson, 2004; Lewy et al., 2015; Maras & Bowler, 2014; West & Stone, 2014) 
and therefore it was expected that higher BDI-2 and STAI scores would significantly 
correlate with lower memory recall of correct information. The findings of this study 
suggest that correct recall is unaffected by sub-clinical anxiety and depression. The fact that 
no significant correlation was revealed between the MFS subtest scores and correct recall 
at interview was also an unexpected finding as this subtest measured participants’ recall of 
a story which is similar to recalling details about an event. Consequently, it was anticipated 
that a higher number of items recalled correctly on this test would significantly correlate 
with better recall performance at interview. With regard to the FM subtest, there was a 
significant positive correlation between the FM scores and correct recall at interview 1. 
Whilst it could be argued that facial memory is more relevant to identification 
performance, one may suggest that facial memory is also important for recalling details 
about the event itself if the event involves people which may explain this finding. However, 
this was not replicated at interview 2. In terms of the GSS-2, there was a significant 
negative correlation between total suggestibility and correct recall at interview 1 and one 
may suggest that this is to be expected given that research has demonstrated that 
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suggestibility can impair correct memory recall (e.g., Jaschinski & Wentura, 2002; Zaragoza 
et al., 2007). Yet, this relationship was not replicated at interview 2.  
With regard to identification performance, it was originally expected that higher scores on 
the BDI-2 and STAI would be significantly associated with lower perpetrator identification 
accuracy. As discussed earlier in this chapter, there is evidence within the literature to 
suggest that the identification accuracy of vulnerable witnesses is generally poorer than 
that of typical witnesses (e.g., Erickson et al., 2016; Havard & Memon, 2009; Wilcock & 
Henry, 2013) and consequently it was anticipated that higher anxiety and depression 
scores would significantly correlate with lower identification accuracy. The fact that no 
significant relationship was revealed between these two measures and identification 
accuracy suggests that identification performance is unaffected by sub-clinical anxiety and 
depression. It was also predicted that higher scores on the FM subtest would significantly 
correlate with better identification accuracy; however, this relationship was not revealed. 
This is an unexpected finding as the FM subtest measured participants’ identification of 
faces and therefore it was anticipated that a higher number of faces identified on this test 
would significantly relate to better identification performance.  
As outlined in Chapter 1, this thesis originally set out to test typical witnesses with no 
mental health problems against witnesses with combined anxiety and depression, 
witnesses with anxiety only, and witnesses with depression only. However, as Chapter 3 
revealed, a depression only group did not emerge when participants were measured for 
levels of anxiety and depression using the psychometric measures (STAI; Spielberger et al., 
1983; BDI-2; Beck et al., 1996). As a result, the effects of depression on its own were not 
explored. The fact that a depression only group did not emerge is perhaps unsurprising 
given that the legal professionals who completed the questionnaire study in Chapter 2 
reported interacting with witnesses with depression less frequently than witnesses with 
anxiety, and also reported depression to be a less common mental health problem 
amongst witnesses. This is supported by recent research revealing that the prevalence rate 
for anxiety in adults over the age of 16 is higher than for depression (Stansfeld et al., 2016). 
It is also to be expected that the anxiety and depression group was the largest with a total 
of 20 participants as combined anxiety and depression is the most common mental health 
problem in the UK (Mental Health Foundation, 2019b).  
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The eyewitness memory findings of this study are interesting. It was originally hypothesised 
that memory recall performance at interview would be worse for adults with sub-clinical 
anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, than for typical witnesses based on 
previous research findings regarding the impact of mental health on general memory 
performance (e.g., Austin et al., 2001; Gallassi et al., 2001; Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2011; 
Plana et al., 2014). Yet, in this initial investigation, no significant differences were found 
between the groups in memory recall performance at either interview. It seems that 
witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, are no worse 
than their typical counterparts at recalling correct or incorrect items of information, or 
confabulations. It also appears that their overall accuracy is equivalent. In addition, there 
was no significant differences revealed between the groups in their recall of new and 
repeated correct information, new and repeated incorrect information, and new and 
repeated confabulations. This indicates that adults with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, 
and sub-clinical anxiety, are 1) just as capable as typical adults at remembering details 
about an event at a later stage and 2) just as capable at retaining details about the event in 
their memory.  
Based on previous literature, it would seem that if general memory capabilities are 
impaired by mental health, eyewitness memory performance would be as well. One may 
argue that the reason for a non-significant difference between groups at interview 1 could 
be due to participants providing immediate recall and consequently there was no effect of 
delay, preventing the risk of memory contamination. Indeed, previous research has 
demonstrated that early recall enhances recollection and protects the memory against the 
negative effects of interference (Gabbert et al., 2012). Yet, there is some evidence to 
suggest that individuals with high trait anxiety are less accurate on an eyewitness task than 
those with low trait anxiety at the encoding and retrieval stages of the memory process 
(Dobson & Markham, 1992), implying that these memory stages are affected to a greater 
degree in individuals with high trait anxiety. However, the literature on the effects of 
mental health on the different stages of the memory process is extremely limited and 
further research is needed before conclusions can be drawn about the encoding, storage, 
and retrieval capabilities of witnesses with a mental health problem. Furthermore, given 
that the general memory performance of adults with a mental health problem is worse 
than that of typical adults and there is research to suggest that interference between the 
encoding and retrieval stages can impact memory (Henderson, 2005), one may have 
expected the groups with sub-clinical anxiety and depression and sub-clinical anxiety in this 
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study to have demonstrated significantly worse memory recall performance at interview 2 
than the typical group. Yet, this finding did not emerge, suggesting that they are just as 
capable as their typical counterparts at recalling details of an event after a delay.  
The current findings regarding identification performance were also interesting. It was 
originally hypothesised that identification accuracy would be worse for adults with sub-
clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, than for typical witnesses based on 
the findings of previous literature examining vulnerability and identification accuracy (e.g., 
Erickson et al., 2016; Henry & Wilcock, 2013; Wilcock & Bull, 2010). However, the findings 
of this preliminary study revealed no significant group differences in identification accuracy 
of either perpetrator. That is, the witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and 
sub-clinical anxiety, were no worse at identifying the perpetrators than the typical group. 
This finding is in line with previous research regarding anxiety that found no effect of trait 
anxiety on eyewitness identification (Valentine & Mesout, 2008). However, in the study 
conducted by Valentine and Mesout (2008), participants were asked to identify the person 
approximately 60 minutes after seeing the event and consequently the delay may have 
been too short for there to have been any group differences in identification accuracy. 
Nonetheless, the present study used a delay of five to nine days and still there was no 
effect of trait anxiety on identification performance. Within the literature, there have been 
some attempts to explore the effects of depression with research revealing that when 
depressive symptoms are improved, witnesses demonstrate enhanced identification 
accuracy (e.g., Rounding et al., 2014). However, the literature is very limited and there has 
been no effort until now to investigate the effect of combined anxiety and depression on 
identification performance. With regard to eyewitness identification confidence, the 
present findings revealed an association between confidence and lineup accuracy. This 
finding is consistent with previous research that has suggested that witnesses who give 
high ratings of confidence are more likely to be accurate on the lineup (Brewer, 2006; 
Wixted & Wells, 2017) and provides support for the suggestion that confidence may be an 
important indicator of eyewitness accuracy (e.g., Potter & Brewer, 1999). The present 
findings also revealed that there were no significant group differences in confidence ratings 
for either perpetrator. From this, it can be concluded that the witnesses with sub-clinical 
anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, were just as confident in their 
identification responses as the typical witnesses with no mental health problems for both 
perpetrators. This is inconsistent with previous research involving other vulnerable groups. 
For example, studies have demonstrated the confidence-accuracy relationship with 
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younger adults but not with older adults (e.g., Memon, Hope, Bartlett, & Bull, 2002; 
Wilcock, Bull, & Vrij, 2007) and, whilst confidence has been shown to predict accuracy in 
typical adults, it is not necessarily an indicator of accuracy in adults with ID (e.g., Wilcock & 
Henry, 2013).  
Whilst the findings of this study were unexpected, there are factors that may explain the 
null effects that emerged. For example, the crime event was mild in nature and maybe not 
sufficiently memorable. Possibly, as a result of this, there was little variance in recall and 
identification scores. Had the crime been more anxiety provoking different results may 
have occurred. Due to where participants were recruited, there was a disproportionate 
number of female participants and future research should seek to address this. Whilst such 
factors were necessary in the research presented here, it is important to raise them in 
order to understand the reasons for the null effects of mental health on recall and 
identification performance. Such findings have implications for the CJS. The fact that adults 
with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, were no less capable of 
providing accurate and reliable witness evidence and no less accurate at identifying a 
perpetrator compared to typical adults is significant because it suggests that their evidence 
is to be regarded with the same level of credibility as any other witness. As the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) makes clear, such witnesses have the same right to access to 
justice as any other witness and prosecutors should make their decisions free from 
assumptions or stereotypes (Crown Prosecution Service, 2009). It emerged from the 
findings in Chapter 2 that there is a considerable proportion of legal professionals who do 
not know how accurate witnesses with a mental health problem are when providing 
evidence and some even stated that such witnesses are not accurate at all. This 
demonstrates the importance of, and need for, further research on mental health and 
eyewitness performance. 
There are some limitations of the current study. Firstly, it did not explore the eyewitness 
capabilities of adults with a mental health diagnosis. The findings may have been different 
if the performance of eyewitnesses with a formal diagnosis had been explored as an effect 
of mental health may have emerged. Given that there is evidence within the literature to 
suggest that severe cases of anxiety are associated with various cognitive deficits, such as 
attention and memory (e.g., Buodo et al., 2011; Plana et al., 2014) and similar findings have 
been revealed with major depression (e.g., McDermott & Ebmeier, 2009), this seems 
probable. Secondly, the participants were mainly university undergraduate students which 
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raises obvious questions with regard to how far the findings can be generalised from this 
population to the general population. A further limitation of this study is the context in 
which the crime event took place. The event was filmed at the University of Winchester 
where the majority of the participants were studying at the time. Although efforts were 
made to ensure that they were not familiar with the area of the university in which the 
event occurred, there is still a risk that they recognised the context and this may have 
enhanced their memory recall of the event. Furthermore, the event was filmed and shown 
on a video clip whereas, in real-life, an event would be witnessed live. Whilst it would have 
been challenging to show a live event, it would have made the research more ecologically 
valid. It is important to acknowledge that the findings of ‘real’ studies are often very 
different to those from controlled studies (Kebbell & Davies, 2006). However, attempts 
were made to make the study as real to practice as possible. For example, the rooms in 
which the interviews took place were set up like an interview room in current police 
practice and there were no windows to distract the participants. Additionally, interview 
protocols and lineup procedures were in accordance with current best practice in England 
and Wales.  
To conclude, the findings of this study will contribute to the literature on the eyewitness 
capabilities of witnesses with a mental health problem. One may argue that the findings 
will also enhance legal professionals’ understanding which will in turn help to improve 
current biases and enable them to make the correct decisions when it comes to assessing 
witness evidence. However, the research findings need to be replicated before we can say 











Study 3: Cross-Examination Performance of Eyewitnesses with Sub-Clinical Anxiety and 
Depression, and Sub-Clinical Anxiety 
Abstract 
The aim of this study was to examine how adults with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, 
and sub-clinical anxiety, fared during a mock cross-examination compared to typical adults 
with no mental health problems. Forty-two adults (15 with sub-clinical anxiety and 
depression, 14 with sub-clinical anxiety, and 13 with no mental health problems) were 
cross-examined by a barrister approximately ten months after witnessing a mock crime 
event. No significant differences in cross-examination performance (measured by memory 
trace strength and cede performance) emerged between groups. The implications of these 
findings are discussed with regard to the criminal justice process. 
5.1. Introduction  
The previous chapter of this thesis revealed that witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety 
and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, perform just as well as witnesses with no mental 
health problems at interview and on identification lineups. However, given that delayed 
memory recall is impaired in individuals with depression (e.g., Ramponi et al., 2010) and 
anxiety (e.g., Butters et al., 2011; Crespo et al., 2015), it was necessary to examine how 
such witnesses perform at cross-examination. At court, cross-examination is performed in 
an attempt to reveal the truth by means of challenging a witness’s evidence (Bettenay et 
al., 2014) and effective cross-examination can emphasise discrepancies in witness 
testimony (Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2009). Advocates will use various strategies to discredit 
the witness and weaken their evidence (Munkman, 1991) such as implying that the witness 
is mistaken (Stone, 1995), accusing them of lying (Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2009; Spencer, 
2012), and putting pressure on them to alter their response (Zajac et al., 2003). Ultimately, 
the aim of such techniques is to suggest that the witness should not be relied upon (Stone, 
1995). As a result, testifying at court can be a stressful experience, particularly for 
vulnerable witnesses (Davies & Westcott, 2018). Previous research has shown that the 
question content and the way in which questions are framed (i.e., the use of closed leading 
questions) can cause significant distress for vulnerable witnesses which may result in them 
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providing inaccurate evidence and conveying a misleading impression as to their credibility 
(Keane, 2012). If such witnesses have extreme doubt about whether they will be believed 
or treated fairly at court, they may decide to withdraw their evidence (Davies & Westcott, 
2018). Developments have been made in recent years to the ways in which vulnerability is 
addressed within the CJS (Davies, 2016). The ABE guidance, for example, has been 
produced in England and Wales to protect vulnerable witnesses during the justice process 
(Ministry of Justice, 2011) and practical, evidence-based guidance is available for advocates 
such as The Advocate’s Gateway (TAG) Toolkit which provides advocates with the ‘tools’ to 
cross-examine vulnerable witnesses in the most appropriate and fair manner (The 
Advocate’s Gateway, 2016). In recent years, under section 28 of the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (YJCEA), video-recorded cross-examination has been 
implemented which allows vulnerable and intimidated witnesses to video record their 
cross-examination before the trial (Ministry of Justice, 2016). The recorded cross-
examination is played at trial so the witness does not need to be present. The main aims of 
section 28 are for the cross-examination to take place earlier in the process to help aid 
recall and improve the quality of the evidence provided by the witness (Ministry of Justice, 
2016). However, this provision is not relevant for the sample in this thesis who would not 
be deemed sufficiently vulnerable for section 28 to be implemented.  
Within the eyewitness testimony literature, the cross-examination performance of 
vulnerable witnesses is under-researched. This is rather concerning given that, in 2006, it 
was estimated that approximately 24% of witnesses who appeared at court were 
‘vulnerable’ (Burton et al., 2006, cited in Davies & Beech, 2018, p. 401) and this figure is 
likely to be even higher today as indicated by the development of guidance for those 
preparing and supporting vulnerable witnesses during the legal process (Cooper & Norton, 
2017; Ministry of Justice, 2011). Of the limited literature that has examined the cross-
examination performance of vulnerable witnesses, most of the findings suggest that the 
accuracy of their evidence is impaired at cross-examination due to these witnesses being 
more inclined to alter their evidence in response to coercive questioning. For example, 
Kebbell et al. (2001) revealed that coercive questioning strategies can detrimentally affect 
the testimonies of adults with learning disabilities at cross-examination with closed leading 
questions being particularly influential. Similarly, Brimacombe et al. (2003) found that 
elderly adults are significantly less accurate than younger adults in response to cross-
examination style questioning. Other research involving child witnesses in sexual abuse 
cases found that 75% of the children changed at least one aspect of their account at cross-
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examination and many withdrew allegations of abuse entirely (Zajac et al., 2003). Yet, there 
is no published research to date that has assessed the cross-examination performance of 
witnesses with a mental health problem. There has, however, been some effort to explore 
the effect of misleading information on such witnesses at the interview stage of the legal 
process, as discussed in Chapter 1. Studies have shown that, when suggestive questions are 
used, anxiety can weaken the effect of misleading post-event information with high state 
anxiety being associated with reduced suggestibility (e.g., Ridley, 2003; Ridley & Clifford, 
2004), indicating that state anxiety may protect against misinformation. On the other hand, 
there is also evidence to indicate that trait anxiety is associated with higher levels of 
suggestibility (Ridley, 2003) which is consistent with other findings that demonstrate that 
misleading post-event information can contaminate memory to a greater degree in 
vulnerable persons (e.g., Gudjonsson & Henry, 2003; Kebbell et al., 2004; Ridley et al., 
2002). Such research is relevant to the study presented in this chapter which is examining 
the effects of suggestive questioning on memory recall performance. Nevertheless, 
research on the effects of suggestibility on witnesses with a mental health problem at the 
cross-examination stage of the legal process is non-existent and consequently their 
competencies at cross-examination are unknown.  
As mentioned above, there has been some exploration of the cross-examination 
performance of vulnerable groups; however, many of the studies to date have used a 24-
hour period between interview and cross-examination, and this delay is not representative 
of the average delay in real proceedings which is typically ten and a half months (Rossetti, 
2015). The trace decay theory of memory would suggest that memory accuracy is 
determined by the length of time between learning and recall, and forgetting is caused by 
automatic decay or fading of the memory trace (Henderson, 2005). According to this 
theory, witnesses who are cross-examined after a substantial delay, for example ten 
months after an event, are likely to remember fewer details than those who are cross-
examined after a much shorter delay, and witnesses with a mental health problem could be 
affected to a greater degree given the general memory difficulties associated with mental 
health (e.g., Airaksinen et al., 2007; Burriss et al., 2008; McDermott & Ebmeier, 2009; Plana 
et al., 2014). Research has shown that delayed memory recall is impaired in individuals with 
major depression (e.g., Landrø, Stiles, & Sletvold, 2001; Vythilingam et al., 2004) as well as 
those with sub-clinical depression (e.g., Ramponi et al., 2010), the latter being particularly 
relevant to the sample in the present study as the participants did not have a formal 
diagnosis of depression. Similar findings have been revealed in individuals with an anxiety 
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disorder (e.g., Butters et al., 2011; Crespo et al., 2015); however, some of the research has 
looked at anxiety in older populations making the findings less generalisable to the present 
study. Nevertheless, the effects of delay on memory in those with anxiety and depression 
are clear from the literature. Even though the studies used a much shorter time delay, for 
example two weeks, between the encoding and retrieval stages than the typical delay 
between interview and cross-examination, effects of delay on memory still emerged 
suggesting that these effects could be even more profound after a longer delay such as ten 
months. Whilst there is some literature that has explored the effect of cross-examination 
using more realistic time delays (e.g., Bettenay et al., 2014; Zajac & Hayne, 2003), the 
findings are mixed and the research is very much focused on child witnesses making it 
difficult to generalise the conclusions to adults with a mental health problem hence the 
need for further research.  
5.1.1. The Present Study 
As the cross-examination performance of witnesses with a mental health problem 
has not yet been assessed within the literature, it is difficult to form hypotheses but the 
following predictions have been proposed. Based on previous research involving other 
vulnerable groups as well as literature on the effects of delay on memory in individuals 
with anxiety and depression, the cross-examination performance of mock witnesses with 
sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, could be worse than that of 
typical witnesses. However, given the findings in study 2 (see Chapter 4) which revealed no 
significant group differences in memory accuracy at interview, for the reduced sample in 
the present study there could be no significant group differences in their cross-examination 
performance either. The participants in the present study all took part in study 2 (see 
Chapter 4) during which they viewed a mock crime on video and were interviewed about 
the event approximately one week later in accordance with the ABE guidance (Ministry of 
Justice, 2011). In the present study, participants were cross-examined on their evidence 
provided during that interview and the cross-examinations took place after a ten-month 






5.2.1. Design  
The study was a one-way between participants design with one independent 
variable which was mental health (mock witnesses with no mental health problems, mock 
witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and mock witnesses with sub-clinical 
anxiety). Participants were challenged on six topics relating to the mock crime which 
included: physical description (topic 1), items of clothing (topic 2), surroundings (topic 3), 
time of day/light conditions (topic 4), items taken (topic 5), and order of events (topic 6) (all 
topics mentioned by the witnesses in their earlier interviews). There were two main 
dependent variables. The first dependent variable was overall memory trace strength 
which was measured by additional information relating to a correct item of information 
with a possible minimum score of 0 and a possible maximum score of 18 across all six 
topics (maximum score of 3 per topic). The second dependent variable was overall cede 
performance which was measured by the total number of topics on which the participant 
ceded, i.e., accepted that they were wrong about their original evidence on the topic when 
challenged by the barrister, with a possible minimum score of 0 and a possible maximum 
score of 6. In addition to the main dependent variables, a further two variables were 
explored. The first additional variable was topic memory trace strength score which 
measured how strong the participant’s memory trace was for correct items of information 
relating to each topic with a possible minimum score of 0 and a possible maximum score of 
3. If the participant did not mention a correct item of information relating to the topic, they 
received a score of 0; if they did mention a correct item of information relating to the topic, 
they received a score of 1; if they included one additional correct detail about the item of 
information, they received a score of 2; and if they included two additional correct details 
about the item of information, they received a score of 3. Therefore, scores on each topic 
ranged from 0 (weak memory trace) to 3 (strong memory trace). The second additional 
variable was topic resistance score which was measured by the point at which the 
participant ceded to the barrister’s challenge on each topic with a possible minimum score 
of 1 and a possible maximum score of 4. In court, cross-examinations typically flow in a 
manner dependent on what arises during questioning. However, in order to ensure that 
there was a reliable way of measuring whether the participant ceded to the challenge and 
at what point they did so, and to enable this to be directly comparable across participants, 
the barrister had a maximum of three attempts to get the participant to cede to his 
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challenge, i.e., accept that they were wrong about their original evidence on the topic. If 
the participant ceded to the challenge on first time of asking, they received a score of 1; if 
they ceded to the challenge on second time of asking, they received a score of 2; if they 
ceded to the challenge on third time of asking, they received a score of 3; and if they did 
not cede at all, they received a score of 4. Therefore, scores on each topic ranged from 1 to 
4 and a higher score indicated greater resistance to the barrister’s challenge. The actual 
questions that the barrister posed to the participant were entirely his choice.  
5.2.2. Participants 
A total of 42 participants (mean age = 23.36, SD = 7.72) comprising 37 females and 
5 males returned to take part in the study on a voluntary basis. These participants all took 
part in the interview study in Chapter 4. Other cross-examination research has used 
samples sizes of 46 (Zajac & Hayne, 2003), 32 (Kebbell et al., 2001), and 21 (Zajac et al., 
2003). Thus, the sample size for this study was at the higher end. There were three groups: 
typical (mean age = 21.00, SD = 3.92), sub-clinical anxiety and depression (mean age = 
24.33, SD = 9.57), and sub-clinical anxiety (mean age = 24.50, SD = 8.20). Table 5.1 presents 
the total number, mean age, SD, and age range for males and females in each group. There 
was no effect of group (typical, sub-clinical anxiety and depression, sub-clinical anxiety) on 
age, F(2, 39) = .87, p = .43. Within the group with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, the 
mock witnesses had mild (N = 10), moderate (N = 2), and severe (N = 3) depression. In the 
interview study in Chapter 4, the mean scores for the group with sub-clinical anxiety and 
depression were 52.90 (SD = 6.51) for anxiety and 21.55 (SD = 6.74) for depression whereas 
in the present study, the mean scores were 51.33 (SD = 5.38) for anxiety and 20.87 (SD = 
6.68) for depression thus the participants in the present study had lower scores of anxiety 
and depression on average. In Chapter 4, the mean score for anxiety for the group with 
sub-clinical anxiety was 46.50 (SD = 6.21) whereas in the present study, the mean score 
was 45.93 (SD = 6.67) thus the participants in the present study had a lower score of 
anxiety on average. With regard to the GSS-2 scores obtained in Chapter 4 by the reduced 
sample in this study, there was no significant effect of group on suggestibility, F(2, 39) = 
.26, p = .78. All participants provided their contact details after taking part in study 2 (see 
Chapter 4) approximately ten months earlier during which they viewed a mock crime on 
video and were interviewed about the event. Approximately 68% of the typical group, 75% 
of the group with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and 78% of the group with sub-
clinical anxiety from study 2 returned to take part in the cross-examinations in the present 
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study. All participants were originally recruited from the local community and the 
University of Winchester. They were contacted about the present study via e-mail.  
 
Table 5.1: Total number, mean age, SD, and age range for males and females in each group 
 
5.2.3. Materials 
Barristers. Two male barristers aged 38 years and 52 years conducted the cross-
examinations over a two-month period. Both were practising barristers from two chambers 
in Winchester. In terms of their experience of cross-examining witnesses within a criminal 
capacity in court, one had eight years and the other had 13 years.  
Witness statement. Prior to the cross-examinations, the barristers were provided with the 
interview transcript of each participant’s interview from study 2 and this document was 
utilised in the same way as a witness statement would be in court. Each barrister was 
provided with only the transcripts of the participants they were individually cross-
examining. Of the 42 cross-examinations that were conducted, one of the barristers 
conducted 26 and the other conducted 16.   
Defence statement. For the cross-examination, a ‘defence statement’ was developed for 
the mock staged crime event (see Appendix U) with the support of a practising barrister in 
order to ensure that it was as ecologically valid as possible. The barrister had 16 years of 
experience and was a different barrister to those who conducted the cross-examinations. 
The defence statement created a more realistic situation in which the barrister was 
representing the defendants in relation to a charge of theft of a mobile phone, car keys, 
 Males   Females 
Group N Mean age SD Age range  N Mean age SD Age range 
Typical 1 19 - -  12 21.17 4.04 18-31 
Anxiety and Depression 1 36 - -  14 23.50 9.35 18-48 
Anxiety 3 26.33 7.51 19-34  11 24 8.65 18-44 
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cash in the form of notes and loose coins to the value of £32.40, sunglasses and case, and a 
laptop computer (see Appendix U). This document and the witness statements were 
utilised by the barristers to devise their cross-examination questions individually for each 
participant.   
Cross-examination protocol. On arrival, all participants were briefed about the cross-
examination and given their witness statement to read in order to refresh their memory of 
their evidence provided at interview, as per the ABE guidance (Ministry of Justice, 2011). 
They were also given the opportunity to ask any questions at this point. After entering the 
room, the barristers asked all participants the following set of opening questions to ensure 
that all participants were starting at the same point prior to the main cross-examination 
questioning phase: “Did you view the video approximately ten months ago? Were there 
three people in the video? None of whom you’d seen before? So, their appearance was not 
familiar to you before you watched the video? Aside from the identification lineups, so far 
as you’re aware; you haven’t seen any of them since? So, your only sight of the individuals 
was a three-minute video clip, approximately ten months ago? It is presumably difficult to 
recall such a short clip after all this time?” (see Appendix V). The main cross-examination 
questioning phase then began. The six topics on which the participants were cross-
examined were selected because all participants mentioned detail relating to these topics 
in their original interview. The topics were covered in the following order for all 
participants: physical description (topic 1), items of clothing (topic 2), surroundings (topic 
3), time of day/light conditions (topic 4), items taken (topic 5), and order of events (topic 
6). This corresponds with the ABE guidance for cross-examining vulnerable witnesses which 
recommends that a systematic and logical sequence of questioning should be used to avoid 
any misunderstanding which could result in the witness giving evidence that is not of the 
best quality that they could provide (Ministry of Justice, 2011). The barristers were also 
instructed to avoid using a firm tone of voice which may be intimidating to a vulnerable 
witness (Ministry of Justice, 2011). They were not informed of the participant’s mental 
health status prior to the cross-examination and consequently adopted a similar cross-
examination technique for all participants. At the end of the main cross-examination 
questioning phase, the barristers read the following closing statement which was identical 
for all participants: “Thank you for your time, you responded well to my questions. I asked 
you some difficult questions and you did well when answering these” (see Appendix V). 
123 
 
Inter-Rater reliability. A second rater coded 20% of the participants’ cross-examinations. 
This sub-sample was randomly selected. Inter-rater reliability was calculated for overall 
cede performance and overall memory trace strength scores. The two raters’ scores were 
significantly correlated for both: r = 1.00, p < .001 and r = .95, p < .001.   
5.2.4. Procedure  
In line with the most recent research on the average court delay in England and 
Wales, all participants were cross-examined approximately ten months after the 
investigative interview (Rossetti, 2015). On arrival, participants were greeted and taken 
into a quiet room at the University of Winchester which was a different room to the one in 
which the investigative interviews took place to avoid spontaneous context reinstatement. 
Initially, participants were shown a copy of the participant information sheet from study 2 
(see Appendix H) to remind them that they would be asked some further questions about 
the mock crime event in a later study (i.e., the present study). They were then informed of 
the purpose of taking part and that there were no risks associated with their participation. 
They were also told that their participation was entirely voluntary and they may withdraw 
from the study at any time up until 14 days after the study without penalty. They were 
informed that no names would be attached to the data and only the researchers involved 
with the study would have access to the data. It was made clear that participant details 
would be coded and no identifiable personal information would be stored on the 
computer, and that participant names would not be audio recorded. Finally, participants 
were informed that the questions would be audio and video recorded for subsequent 
transcription and potential use in a future study. If they were happy to continue, they were 
asked to provide written consent (see Appendix W).  
After providing consent, participants were given a brief explanation of the running order of 
the session. They were advised that they would be meeting a barrister and an explanation 
of the barrister’s role was given. In line with current practice, they were then given their 
witness statement to read to remind them of what they said at interview and told that they 
could take as long as they needed to read their statement. It was highlighted to all 
participants that the witness statement was their version of what happened on the video 
and an important part of the process. Once they had read their statement, it was taken 
from them and they were informed that the barrister would be asking them some 
questions about what they said at interview. They were told to tell the truth about what 
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they could remember and not to guess or leave anything out. It was made clear that if the 
barrister asked them a question to which they did not know the answer, they needed to 
say so. They were also instructed to tell the barrister if they did not understand a question. 
After these instructions were given, participants were asked if they were happy to proceed, 
and all were.  
The barrister was then asked to enter the room. Once seated, the audio and video 
equipment was switched on and the researcher asked the following question: “For the 
purpose of the video equipment, please can you confirm that you are happy to be asked 
some questions?” to which all participants confirmed. The barrister then said: “I’m going to 
ask you some questions about what you said about the video event at interview and I need 
you to listen carefully, and then answer me truthfully”. He began by asking a set of opening 
questions which was identical for all participants (see cross-examination protocol). 
Following this, the main questioning phase of the cross-examination began during which all 
participants were challenged on the six topics relating to the mock crime event.   
After the main questioning phase, the barrister thanked the participants for their time and 
told them that they responded well to the questions. He explained that some difficult 
questions were asked and they did well when answering these (see cross-examination 
protocol). The audio and video equipment was then switched off, the barrister left the 
room, and the participants were debriefed (see Appendix X). The entire cross-examination 
process lasted approximately 20-30 minutes, including the time taken for the participants 
to be briefed and debriefed. The actual cross-examination questioning phase lasted 
approximately 15 minutes. In each case, the researcher was present in the room 
throughout the entire process and positioned out of the participant’s line of sight to 
prevent any potential effects of administrator-witness contact on eyewitness performance 
(Haw & Fisher, 2004).   
5.3. Results 
The data for this chapter will be approached by initially reporting the descriptive 
statistics for the main dependent variables across groups. The relationship between the 
main dependent variables will then be reported followed by the relationship between 
memory trace strength and resistance on each topic. Subsequently, the results of an 
ANOVA exploring the effect of condition on overall memory trace strength will be reported 
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followed by the results of an ANCOVA exploring the effect of condition on overall cede 
performance, controlling for overall memory trace strength as a covariate. Regarding the 
reduced sample in the present study, there was no significant correlation between 
suggestibility scores on the GSS-2 (obtained in Chapter 4) and overall cede performance (r = 
-.19, p = .23).  
  5.3.1. Descriptive Statistics for Overall Memory Trace Strength across Groups 
Table 5.2 displays the mean, SD, and range for the overall memory trace strength 
scores obtained across groups. The possible minimum score was 0 and the possible 
maximum score was 18. A higher overall memory trace strength score indicated a stronger 
memory trace for correct items of information across all topics. The typical group obtained 
the highest mean score and the group with sub-clinical anxiety obtained the lowest. The 
typical group and the group with sub-clinical anxiety obtained the largest range of scores. 
 
Table 5.2: Overall memory trace strength mean scores, SD, and range across groups 
 
5.3.2. Descriptive Statistics for Overall Cede Performance across Groups  
Table 5.3 displays the mean, SD, and range for the overall cede performance scores 
obtained across groups. The possible minimum score was 0 and the possible maximum 
score was 6. A higher overall cede performance score indicated a higher number of topics 
on which the participant ceded to the barrister’s challenges. The typical group obtained the 
highest mean score and the group with sub-clinical anxiety and depression obtained the 
lowest. The group with sub-clinical anxiety obtained the largest range of scores. 
 Overall memory trace strength 
Group Mean SD Range 
Typical 
 
9.08 2.93 5-15 
Anxiety and Depression 9.00 2.07 5-13 
Anxiety 7.36 2.85 4-14 
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5.3.3. Relationship between Overall Memory Trace Strength and Overall Cede 
Performance 
A bivariate correlational analysis was conducted to explore the relationship 
between overall memory trace strength and overall cede performance (see Appendix Y). 
Overall memory trace strength was significantly correlated with overall cede performance, 
r = -.41, p < .01. The stronger the overall memory trace was for correct items of 
information, the fewer topics on which the participant ceded.  
5.3.4. Relationship between Memory Trace Strength and Resistance across Topics 
A series of bivariate correlational analyses were also conducted to explore the 
relationship between memory trace strength and resistance across topics (see Appendix Y). 
A higher topic memory trace strength score indicated a stronger memory trace for correct 
items of information relating to the topic. A higher topic resistance score indicated greater 
resistance to the barrister’s challenges on the topic. Memory trace strength was 
significantly correlated with resistance on all topics. The stronger the memory trace was for 
correct items of information on each topic, the more resistant the participant was to the 
barrister’s challenges. Table 5.4 displays the correlation coefficients and confidence 
intervals for each topic.     
 
 Overall cede performance 
Group Mean SD Range 
Typical 4.15 1.07 2-6 
Anxiety and Depression 3.80 .86 2-5 
Anxiety 4.14 1.46 1-6 
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 Table 5.4: Topic Memory Trace Strength and Topic Resistance correlation coefficients  
   ** p < .01.  
 
5.3.5. Effect of Condition on Overall Memory Trace Strength 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to explore the effect of condition (typical, sub-
clinical anxiety and depression, sub-clinical anxiety) on overall memory trace strength (see 
Appendix Z). The assumptions of the test were met. There was no significant effect of 
condition on overall memory trace strength, F(2, 39) = 1.92, p = .16.  
5.3.6. Effect of Condition on Overall Cede Performance 
An ANCOVA was conducted to explore the effect of condition (typical, sub-clinical 
anxiety and depression, sub-clinical anxiety) on overall cede performance, controlling for 
overall memory trace strength as a covariate (see Appendix AA) as this variable was 
significantly correlated with overall cede performance. The assumptions of the test were 
met. The covariate, overall memory trace strength, was significantly related to overall cede 
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performance, F(1, 38) = 7.89, p < .01, r = .41. However, there was no significant effect of 
condition on overall cede performance after controlling for the effect of overall memory 
trace strength, F(2, 38) = 0.48, p = .62. When the covariate was removed and an ANOVA 
was conducted, there was still no significant effect of condition on overall cede 
performance (F(2, 39) = .44, p = .65).  
Summary. To summarise, overall memory trace strength and overall cede performance 
were significantly correlated. In addition, topic memory trace strength and topic resistance 
were significantly correlated. These findings demonstrate that a stronger memory trace for 
correct items of information was related to greater resistance to the barrister’s challenges. 
There was no significant effect of witness group on overall memory trace strength or 
overall cede performance after controlling for the effect of memory trace strength.  
5.4. Discussion  
The aim of this study was to compare the cross-examination performance of 
witnesses with no mental health problems and witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety and 
depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, approximately ten months after witnessing an event. 
Cross-examination performance was measured by 1) how strong their memory trace was 
for correct items of information and 2) how often they ceded to the cross-examination 
questions (i.e., accepted that they were wrong about their original evidence at interview). 
This is the first study within the literature to investigate the cross-examination 
performance of witnesses with a sub-clinical mental health problem and the method used 
is a novel approach to cross-examination research. The independent variable was mental 
health (typical, sub-clinical anxiety and depression, sub-clinical anxiety). The main 
dependent variables were overall memory trace strength and overall cede performance. 
There were two additional dependent variables which were topic memory trace strength 
score and topic resistance score.  
The findings revealed a significant relationship between the dependent variables. As overall 
memory trace strengthened (i.e., participants demonstrated a stronger memory trace for 
correct items of information across all topics), overall cede performance decreased (i.e., 
participants ceded to the barrister’s challenges on fewer topics). The same pattern of 
results emerged when the relationship between memory trace strength and resistance was 
examined on each topic. These findings are consistent with two theories of memory. The 
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first is the memory trace strength theory of suggestibility which proposes that stronger 
memories are more likely to resist suggestibility than weaker memories (Pezdek & Roe, 
1995). The second is the fuzzy trace theory which suggests that “misleading information 
degrades memory by either altering the trace or by preventing its retrieval (or both), with 
the amount of degradation being dependent upon the current strength of memory for the 
original event details” (Holliday, Douglas, & Hayes, 1999, p. 445). According to these two 
theories, the finding from the present study that participants with a stronger memory trace 
for the crime event were more resistant to the barrister’s suggestions that they were 
wrong about their evidence is to be expected.  
With regard to overall memory trace strength across groups, there was no significant effect 
of condition found. On one hand, this is surprising as there is a large body of research to 
suggest that general memory performance is negatively affected by mental health (e.g., 
Gallassi et al., 2001; Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2011; Plana et al., 2014). One may have 
therefore expected the participants with a mental health problem in this study to have 
demonstrated a weaker memory trace for the crime event. Also, the cross-examinations 
took place after a lengthy delay during which the memory trace is likely to have decayed 
and/or been contaminated by interference (Henderson, 2005). Given that general memory 
capabilities are affected by mental health and delayed memory recall is impaired to a 
greater extent in individuals with depression (e.g., Ramponi et al., 2010; Vythilingam et al., 
2004) and anxiety (e.g., Butters et al., 2011; Crespo et al., 2015), the findings of this study 
are somewhat unexpected. On the other hand, study 2 (see Chapter 4) revealed no 
significant group differences in memory recall for correct information at interview which is 
in line with the present findings. One of the original predictions of the present study was 
that similar findings may emerge to those revealed in study 2. However, it is important to 
highlight that the participants did not have a formal mental health diagnosis and 
consequently the findings cannot be generalised to severe cases. There may be differences 
in the memory recall performance of individuals with a formal diagnosis.   
With regard to overall cede performance across groups, there was also no significant effect 
of condition found after controlling for the effect of overall memory trace strength. When 
the participants were challenged on their evidence, the groups with sub-clinical anxiety and 
depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, did not cede to the barrister’s suggestions that they 
were wrong significantly more than the typical group. It was originally predicted that their 
cross-examination performance would be either worse than or equivalent to the typical 
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group; the latter being based on the findings of study 2 (see Chapter 4). The present 
findings support the latter prediction. This suggests that, as well as being just as accurate in 
memory recall at interview as typical witnesses, witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety and 
depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, perform just as well at cross-examination. The present 
findings correspond to those of a study conducted on children with and without an ID 
which used a similar time delay to the delay used in the present study (and real-life cases) 
between interview and cross-examination, and revealed no group differences in cross-
examination performance (Bettenay et al., 2014). However, care should be taken when 
comparing the present findings to those from studies involving children as the samples are 
very different.     
Furthermore, participants in the present study were questioned about the crime event in a 
suggestive way in which misleading questions were used and much of the literature has 
demonstrated that misleading post-event information can significantly impair memory 
(e.g., Gudjonsson & Henry, 2003; Kebbell et al., 2004; Loftus, 1975; Zaragoza et al., 2007). 
The findings of cross-examination studies have shown that misleading questions can 
impede witness accuracy (e.g., Kebbell & Giles, 2000; Kebbell & Johnson, 2000; Wheatcroft, 
Wagstaff, & Kebbell, 2004) with witnesses often recalling details that represent the 
misinformation rather than details of the actual event (e.g., Jaschinski & Wentura, 2002; 
Zaragoza et al., 2007). It appears that misleading post-event information can contaminate 
memory to a greater degree in vulnerable persons (e.g., Gudjonsson & Henry, 2003; 
Kebbell et al., 2004; Ridley et al., 2002). However, the present study contradicts such 
findings as the participants with a mental health problem were not affected by misleading 
information significantly more than the typical participants. There is currently no research 
that has explored the effect of misleading information on witnesses with a mental health 
problem specifically at cross-examination but there is some literature on the effects of 
mental health on suggestibility more generally. In terms of depression, the literature is 
non-existent. However, regarding anxiety, Ridley (2003) found that state anxiety weakened 
the effect of misleading information with high state anxiety being associated with 
reductions in suggestibility. In contrast, trait anxiety, which is the form of anxiety that is 
relevant to this thesis, was associated with higher levels of suggestibility (Ridley, 2003). Yet, 
in the present study, participants with trait anxiety were no more suggestible than their 
typical counterparts. This finding is somewhat surprising given that the mean trait anxiety 
scores for the groups with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, in 
the present study were higher than those in the study conducted by Ridley (2003). 
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Nevertheless, with regard to the reduced sample in the present study, there was no 
significant effect of mental health on suggestibility at interview in study 2 (see Chapter 4) 
using the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale-2 (GSS-2) (Gudjonsson, 1997) which is consistent 
with the present findings.   
There are several limitations of the present study, some of which are similar to those 
outlined in study 2 (see Chapter 4) as the participants took part in both studies. First, the 
participants were not totally representative of the general population as they were largely 
students. Second, the groups with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical 
anxiety, did not have a formal mental health diagnosis and consequently different findings 
may have emerged if more severe cases of anxiety and depression had been explored. 
Third, the barristers were approachable and the context in which the cross-examinations 
took place was familiar to most of the participants as they were conducted at the 
University of Winchester. Therefore, the potential trauma of a real court case could not be 
replicated which limits the extent to which the findings can be generalised to real cases. 
Additionally, although positioned out of view, the researcher was present in the room at all 
times which may have caused the participants to feel more at ease than if they were 
partaking in a real case. Furthermore, the length of the cross-examinations was on average 
15 minutes. It seems that there is no specific time frame that fits all cross-examinations as 
it is dependent upon the circumstances of the case (Clark, Dekle, & Bailey, 2015). Whilst 
there is no literature regarding how long a typical cross-examination of a vulnerable adult 
with a mental health problem lasts, the ABE guidance outlines that some vulnerable 
witnesses may need breaks whilst giving their evidence (Ministry of Justice, 2011) which 
indicates that real cases are likely to be lengthy. However, for ethical reasons, it would not 
have been possible to replicate the length of a real cross-examination. One may argue that 
the cross-examination performance across groups may have been different in this study 
had the cross-examinations been longer and more severe mental health cases had been 
examined. Finally, it may have been useful to measure the participants’ stress levels and 
physiological reactions whilst being cross-examined as the process in itself may have 
induced anxiety. This needs to be considered for future research.  
To conclude, the cross-examination performance of the witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety 
and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, was equivalent to that of the typical witnesses 
with no mental health problems. This indicates that their memory trace for the original 
crime event was just as strong and they were just as resistant to the barrister’s suggestions 
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that they were wrong about their evidence. Such findings contradict previous research 
involving other vulnerable groups but are consistent with the findings of study 2 (see 
Chapter 4) which found no significant group differences in memory accuracy and 




















Study 4: Mock Jurors’ Perceptions of Eyewitnesses with Sub-Clinical Anxiety and 
Depression, and Sub-Clinical Anxiety 
Abstract  
The aim of this study was to assess mock jurors’ perceptions of witnesses with sub-clinical 
anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, compared to a typical witness with no 
mental health problems either with or without the provision of knowledge regarding the 
witness’s mental health status. One hundred and twenty participants viewed a witness 
giving evidence at interview and cross-examination. Participants were assigned to one of 
six groups. Two groups viewed a witness with sub-clinical anxiety and depression; one of 
which was informed of their mental health problem. Two groups viewed a witness with 
sub-clinical anxiety; one of which was informed of their mental health problem. Two 
groups viewed a typical witness; one of which was informed that they did not have a 
mental health problem. Overall, the witness with sub-clinical anxiety and depression was 
perceived to be less credible than the other two witnesses and the mock jurors were more 
inclined to consider the defendants to be not guilty as a result of viewing the witnesses 
with a mental health problem. Both sets of findings were irrespective of whether the mock 
jurors were informed of the witness’s mental health status. The implications of these 
findings are discussed in relation to the criminal justice process.  
6.1. Introduction  
 Within Chapter 2 of this thesis, a study was presented which addressed the 
perceived reliability and credibility of witnesses with a mental health problem from the 
perspective of legal professionals working at various stages of the criminal justice process. 
However, along with assessing legal professionals’ perceptions, it is also important to 
determine how such witnesses are perceived by jury members. The UK has an adversarial 
judicial system in which a prosecuting advocate and a defense advocate argue their points 
before an impartial group of people, known as a jury, who attempt to determine the truth. 
Under the Contempt of Court Act (1981), the members of a jury in the UK cannot discuss 
how they reach their decision and therefore it is impossible to know which factors may 
influence the decision-making process. However, understanding the factors that may affect 
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their decision making is important in determining whether juries are fair. If, for example, 
jurors use their own biases in place of the witness’s actual testimony to reach their 
decision, this could result in an unfair trial. Research has shown that when jurors perceive a 
witness to lack credibility, they are less likely to decide that the defendant is guilty (Pica, 
Sheahan, Mesesan, & Pozzulo, 2017). There are several factors that appear to influence 
jurors’ perceptions of credibility such as eye contact (e.g., Field et al., 2010), confidence 
(e.g., Dodson & Dobolyi, 2015), and emotion (e.g., Cooper, Quas, & Cleveland, 2014) which 
suggests that jurors do not rely exclusively on the content of the witness’s testimony but 
use other factors on which to base their decision.  
A further factor that has been shown to affect jurors’ decision making is vulnerability (e.g., 
Allison et al., 2006; Bruer & Pozzulo, 2012; Henry et al., 2011). Within the literature, there 
are a number of studies that have explored jurors’ perceptions of testimony provided by 
vulnerable witnesses and the research seems to suggest that such witnesses are perceived 
differently to typical witnesses. For example, child witnesses are perceived with less 
integrity than adult witnesses (e.g., Bruer & Pozzulo, 2012) and children with an ID are seen 
to be less credible than typically developing children (e.g., Henry et al., 2011). There is also 
evidence to suggest that jurors perceive elderly adults to be less believable than their 
younger counterparts (e.g., Allison et al., 2006) and are reluctant to rely on the evidence 
provided by adults with an ID (e.g., Stobbs & Kebbell, 2003). Nevertheless, literature on 
jurors’ perceptions of witnesses with a mental health problem is extremely limited.  
As mental health is a growing public health concern (Mental Health Foundation, 2019a) and 
it is common for individuals with a mental health problem to encounter the CJS (Prison 
Reform Trust and Rethink Mental Illness, 2013), it is crucial to determine how they are 
perceived as witnesses within the context of a jury. It is even more crucial that jurors’ 
perceptions of anxiety and depression are explored given that these are amongst the most 
prevalent mental health problems within society (Mental Health Foundation, 2019b). As 
outlined in this thesis, there is very little empirical research on the performance of 
witnesses with a mental health problem when providing evidence within a criminal justice 
context. With studies 2 and 3 (see Chapters 4 and 5) indicating that the testimonies of 
witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, are just as 
accurate as those provided by witnesses with no mental health problems, it is crucial to 
understand how jurors perceive their evidence. This is important because eyewitness 
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testimony is one of the most influential pieces of evidence presented to a jury (Brewer & 
Burke, 2002).  
There is a large body of literature to suggest that individuals with a mental health problem 
experience public stigma (i.e., stereotypes, prejudices, and discrimination). Approximately 
nine out of ten individuals with a mental health problem experience mental health related 
stigma (Corker et al., 2016) and are less likely to seek help and support as a result (Clement 
et al., 2015). Due to members of the public having stereotypical views about mental health 
and how it affects people (Mental Health Foundation, 2019c), the credibility of witnesses 
with a mental health problem could be questioned by jurors. Indeed, there is research to 
suggest that the beliefs of jurors can be influenced by stereotypes which can subsequently 
affect their judgements about the credibility of a witness (Peled et al., 2004). Whilst, in 
real-life cases, jurors may or may not be aware that a witness has got a mental health 
problem when asked to evaluate their evidence, research has shown that the mere 
knowledge of a witness having a vulnerability can bias jurors’ perceptions of the credibility 
of their testimony, irrespective of the quality of their evidence (Peled et al., 2004). 
Therefore, the present study focuses on whether providing mock jurors with the 
knowledge that a witness has got a mental health problem influences their perceptions of 
the witness’s credibility. One may argue that providing jurors with information about a 
witness’s mental health problem could cause them to perceive the credibility of the 
witness less favourably given the stigma associated with mental health. On the other hand, 
previous research with other vulnerable groups has demonstrated that the provision of 
additional information can in fact help to reduce unfair biases held about their credibility. 
Sasson and Morrison (2017), for example, found that notifying typically developing adult 
observers of an individual’s diagnosis of autism led to the observers judging the individual 
more favourably. Similar findings have been revealed with other diagnoses such as 
Alzheimer’s disease and major depression (e.g., Wadley & Haley, 2001). The findings of the 
previous two chapters of this thesis suggest that the accuracy and reliability of testimony 
provided by a witness with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, or sub-clinical anxiety, is not 
necessarily poorer than that of a typical witness. Consequently, it is vital that jurors are not 
disregarding the evidence of a potentially credible witness because of stereotypes about 
mental health. Within the literature, most of the mock juror studies have focused on the 
interview stage of the legal process using interview transcripts (e.g., Bruer & Pozzulo, 2012; 
Stobbs & Kebbell, 2003) whereas the present study is based on video material of witness 
interviews and cross-examinations, making the research more ecologically valid.   
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6.1.1. The Present Study 
Based on the fact that the literature on mental health and its effects on eyewitness 
memory is sparse and there is a strong stigma attached to mental health, it is likely that 
mock jurors will have biased perceptions of witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety and 
depression, and sub-clinical anxiety. By informing mock jurors that a witness has got a 
mental health problem, prior to hearing their evidence, it is expected that their perceptions 
will be influenced. It is also expected that mock jurors’ perceptions of a witness with no 
mental health problems will be unaffected by whether or not they are informed that the 
witness does not have a mental health problem. The interviews and cross-examinations 
used in the present study were taken from studies 2 and 3 of this thesis in which adults 
with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, and typical adults with no 
mental health problems were asked questions about a previously witnessed mock staged 
crime. 
6.2. Method 
6.2.1. Design  
The study was a 3 x 2 between participants design. The first independent variable 
was mental health status of the witness (no mental health problems, sub-clinical anxiety 
and depression, sub-clinical anxiety). The second independent variable was knowledge 
(whether or not the mock jurors were informed of the witness’s mental health status). 
There were ten dependent variables which measured the mock jurors’ perceptions of the 
witness at interview. Perceptions were measured in terms of how accurate, convincing, 
confident (in their account), confident (in their general demeanour), competent, honest, 
and believable the witness appeared as well as their completeness of testimony, level of 
cognitive functioning, and capability to testify. Responses were measured on a 7-point 
Likert scale with lower scores indicating, for example, less accurate or convincing. These 
ten dependent variables were also used to measure the mock jurors’ perceptions of the 
witness at cross-examination. There were three further dependent variables which 
measured their perceptions of the witness’s credibility at interview, at cross-examination, 
and overall (across both interview and cross-examination). In addition, the mock jurors’ 
verdict was measured in terms of whether they perceived the defendants to be guilty or 
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not guilty on the basis of the witness’s testimony and qualitative responses were obtained 
with regard to how the witness’s credibility might have been improved.  
6.2.2. Participants 
A total of 120 jury eligible individuals (mean age = 45.21, SD = 16.32) comprising 72 
females and 48 males took part in the study on a voluntary basis. For a MANOVA examining 
the effect of the independent variable (witness’s mental health status) on mock jurors’ 
perceptions, a post hoc power analysis on the sample of 120 was conducted using the 
software package, GPower (Faul et al., 2007). The recommended effect sizes used were as 
follows: small (.10), medium (.30), and large (.50; see Cohen, 1988). The alpha level used 
for this analysis was p < .05. A post hoc analysis revealed that the statistical power for this 
study was 1.0. Thus, there was adequate power at the large effect size. In each group, 
there were 20 participants (twelve females and eight males). Two groups viewed a witness 
with sub-clinical anxiety and depression; one of which was informed of their mental health 
problem. Two groups viewed a witness with sub-clinical anxiety; one of which was 
informed of their mental health problem. Two groups viewed a typical witness; one of 
which was informed that they did not have a mental health problem. Table 6.1 presents the 
total number, mean age, SD, and age range for males and females in each group. There was 
no effect of group on age, F(5, 114) = .20, p = .96. The majority of the participants were 
White British. There were four participants from a different ethnic background (Asian 
British, Mixed White and Asian, Mixed White and Black Caribbean, and Other White 
Background) and these four participants were in different experimental conditions (typical 
informed, typical uninformed, anxiety and depression informed, and anxiety uninformed). 
All participants were recruited from the local community in Winchester and the 







Table 6.1: Total number, mean age (SD), and age range for males and females in each 
group 
 Males  Females 
Group N Mean Range  N Mean Range 
Anxiety and Depression  
(informed)  
 








8 45.00 (20.28) 22-74  12 48.75 (15.51) 20-69 
Anxiety and Depression  
(uninformed)  
 








8 41.63 (15.63) 22-67  12 45.58 (16.62) 26-70 
 
6.2.3. Materials 
Video Material. A total of six videos were selected for the present study which 
were taken from studies 2 and 3 of this thesis. All participants on the videos provided their 
consent to be recorded. The video material comprised one interview and one cross-
examination of three separate mock witnesses: 1) a typical witness with no mental health 
problems, 2) a witness with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and 3) a witness with sub-
clinical anxiety. Participants were each shown two videos: one video of a witness at 
interview and one video of the same witness at cross-examination. The videos were 
selected using specific criteria to ensure that they were matched as much as possible. All 
witnesses were female, White British, aged between 19 and 24 years, and spoke English as 
their first language. These criteria represented the majority of the mock witnesses in 
studies 2 and 3. The interviews were similar in length of time (between six minutes 21 
seconds and six minutes 42 seconds) and comprised a similar number of correct items of 
information recalled by the mock witnesses (between 33 and 39 items). In addition, the 
cross-examinations were similar in length of time (between nine minutes 32 seconds and 
nine minutes 56 seconds) and all witnesses were cross-examined by the same barrister.  
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Questionnaire. There was one questionnaire used for this study which had a 
different introduction according to participant condition (see Appendix BB). For the 
informed groups, the questionnaire included one of the following introductory statements: 
“The witness has anxiety and depression”, “The witness has anxiety”, or “The witness does 
not have a mental health problem”. For the uninformed groups, no information about the 
witness’s mental health status was given. The questionnaire was divided into three main 
sections. The first section comprised a set of ten scaled-response questions relating to the 
witness at interview (first video clip). Participants were asked to circle a number between 
one and seven that they felt best represented 1) how accurate the witness’s account was, 
2) how convincing the witness was in their account, 3) how confident the witness appeared 
in what they said in their account, 4) how confident the witness appeared in their general 
demeanour, 5) how competent the witness appeared in their account, 6) how honest the 
witness appeared, 7) how believable the witness appeared, 8) how complete the witness’s 
account appeared, 9) the witness’s overall level of cognitive functioning (i.e., their ability to 
think, reason and remember), and 10) the witness’s capability to testify. A lower score on 
the 7-point Likert scale indicated, for example, less accurate or convincing. The second 
section comprised the same set of ten scaled-response questions but relating to the 
witness at cross-examination (second video clip). The third section included three further 
scaled-response questions relating to perceived credibility of the witness at interview, at 
cross-examination, and overall (taking into account both videos). There was an optional 
question at the end of each section asking participants how the witness’s credibility might 
be improved. At the end of the questionnaire, participants were asked to indicate whether 
they believed the defendants to be guilty or not guilty on the basis of the witness 
testimony (if all other evidence was equal). Finally, the informed participants who viewed 
the witnesses with a mental health problem were asked if they remembered that the 
witness had anxiety and depression, or anxiety, in order to check that the manipulation was 
successful (see Appendix BB). All participants responded with ‘yes’ to this question.   
6.2.4. Procedure  
All participants took part in the present study in a quiet, convenient location such 
as their own home or an office in their workplace. Initially, they were given the participant 
information sheet to read (see Appendix CC). They were then informed of the purpose of 
taking part and that there were no risks associated with their participation. They were also 
told that their participation was entirely voluntary and they may withdraw from the study 
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at any time up until 14 days after the study without penalty. They were informed that no 
names would be attached to the data and only the researchers involved with the study 
would have access to the data. It was made clear that participant details would be coded 
and no identifiable personal information would be stored on the computer. If they were 
happy to continue, they were asked to provide written consent (see Appendix DD).  
After providing consent, participants were given a brief explanation of the running order of 
the study. They were informed that they would be viewing a video interview and a video 
cross-examination provided by a witness to a mild mock crime event and asked some 
questions about the accuracy and reliability of their evidence. They were then asked to 
read the eligibility for jury service criteria on the first page of the questionnaire (see 
Appendix BB) to check that they were eligible for jury service in the UK and provide a 
response by circling ‘yes’ or ‘no’. All participants responded with ‘yes’. They were also 
asked to provide some demographic details such as age, gender, and ethnicity. They were 
then asked to read the statement at the bottom of the page (“Now we would like you to 
watch a short video clip of a witness being interviewed about an event they have seen”). For 
the informed groups, information about the witness’s mental health status was given. All 
participants were asked to close the questionnaire and refrain from opening it again until 
after the video clip had been shown.  
The video clip of the witness at interview was shown first. After viewing the video clip, 
participants were asked to complete the first section of the questionnaire (see materials 
section). At the end of this section, the questionnaire included the following statement: 
“Now we would like you to watch a short video clip of the same witness being cross-
examined by a barrister”. The video clip of the witness at cross-examination was shown. 
After viewing the video clip, participants were asked to complete the second section of the 
questionnaire (see materials section). Once this section had been completed, participants 
were instructed to complete the third section of the questionnaire (see materials section). 
Finally, all participants were asked to respond to the following question: “If all other 
evidence is equal; on the basis of this witness testimony, do you think the defendants are 
guilty or not guilty?” They were asked to circle ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’. For the informed 
groups who viewed the video clips of the witnesses with a mental health problem, 
participants were asked if they remembered that the witness had anxiety and depression, 
or anxiety. Once the questionnaire had been completed, the participants were thanked for 
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their time and debriefed (see Appendix EE). The study lasted approximately 60 minutes, 
including the time taken for the participants to be briefed and debriefed.    
6.3. Results  
The data for this chapter will be approached by initially reporting the results of a 
MANOVA which explored the effects of the witness’s mental health status (typical, sub-
clinical anxiety and depression, sub-clinical anxiety) and knowledge (informed or 
uninformed) on the interview questionnaire items. Following this, the results of a MANOVA 
which explored the effects of the witness’s mental health status (typical, sub-clinical 
anxiety and depression, sub-clinical anxiety) and knowledge (informed or uninformed) on 
the cross-examination questionnaire items will be reported. Subsequently, the results of a 
one-way ANOVA will be reported which examined the effects of the two independent 
variables described above on mock jurors’ perceptions of the witness’s overall credibility 
(across both interview and cross-examination). Then, the results of a loglinear analysis will 
be reported which explored the associations between 1) the witness’s mental health 
status, 2) whether mock jurors were informed of the witness’s mental health status, and 3) 
whether they considered the defendants to be guilty or not guilty (verdict). Finally, 
qualitative responses from the questionnaires will be reported in terms of how witness 
credibility could be improved. Initial explorations of the data indicated that the dependent 
variables were normally distributed and there were no significant outliers. Multicollinearity 
describes a situation in which two or more variables are very closely linearly related (Field, 
2018). To avoid multicollinearity, Field (2018) suggests eliminating one (or more) variables 
when the correlation between two variables is greater than .80 (r > .80). In the present 
study, all correlation scores were below .80 and therefore no variables were eliminated 
from the analyses.   
6.3.1. Effect of Condition and Knowledge on Interview Items 
A MANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of the witness’s mental health 
status (typical, sub-clinical anxiety and depression, sub-clinical anxiety) and knowledge 
(informed or uninformed) on mock jurors’ perceptions of the witness at interview (see 
Appendix FF). Although the assumption of homogeneity was not met for three of the 
dependent variables (confidence in account, believability, and capability to testify; see 
Appendix FF), there was no need to transform the data as the sample sizes were equal 
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(Blanca et al., 2017; Field, 2018). In terms of interpreting the MANOVA results, Pillai’s trace 
statistic was used because it is the most powerful and robust (Field, 2018). Using Pillai’s 
trace, there was a significant main effect of the witness’s mental health status on mock 
jurors’ perceptions, V = 0.33, F(22, 210) = 1.89, p < .05, ƞp2 = .17. Post hoc comparisons 
using the Tukey HSD test indicated that there was a significant difference (p < .05) between 
perceptions of the typical witness and the witness with sub-clinical anxiety and depression 
on all of the interview questionnaire items. For each item, the mock jurors’ perceptions 
were more positive for the typical witness (see Table 6.2 for means and SDs). There was 
also a significant difference (p < .05) between perceptions of the witness with sub-clinical 
anxiety and the witness with sub-clinical anxiety and depression on the following 
questionnaire items: accurate, convincing, confident (in account), competent, believable, 
credible, completeness of testimony, and cognitive functioning. For each item, the mock 
jurors’ perceptions were more positive for the witness with sub-clinical anxiety (see Table 
6.2 for means and SDs). There was no significant main effect of knowledge on mock jurors’ 
perceptions, V = 0.12, F(11, 104) = 1.25, p = .27. There was also no significant interaction 
between the witness’s mental health status and knowledge on mock jurors’ perceptions, V 
= 0.19, F(22, 210) = 0.98, p = .50. Table 6.2 displays the mean and SD of scores obtained 
across groups for the interview items of the questionnaire.  
143 
 
Table 6.2: Mean score (SD) for the interview questionnaire items across groups   
 Anxiety and Depression  Anxiety  Typical 
 Informed Uninformed Overall  Informed Uninformed Overall  Informed Uninformed Overall 
Item Mean Mean Mean  Mean Mean Mean  Mean Mean Mean 
Accurate 4.25 (1.02) 4.10 (.79) 4.18 (.90)  5.10 (1.21) 4.85 (.99) 4.98 (1.10)  5.20 (1.12) 4.90 (.85) 5.05 (.99) 
Convincing 3.80 (1.61) 3.80 (1.24) 3.80 (1.42)  4.75 (1.33) 4.40 (1.14) 4.58 (1.29)  4.90 (.85) 4.95 (1.36) 4.93 (1.12) 
Confident (account) 3.50 (1.19) 3.45 (1.54) 3.48 (1.36)  4.60 (1.00) 4.50 (.83) 4.55 (.90)  4.60 (1.14) 5.00 (1.17) 4.80 (1.16) 
Confident (general) 3.20 (1.24) 3.15 (1.50) 3.18 (1.36)  3.70 (1.38) 3.90 (1.17) 3.80 (1.27)  4.15 (1.53) 4.00 (1.59) 4.08 (1.54) 
Competent 3.80 (1.20) 4.05 (1.15) 3.93 (1.16)  4.75 (1.16) 4.45 (1.15) 4.60 (1.15)  4.90 (.97) 4.80 (1.24) 4.85 (1.10) 
Honest 5.40 (1.23) 5.35 (.81) 5.38 (1.03)  5.65 (1.42) 5.85 (.88) 5.75 (1.17)  6.05 (1.00) 5.95 (1.00) 6.00 (.99) 
Believable 4.25 (1.68) 4.45 (1.05) 4.35 (1.39)  5.40 (1.10) 5.50 (.83) 5.45 (.96)  5.50 (1.10) 5.50 (1.15) 5.50 (1.11) 
Complete 3.60 (1.31) 3.40 (1.23) 3.50 (1.26)  4.50 (1.32) 4.05 (1.10) 4.28 (1.22)  4.40 (1.35) 4.30 (1.38) 4.35 (1.35) 
Cognitive functioning 3.75 (1.33) 4.55 (1.70) 4.15 (1.56)  5.15 (.93) 4.80 (1.20) 4.98 (1.07)  5.35 (1.14) 5.05 (1.43) 5.20 (1.29) 
Capability to testify 4.25 (1.16) 4.20 (1.74) 4.23 (1.46)  5.00 (.97) 4.80 (1.15) 4.90 (1.06)  5.30 (1.26) 4.75 (1.52) 5.03 (1.41) 
Credible 3.90 (1.37) 4.20 (1.20) 4.05 (1.28)  4.95 (1.00) 5.00 (.80) 4.98 (.89)  5.00 (1.21) 5.10 (1.12) 5.05 (1.15) 
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6.3.2. Effect of Condition and Knowledge on Cross-Examination Items    
A MANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of the witness’s mental health 
status (typical, sub-clinical anxiety and depression, sub-clinical anxiety) and knowledge 
(informed or uninformed) on mock jurors’ perceptions of the witness at cross-examination 
(see Appendix FF). The assumption of homogeneity was met for all dependent variables 
and again Pillai’s trace statistic was used because it is the most powerful and robust (Field, 
2018). Using Pillai’s trace, there was no significant main effect of the witness’s mental 
health status on mock jurors’ perceptions, V = 0.20, F(22, 210) = 1.05, p = .41. There was 
also no significant main effect of knowledge on mock jurors’ perceptions, V = 0.15, F(11, 
104) = 1.60, p = .11. However, there was a significant interaction between the witness’s 
mental health status and knowledge on mock jurors’ perceptions, V = 0.37, F(22, 210) = 
2.20, p < .01, ƞp2 = .19. In each case, the difference emerged when the mock jurors were 
informed about the mental health status of the witness. When informed, there was a 
significant difference (p < .05) between perceptions of the accuracy of the typical witness 
(M = 4.75, SD = 1.16) and the witness with sub-clinical anxiety and depression (M = 3.80, SD 
= 1.32) with the mock jurors perceiving the typical witness to be more accurate. When 
informed, there was also a significant difference (p < .01) between perceptions of the 
cognitive functioning of the typical witness (M = 5.50, SD = 1.10) and the witness with sub-
clinical anxiety and depression (M = 4.20, SD = 1.64), again with the mock jurors perceiving 
the typical witness to have better cognitive functioning. Furthermore, when informed, 
there was a significant difference (p < .05) between perceptions of the honesty of the 
typical witness (M = 6.20, SD = .70) and the witness with sub-clinical anxiety (M = 5.40, SD = 
1.47), again with the mock jurors perceiving the typical witness to be more honest. Table 
6.3 displays the mean and SD of scores obtained across groups for the cross-examination 




Table 6.3: Mean score (SD) for the cross-examination questionnaire items across groups   
 Anxiety and Depression  Anxiety  Typical 
 Informed Uninformed Overall  Informed Uninformed Overall  Informed Uninformed Overall 
Item Mean Mean Mean  Mean Mean Mean  Mean Mean Mean 
Accurate 3.80 (1.32) 4.20 (1.15) 4.00 (1.24) 
 
 3.95 (1.19) 3.90 (1.07) 3.93 (1.12)  4.75 (1.16) 4.25 (1.29) 4.50 (1.24) 
Convincing 4.00 (1.45) 4.40 (1.14) 4.20 (1.31)  4.05 (1.40) 3.80 (1.24) 3.93 (1.31)  4.65 (1.27) 4.35 (1.42) 4.50 (1.34) 
Confident (account) 4.40 (1.27) 4.20 (1.28) 4.30 (1.27)  3.80 (1.74) 4.25 (1.12) 4.03 (1.46)  4.75 (1.21) 4.40 (1.47) 4.58 (1.34) 
Confident (general) 5.05 (1.10) 4.50 (1.24) 4.78 (1.19)  4.05 (1.57) 4.55 (1.23) 4.30 (1.42)  4.85 (1.31) 4.25 (1.41) 4.55 (1.38) 
Competent 4.40 (1.27) 4.25 (1.21) 4.33 (1.23)  3.95 (1.47) 4.35 (1.35) 4.15 (1.41)  4.65 (1.23) 4.60 (1.43) 4.63 (1.31) 
Honest 6.00 (.92) 5.65 (.81) 5.83 (.87)  5.40 (1.47) 5.60 (.88) 5.50 (1.20)  6.20 (.70) 5.90 (1.12) 6.05 (.93) 
Believable 4.80 (1.32) 4.90 (1.02) 4.85 (1.17)  4.85 (1.31) 4.70 (1.08) 4.78 (1.19)  5.55 (.89) 5.30 (1.26) 5.43 (1.08) 
Complete 3.15 (1.27) 3.55 (1.40) 3.35 (1.33)  3.35 (.99) 3.35 (.81) 3.35 (.89)  4.00 (1.21) 3.65 (1.50) 3.83 (1.36) 
Cognitive functioning 4.20 (1.64) 4.90 (1.25) 4.55 (1.48)  4.90 (1.29) 4.65 (1.31) 4.78 (1.29)  5.50 (1.10) 4.90 (1.37) 5.20 (1.27) 
Capability to testify 4.95 (1.05) 4.35 (1.69) 4.65 (1.42)  4.60 (1.60) 4.65 (1.50) 4.63 (1.53)  5.60 (1.31) 4.90 (1.59) 5.25 (1.48) 
Credible 4.40 (1.50) 4.05 (1.32) 4.23 (1.41)  4.30 (1.22) 3.75 (1.29) 4.03 (1.27)  4.90 (1.21) 4.40 (1.39) 4.65 (1.31) 
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6.3.3. Effect of Condition and Knowledge on Overall Credibility  
A 3 x 2 between participants ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of the 
witness’s mental health status (typical, sub-clinical anxiety and depression, sub-clinical 
anxiety) and knowledge (informed or uninformed) on mock jurors’ perceptions of the 
witness’s overall credibility across both interview and cross-examination (see Appendix 
GG). There was a significant main effect of the witness’s mental health status on mock 
jurors’ perceptions, F(2, 114) = 5.44, p < .01, ƞp2 = .09. Post hoc comparisons using the 
Tukey HSD test indicated that there was a significant difference (p < .01) between 
perceptions of the typical witness (M = 4.88, SD = 1.11) and the witness with sub-clinical 
anxiety and depression (M = 4.05, SD = 1.30) with the mock jurors perceiving the typical 
witness to be more credible. There was no significant difference (p = .08) between 
perceptions of the typical witness (M = 4.88, SD = 1.11) and the witness with sub-clinical 
anxiety (M = 4.32, SD = .97) and no significant difference (p = .53) between perceptions of 
the witness with sub-clinical anxiety and depression (M = 4.05, SD = 1.30) and the witness 
with sub-clinical anxiety (M = 4.32, SD = .97). There was no significant main effect of 
knowledge on mock jurors’ perceptions, F(1, 114) = 0.93, p = .34. There was also no 
significant interaction between the witness’s mental health status and knowledge on mock 
jurors’ perceptions, F(2, 114) = 0.75, p = .47.  
6.3.4. Associations between Condition, Knowledge, and Verdict 
A three-way loglinear analysis was conducted to explore the associations between 
mental health status of the witness (typical, sub-clinical anxiety and depression, sub-clinical 
anxiety), knowledge (informed or uninformed), and verdict (guilty or not guilty) (see 
Appendix HH). The analysis produced a final model that retained one higher-order effect. 
The two-way interaction between mental health status of the witness and verdict was 
significant, χ2 (11) = 26.93, p < .05. Table 6.4 displays the frequency counts for guilty/not 
guilty decisions based on each witness. To further examine this interaction, a Chi-square 
test was performed (see Appendix II). The analysis found a significant association between 
mental health status of the witness and verdict, χ2 (2) = 9.98, p < .01. Eighty-five percent of 
mock jurors who viewed the typical witness considered the defendants to be guilty 
compared with 62.5% of mock jurors who viewed the witness with sub-clinical anxiety and 
depression and 52.5% of mock jurors who viewed the witness with sub-clinical anxiety. 
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Field (2018) states that, in order to decompose what contributes to the overall association 
that the Chi-square statistic measures, it is important to examine the individual 
standardized residuals. If the value lies outside of +/-1.96 then it is significant at p < .05 
(Field, 2018). The Chi-square test revealed one standardized residual that was greater than 
1.96. The mock jurors who viewed the typical witness made significantly fewer not guilty 
verdicts than the mock jurors who viewed the other two witnesses (z = -2.0), i.e., the mock 
jurors who viewed the witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical 
anxiety, were more inclined to consider the defendants to be not guilty on the basis of the 
witness testimony.  
 
Table 6.4: Frequency counts for guilty/not guilty decisions based on each witness    
 
6.3.5 Qualitative Responses to Improving Eyewitness Credibility 
After viewing the witness at interview, mock jurors were asked how they thought 
the witness’s credibility might be improved. Eighty-eight of the 120 mock jurors (73.3%) 
provided a response to this free recall question with a similar number of mock jurors 
responding for each witness (typical: 27; sub-clinical anxiety and depression: 33; sub-
clinical anxiety: 28) and a near equal divide between the informed and uninformed 
conditions (informed: 43; uninformed: 45). Irrespective of the witness’s mental health 
status and whether mock jurors were informed of their mental health problem, the most 
common suggestion, provided by 45.5% of the mock jurors who responded, was for the 
witness to provide more detail. Other frequently mentioned suggestions included the 
witness having more confidence in what she was saying (27.3%) and holding herself more 
confidently (26.1%). The same free recall question was put to the mock jurors after viewing 
the witness at cross-examination. Fifty-four of the 120 mock jurors (45%) provided a 
 Guilty Not guilty 
Typical  34 6 
Anxiety and Depression 25 15 
Anxiety  21 19 
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response with a similar number of mock jurors responding for each witness (typical: 16; 
sub-clinical anxiety and depression: 21; sub-clinical anxiety: 17) and a near equal divide 
between the informed and uninformed conditions (informed: 28; uninformed: 26). The 
most common suggestion, provided by 61.1% of the mock jurors who responded, was for 
the witness to have more confidence in what she was saying, followed by the witness 
providing a clearer account (18.5%). In terms of how the witness’s overall credibility (across 
both interview and cross-examination) could be improved, 44 of the 120 mock jurors 
(36.7%) provided a response with a similar number of mock jurors responding for each 
witness (typical: 14; sub-clinical anxiety and depression: 13; sub-clinical anxiety: 17) and a 
near equal divide between the informed and uninformed conditions (informed: 23; 
uninformed: 21). The most common suggestion, provided by 40.9% of the mock jurors who 
responded, was for the witness to be more consistent in her responses between the 
interview and cross-examination.  
With regard to the interview, when mock jurors were uninformed of the witness’s mental 
health status, providing more detail remained the most commonly mentioned suggestion 
for improving credibility for both the typical witness (50%) and the witness with sub-clinical 
anxiety (71.4%). However, for the witness with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, having 
more confidence in what she was saying was the most commonly stated means of 
improving credibility (47.1%). Similar findings were revealed when mock jurors were 
informed of the witness’s mental health status. Providing more detail remained the most 
commonly mentioned suggestion for improving credibility for both the typical witness 
(61.5%) and the witness with sub-clinical anxiety (42.9%). For the witness with sub-clinical 
anxiety and depression, having more confidence in what she was saying was the most 
common suggestion (43.8%). In terms of the cross-examination, when mock jurors were 
uninformed of the witness’s mental health status, having more confidence in what she was 
saying remained the most commonly mentioned suggestion for improving credibility for all 
three witnesses (typical: 57.1%; sub-clinical anxiety and depression: 60%; sub-clinical 
anxiety: 44.4%). The same suggestion remained the most common for all three witnesses 
when mock jurors were informed of their mental health status (typical: 88.9%; sub-clinical 
anxiety and depression: 45.5%; sub-clinical anxiety: 75%). Regarding the witness’s overall 
credibility (across both interview and cross-examination), when mock jurors were 
uninformed of the witness’s mental health status, being more consistent in their responses 
between the interview and cross-examination remained the most commonly mentioned 
suggestion for improving credibility for all three witnesses (typical: 57.1%; sub-clinical 
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anxiety and depression: 66.7%; sub-clinical anxiety: 62.5%). This also remained the most 
common suggestion for all three witnesses when mock jurors were informed of their 
mental health status (typical: 71.4%; sub-clinical anxiety and depression: 57.1%; sub-clinical 
anxiety: 77.8%).  
Summary. To summarise, the mock jurors perceived the witness with sub-clinical anxiety 
and depression less favourably at interview than the other two witnesses, irrespective of 
whether they were informed of the witness’s mental health status. At cross-examination, 
the witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, were 
perceived less favourably when the mock jurors were informed of their mental health 
problem but only for a limited number of the questionnaire items. In terms of overall 
credibility, the witness with sub-clinical anxiety and depression was perceived to be less 
credible than the other two witnesses. In addition, the mock jurors who viewed the 
witnesses with a mental health problem were more inclined to consider the defendants to 
be not guilty than those who viewed the typical witness, regardless of whether they knew 
about their mental health status. 
6.4. Discussion 
The aim of this study was to compare mock jurors’ perceptions of a typical witness 
with no mental health problems, a witness with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and a 
witness with sub-clinical anxiety at interview and cross-examination, and to examine 
whether being informed of the witness’s mental health status influenced their perceptions. 
There were two independent variables: 1) mental health status of the witness (typical, sub-
clinical anxiety and depression, sub-clinical anxiety) and 2) knowledge (informed vs. 
uninformed of the witness’s mental health status). There were ten dependent variables 
relating to the mock jurors’ perceptions (accurate, convincing, confident (in account), 
confident (in general demeanour), competent, honest, believable, completeness of 
testimony, cognitive functioning, and capability to testify) and three further dependent 
variables which measured their perceptions of the witness’s credibility at interview, at 
cross-examination, and overall (across both interview and cross-examination). 
With regard to perceptions of the witness at interview, the findings revealed that mock 
jurors perceived the witness with sub-clinical anxiety and depression to be less accurate, 
convincing, confident (in both her account and general demeanour), competent, honest, 
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believable, and credible than the typical witness. They also perceived this witness to have a 
less complete testimony, worse cognitive functioning, and worse capability to testify. It 
seems from the qualitative data that confidence (in account) was particularly noticeable to 
the mock jurors as this was the most commonly stated means of improving credibility for 
the witness with sub-clinical anxiety and depression. This is consistent with previous 
research that suggests that confidence influences jurors’ perceptions of credibility (Dodson 
& Dobolyi, 2015). Although there is a lack of literature on the effects of mental health on 
eyewitness memory, there is a wealth of research on public stigma attached to mental 
health (e.g., Corker et al., 2016; Mental Health Foundation, 2019c) and based on this 
research it was initially hypothesised that mock jurors would have biased perceptions of 
witnesses with a mental health problem. However, the findings described above were 
irrespective of whether the mock jurors were informed of the witness’s mental health 
status and therefore do not support this hypothesis. It appears that even in the absence of 
knowledge of whether the witness did or did not have anxiety and depression, perceptions 
amongst mock jurors were still affected. This is consistent with a previous mock juror study 
that explored perceived credibility of children with ID (Henry et al., 2011). However, it is 
inconsistent with other research that has revealed that the presence of knowledge can 
influence perceptions. Stobbs and Kebbell (2003), for example, found that mock jurors who 
were informed of a witness’s learning disability were reluctant to rely on their evidence. 
Furthermore, a study that used transcripts that indicated the age of the witness revealed 
that adult witnesses were perceived with more integrity than child witnesses (Bruer & 
Pozzulo, 2012). The present findings are also inconsistent with research to suggest that 
stereotypical views can influence jurors’ beliefs and judgements about witness credibility 
regardless of the quality of their evidence (Peled et al., 2004). Given such research and the 
public stigma surrounding mental health (Corker et al., 2016; Mental Health Foundation, 
2019c), the present findings are surprising. In addition, the witness with sub-clinical anxiety 
and depression was perceived to be less accurate, convincing, confident (in her account), 
competent, believable, and credible at interview than the witness with sub-clinical anxiety 
as well as have a less complete testimony and worse cognitive functioning. As the witness 
with sub-clinical anxiety and depression was clearly perceived differently to the other two 
witnesses but there was no effect of knowledge found, it is possible that there may be 
factors about the testimony provided by this witness that make it less credible. When 
subsequently analysing the video material, she was found to have made very little eye 
contact with the interviewer and demonstrated non-verbal behaviour during the interview 
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(e.g., continually touching her ear) which may have influenced the mock jurors’ 
perceptions. Indeed, there is research to suggest that eye contact influences jurors’ 
perceptions of credibility (Field et al., 2010). Therefore, there may have been a potential 
impact of behavioural manifestations of anxiety and depression, i.e., it may have been the 
witness’s behavioural manifestations to which the mock jurors were responding rather 
than knowledge of the witness’s mental health status. The modified labelling theory 
proposes that people are socialised to accept negative social attitudes and beliefs about 
individuals with a stigmatised mental health status (Link, Cullen, Struening, & Shrout, 
1989). When individuals self-label with that same status, social conceptions are internalised 
and manifested in their behaviour. As a consequence, the mock jurors in the present 
research may have held negative perceptions of the witness as a response to her behaviour 
rather than the knowledge (i.e., label) that she had anxiety and depression.  
With regard to perceptions of the witness at cross-examination, whilst the findings 
revealed no main effect of either mental health status or knowledge on mock jurors’ 
perceptions, an interaction effect did emerge. When mock jurors were informed about the 
witness’s mental health status, they perceived the witness with sub-clinical anxiety and 
depression to be less accurate and have worse cognitive functioning than the typical 
witness. They also perceived the witness with sub-clinical anxiety to be less honest than the 
typical witness. It is difficult to compare the present findings to those obtained from 
previous juror perception studies as past research has focused predominantly on 
perceptions of the witness at interview. Nevertheless, the findings provide some insight 
into how different witness groups may be perceived at the cross-examination stage of the 
legal process. The fact that, when mock jurors were informed about the witness’s mental 
health status, the witnesses with a mental health problem were perceived differently to 
the typical witness provides evidence for the effect of knowledge on perceptions (Peled et 
al., 2004) and supports research on mental health related stigma (Corker et al., 2016; 
Mental Health Foundation, 2019c). Yet, this was only true for a limited number of the 
dependent variables. For example, when asked how competent the witness was at cross-
examination, mock jurors perceived the witnesses with a mental health problem to be just 
as competent as the typical witness. Consequently, care should be taken when drawing 
conclusions about perceptions of the witness groups at the cross-examination stage 
because, for the majority of the questionnaire items, all three witnesses were perceived at 
an equivalent level.  
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In relation to credibility, as previously outlined, the witness with sub-clinical anxiety and 
depression was perceived to be less credible than the other two witnesses at interview. 
The fact that the mock jurors gave this witness a lower score for all of the additional 
questionnaire items than the typical witness and a lower score for most of the additional 
questionnaire items than the witness with sub-clinical anxiety reflects this finding. 
However, at cross-examination, there was no significant difference in perceptions of 
credibility between the witness groups. When analysing the cross-examination video 
material, in contrast to her interview, the witness with sub-clinical anxiety and depression 
made regular eye contact with the barrister and demonstrated minimal non-verbal 
behaviour. This suggests that, approximately ten months later, she may have felt more 
comfortable being asked questions about the crime event or she may have no longer been 
experiencing anxiety and depression which may explain why she was perceived more 
positively at cross-examination. On reflection, mental health should have been measured 
at each time point to establish whether or not the participants still had sub-clinical anxiety 
and depression, or sub-clinical anxiety, when they were cross-examined. Nevertheless, with 
regard to overall credibility, taking into account both interview and cross-examination, the 
witness with sub-clinical anxiety and depression was perceived with less credibility than the 
typical witness. As there was no significant difference in perceived credibility between 
these two witnesses at cross-examination, this finding suggests that the interview 
testimony specifically of the witness with sub-clinical anxiety and depression had a 
fundamental influence on the mock jurors’ perceptions of her overall credibility.    
At the end of the questionnaire, mock jurors were asked whether they thought the 
defendants were guilty or not guilty on the basis of the witness testimony (if all other 
evidence was equal). The findings revealed that mock jurors who viewed the witnesses 
with a mental health problem were more inclined to consider the defendants to be not 
guilty than those who viewed the typical witness, irrespective of whether they knew about 
the witness’s mental health status. It appears that they had less belief in their evidence. 
This finding is consistent with previous research that suggests that jurors are less likely to 
decide that a defendant is guilty when they perceive the witness to lack credibility (Pica et 
al., 2017). However, the fact that the mock jurors who viewed the witness with sub-clinical 
anxiety were more inclined to consider the defendants to be not guilty is somewhat 
surprising given that this witness was not perceived significantly differently to the typical 
witness at interview and only perceived to be less honest at cross-examination. 
Nevertheless, such findings have implications for the CJS. As studies 2 and 3 revealed (see 
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Chapters 4 and 5), the testimonies of the witnesses with a mental health problem in the 
present study were just as accurate as the testimony provided by the typical witness, yet 
the mock jurors had less belief in their evidence and were consequently more inclined to 
consider the defendants to be not guilty even though their evidence was just as accurate 
and reliable as that of the typical witness. This indicates that jurors may be using other 
factors in place of the witness’s actual testimony to reach their decision which could lead to 
an unfair trial.   
The present study has several limitations. First, the method used differed from an actual 
court case and therefore care should be taken when extrapolating the findings. Whilst the 
use of video clips is closer to real-world procedure than the use of transcripts, this study 
would have been more ecologically valid if the participants had been questioned within a 
real court setting. Had they seen the witness physically being questioned within the context 
of a real court, the findings may have been different. The participants who were informed 
of the witness’s mental health problem may, for example, have had more empathy and 
taken their mental health problem into account when forming their perceptions. Second, 
the participants took part in the study on their own and formed their verdict individually. 
Their responses to the questionnaire and indeed their verdict may have been different if 
they had participated in deliberations with other jurors, as in real life. Third, the 
participants watched the witness describing a specific case (i.e., a distraction burglary) and 
consequently the findings cannot be generalised to different cases. Fourth, the participants 
were only provided with the free recall part of the witness’s investigative interview. As a 
result, they may have responded differently had they also been given access to the 
witness’s responses to the follow-up questions as this may have provided them with more 
information about her credibility at interview. In addition, the design of the questionnaire 
used to measure the participants’ perceptions could be improved. The questionnaire did 
not, for example, ask the participants to state whether they had previously been on jury 
service. If any of the participants had been on a real jury, their perceptions may have been 
influenced by their experiences. Furthermore, the witnesses with a mental health problem 
did not have a formal mental health diagnosis and therefore it is important to recognise 
that the present findings may not apply to perceptions of witnesses who have a formal 
diagnosis. The findings may have differed if the witnesses had more severe anxiety and 
depression, and anxiety. On the other hand, the participants in this study were not 
informed of the lack of a formal diagnosis and consequently it could be argued that they 
may have formed their perceptions on the assumption that the witnesses had been 
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diagnosed with anxiety and depression, or anxiety. In addition, asking the mock jurors to 
view just one witness from each mental health group is problematic as there may have 
been a unique characteristic of that witness that may have influenced the findings (Wells & 
Windschitl, 1999). Therefore, it would have been more methodologically robust to ask the 
mock jurors to view more than one witness from each group to enable us to make 
generalisations about anxious or depressed witnesses as a group, rather than the 
performance of one single example of each. 
To conclude, the mock jurors perceived the witness with sub-clinical anxiety and 
depression less favourably than the typical witness at interview regardless of whether they 
were informed of her mental health problem. Such findings are inconsistent with the 
literature on the effects of knowledge on perceptions and research on mental health 
related stigma; however, care should be taken when comparing between the present study 
and previous research on mental health related stigma as previous studies have explored 
other factors such as behaviours rather than merely knowledge which was the focus of the 
present study. The witness with sub-clinical anxiety and depression was also perceived less 
favourably at cross-examination; however, only for a limited number of the questionnaire 
items. When the mock jurors were asked to give their verdict, those who viewed the 
witnesses with a mental health problem were more inclined to consider the defendants to 
be not guilty than those who viewed the typical witness, irrespective of whether they were 
informed of their mental health status. This has implications for the CJS given that there 














7.1. Summary of Findings  
 The present thesis described four new studies. The first study, described in Chapter 
2, obtained legal professionals’ perceptions of witnesses with anxiety and depression. This 
study ascertained that legal professionals working at various stages of the criminal justice 
process (police officers, barristers, judges, solicitor-advocates, and registered 
intermediaries) frequently encounter witnesses with anxiety and depression. It was 
revealed that, on the whole, such witnesses are perceived to be credible which is 
inconsistent with previous research within the field (e.g., Watson et al., 2004). However, a 
large proportion reported that pre-existing knowledge of anxiety and depression derived 
mainly from professional experience rather than robust evidence-based sources influenced 
their perceptions, particularly regarding witness reliability. They also believed that pre-
existing knowledge may influence jurors’ perceptions; however, this was not revealed in 
the fourth study of this thesis which will be discussed later. Regarding interview 
procedures, there was a strong feeling amongst those involved with the interviewing 
process (police officers, solicitor advocates, and registered intermediaries) that changes are 
needed to the investigative interviewing procedures involving witnesses with anxiety and 
depression, specifically better mental health awareness training for professionals, more 
time allocated to conduct interviews, and more rapport building. Furthermore, the findings 
revealed that the current support for such witnesses is not satisfactory even though the 
ABE guidance (Ministry of Justice, 2011) including special measures was supported by most 
groups, particularly police officers.  
The findings of the first study of this thesis demonstrated the importance of, and need for, 
further research on mental health and eyewitness performance. Consequently, the second 
study, described in Chapter 4, examined the eyewitness performance (memory recall and 
identification accuracy) of witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-
clinical anxiety, compared to that of typical witnesses (with no mental health problems). 
Within this study, participants’ levels of anxiety and depression were classified and their 
general memory functioning and degree of suggestibility were measured. The findings are 
reported in Chapter 3. The results of the psychometric measures revealed that the groups 
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with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, obtained higher scores of 
anxiety than the typical group, and the group with sub-clinical anxiety and depression 
obtained higher scores of depression than the other two groups. However, a depression 
only group did not emerge. With regard to general memory functioning and degree of 
suggestibility, there were no differences between the groups. A mock witness paradigm 
was used to investigate witness performance during 1) a statement taking interview, 2) a 
full investigative interview, and 3) PP and PA video identification lineups. No differences in 
memory recall or identification accuracy emerged between the groups. One week after 
witnessing the event, the witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-
clinical anxiety, were just as capable at remembering details about the crime event during 
an ABE compatible interview and just as capable at 1) making a correct identification on a 
PP identification lineup and 2) making a correct rejection on a PA identification lineup 
compared to the typical witnesses. Such findings are inconsistent with the literature on 
general memory that suggests that memory capabilities are impaired by depression (e.g., 
Austin et al., 2001; Gallassi et al., 2001) and anxiety (e.g., Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2011; 
Plana et al., 2014), and also with research indicating that trait anxiety is associated with 
poor memory retrieval in an eyewitness context (e.g., Dobson & Markham, 1992). Similarly, 
the findings do not support previous literature that has explored the identification 
performance of other vulnerable groups and found that their identification accuracy is 
worse than that of their typical counterparts (e.g., Erickson et al., 2016; Henry & Wilcock, 
2013; Wilcock & Bull, 2010). 
In addition to examining the eyewitness performance of witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety 
and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, at the interview stage of the legal process, it was 
also important to examine their performance at a later stage, i.e., at cross-examination, as 
this has not been investigated before. The third study, described in Chapter 5, investigated 
the cross-examination performance and the effects of suggestibility on a sample of the 
mock witnesses from the second study. This study is the first to examine the cross-
examination performance of witnesses with a mental health problem and the method used 
is a novel approach to cross-examination research. There was a ten-month delay 
(approximately) between the investigative interview in the second study and the cross-
examination which is representative of the average delay in real proceedings (Rossetti, 
2015). The findings revealed that the witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, 
and sub-clinical anxiety, performed at an equivalent level to the typical witnesses under the 
pressure of cross-examination style questioning. Approximately ten months after 
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witnessing the crime, their memory trace of the event was just as strong and they were just 
as resistant to the barrister’s suggestions that they were wrong about their original 
evidence as the typical witnesses. Such findings contradict previous literature that has 
demonstrated that delayed memory recall is impaired in individuals with sub-clinical 
depression (e.g., Ramponi et al., 2010) and anxiety (e.g., Butters et al., 2011; Crespo et al., 
2015), and also a wealth of research on the detrimental effects of misleading post-event 
information on the memory recall of vulnerable groups such as children and adults with an 
ID (e.g., Gudjonsson & Henry, 2003; Kebbell et al., 2004; Ridley et al., 2002).  
As well as assessing legal professionals’ perceptions in the first study of this thesis, another 
much needed area of research is jurors’ perceptions. The fourth study of this thesis, 
described in Chapter 6, explored mock jurors’ perceptions of the interview and cross-
examination performance of a typical mock witness compared to that of a mock witness 
with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and a mock witness with sub-clinical anxiety. The 
interviews and cross-examinations were shown on video and taken from the second and 
third studies of this thesis. Contrary to previous research (e.g., Peled et al., 2004; Stobbs & 
Kebbell, 2003), there was no effect of knowledge of mental health status of the witness on 
mock jurors’ perceptions. This is also inconsistent with what the literature suggests about 
mental health related stigma (e.g., Corker et al., 2016; Mental Health Foundation, 2019c) 
and the beliefs of legal professionals in the first study of this thesis that prior knowledge of 
a witness’s mental health problem would influence how jurors perceive their evidence. The 
findings revealed that, irrespective of whether they were given information about the 
witness’s mental health status, mock jurors perceived the witness with sub-clinical anxiety 
and depression to be less credible overall than the typical witness. This finding may have 
been due to the witness making very little eye contact with the interviewer and 
demonstrating non-verbal behaviour during the interview (e.g., continually touching her 
ear). It was also found that, again irrespective of whether they received knowledge about 
the witness’s mental health status, mock jurors were more inclined to consider the 
defendants to be not guilty after viewing the witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety and 
depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, even though their evidence was just as accurate and 
reliable as that of the typical witness. In this situation, jurors may be using other factors 
instead of the witness’s actual testimony to reach their decision which could result in an 
unfair trial. Whilst it has been shown that knowledge does not qualify as one of these 
factors, other factors such as body language, tone of voice, and general demeanour may be 
playing a role. The present chapter will integrate the findings reported in the previous 
158 
 
chapters, focusing on the theoretical and practical implications of the findings before 
addressing the methodological limitations of the studies and possible directions for future 
research.  
7.2. Theoretical and Practical Implications 
 7.2.1. Theoretical Implications   
The research presented in this thesis has revealed that the eyewitness 
performance (memory recall and identification accuracy) of witnesses with sub-clinical 
anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, is no worse than that of their typical 
counterparts. Such findings have theoretical implications. The existing research and theory 
on the effects of anxiety and depression have not been supported by the findings of this 
thesis as an effect of mental health on memory performance did not emerge. The majority 
of the existing literature on mental health and general cognitive functioning has 
demonstrated that anxiety (e.g., Buodo et al., 2011; Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2011) and 
depression (e.g., Gallassi, Morreale, & Pagni, 2001; McDermott & Ebmeier, 2009) can 
significantly impair memory performance. With regard to episodic memory, which is critical 
for eyewitness memory, the present findings do not support the specific deficit of 
recollection that has been demonstrated in depression (e.g., Drakeford et al., 2010; 
Ramponi et al., 2010) and are also inconsistent with one of the primary memory biases 
associated with depression known as overgeneral autobiographical memory (OGM) (e.g., 
Dillon & Pizzagalli, 2018). With regard to eyewitness performance specifically, the present 
findings support the theory that trait anxiety has no adverse effect on eyewitness memory 
recall (Ridley, 2003) and identification accuracy (Valentine & Mesout, 2008) but is 
inconsistent with research suggesting that individuals with high trait anxiety are unable to 
provide as many correct responses as those with low trait anxiety when asked to identify 
details of an event (Dobson & Markham, 1992). Regarding depression, the literature is very 
limited and therefore it is difficult to compare the present findings. As this thesis does not 
build on existing research and theory on the effects of anxiety and depression on memory 
performance, it could be the case that sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical 
anxiety, do not have a significant effect on eyewitness memory. Furthermore, the lack of 
support for the memory deficits associated with anxiety and depression may be explained 
by the findings in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The lack of group differences in general memory 
performance in Chapter 3 follows through to the lack of group differences in eyewitness 
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performance in Chapters 4 and 5. When participants were measured for general memory 
functioning, including memory for stories (recall) and facial memory (recognition), there 
were no significant differences between those with a sub-clinical mental health problem 
and those with no mental health problems. This could be due to the participants not being 
sufficiently anxious and depressed for an effect of mental health on memory to have 
emerged. Indeed, the majority of the literature that has demonstrated an effect of mental 
health on general memory functioning has involved individuals with a clinical mental health 
disorder whereas the sample in this thesis did not have a formal mental health diagnosis 
which may explain the disparity in findings. Consequently, it may be that clinical levels of 
anxiety and depression, and anxiety, do affect eyewitness memory and this needs to be 
examined further.  
From a theoretical perspective, this thesis makes a significant contribution to the field of 
eyewitness performance and mental health as it proposes that adults with a sub-clinical 
mental health problem may not be poorer eyewitnesses than typical adults. This is an 
important finding given that many mental health problems are undiagnosed and untreated 
in the UK. Research has found that 36% of common mental health problems such as anxiety 
and depression are undiagnosed (Open Access Government, 2019). It is important, 
however, to keep in mind that the studies presented in this thesis are amongst only a small 
number to have investigated the eyewitness performance of individuals with a mental 
health problem and consequently further research is very much needed before firm 
conclusions can be drawn about the capabilities of such witnesses. 
With regard to the cross-examination findings in Chapter 5, again these may be explained 
by the results of the GSS-2 in Chapter 3 which revealed no significant group differences in 
suggestibility. The lack of group differences in levels of suggestibility in Chapter 3 follows 
through to Chapter 5 as the witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-
clinical anxiety, were no more suggestible than their typical counterparts when exposed to 
misleading information at cross-examination. It is difficult to compare these findings to 
previous literature as the study in Chapter 5 is the first to examine the cross-examination 
performance of witnesses with a mental health problem. Given that the existing literature 
on mental health and general memory capabilities has revealed memory problems 
associated with anxiety and depression (e.g., Gallassi et al., 2001; Plana et al., 2014), and 
delayed memory is affected to a greater degree in individuals with a sub-clinical mental 
health problem (e.g., Ramponi et al., 2010), it seems surprising that their recall 
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performance under the pressure of cross-examination style questioning was equivalent to 
that of their typical counterparts. On the other hand, their GSS-2 scores in Chapter 3 were 
not significantly different to those obtained by the typical group and therefore it is perhaps 
unsurprising that as a result they were no more suggestible in the subsequent cross-
examination study. Whilst this thesis does not build on the existing cross-examination 
research involving vulnerable groups such as adults with learning disabilities (e.g., Kebbell 
et al., 2001) and children (e.g., Zajac et al., 2003), which has revealed that vulnerability 
impairs recall at cross-examination, it does contribute significantly to the field as it is the 
first study to examine the cross-examination capabilities of witnesses with a mental health 
problem.  
Regarding Chapter 2 of this thesis, there are very few studies within the literature that have 
explored legal professionals’ perceptions of mental health, as discussed in Chapter 1. On 
the one hand, the present findings are inconsistent with the idea that legal professionals 
perceive witnesses with a mental health problem to lack credibility (e.g., Watson et al., 
2004) as, overall, the legal professionals perceived witnesses with anxiety and depression 
to be credible. But, on the other hand, the present findings build on existing literature that 
has proposed that legal professionals are not equipped with adequate knowledge about 
mental health (e.g., Reavey et al., 2016). Furthermore, the legal professionals’ beliefs that 
prior knowledge of mental health influences jurors’ perceptions of witness evidence is 
consistent with previous literature that has demonstrated that knowledge of a witness’s 
vulnerability can affect jurors’ perceptions of the credibility of their evidence (e.g., Bruer & 
Pozzulo, 2012; Peled et al., 2004; Stobbs & Kebbell, 2003). However, this finding does not 
correspond to the findings of the mock juror perception study in Chapter 6 of this thesis 
which revealed that there was no effect of knowledge of the mental health status of the 
witness on overall witness credibility. The witness with sub-clinical anxiety and depression 
was perceived as less credible than the typical witness irrespective of whether the mock 
jurors received information about her mental health status which is inconsistent with 
previous literature (e.g., Bruer & Pozzulo, 2012; Peled et al., 2004; Stobbs & Kebbell, 2003). 
In addition, there is a wealth of literature on public stigma associated with mental health 
(e.g., Corker et al., 2016; Mental Health Foundation, 2019c), yet the present thesis does not 
support such literature as the provision of knowledge regarding the mental health status of 
the witness did not influence perceptions and therefore stigmatisation did not play a role. 
Nevertheless, an effect of mental health on its own (regardless of knowledge) was revealed 
and this extends previous research within the area of vulnerability that has demonstrated 
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that even in the absence of knowledge of whether a child does or does not have an ID, 
mock jurors’ perceptions of credibility are still affected (Henry et al., 2011). The present 
findings are also consistent with previous research suggesting that jurors are less likely to 
decide that a defendant is guilty when they perceive the witness to lack credibility (Pica et 
al., 2017).  
It is important to consider the fact that theories on the effects of anxiety and depression 
have focused largely on participants with more severe or diagnosed cases of anxiety and 
depression, and it may therefore be helpful for researchers to acknowledge the growth in 
sub-clinical cases and investigate in a consistent manner the effect of sub-clinical anxiety 
and depression on a range of cognitive tests.  
7.2.2. Practical Implications   
The findings of this thesis also have implications for practice and the CJS as they 
demonstrate that witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical 
anxiety, may be capable of providing evidence that is of the same quality as that provided 
by a typical witness, not only at interview but also when questioned in a suggestible 
manner later in the investigative process. As this thesis presents the first study to examine 
the capabilities of witnesses with a combination of sub-clinical anxiety and depression at 
interview as well as the first study to explore the cross-examination performance of 
witnesses with a mental health problem, there is currently very little evidence upon which 
legal professionals working within the CJS can draw when supporting such witnesses.  
As outlined in Chapter 1, anxiety and depression are two of the most prevalent mental 
health problems within the community (Mental Health Foundation, 2019b) and this was 
accentuated in Chapter 2 when professionals working at all stages of the criminal justice 
process stated that they frequently encounter witnesses with anxiety and depression. 
Consequently, it is vital that professionals are informed of their eyewitness capabilities. As 
Chapter 2 revealed, a large proportion of legal professionals believe that prior knowledge 
of anxiety and depression influences their perceptions with many stating that it causes 
them to question the reliability of witness evidence. When asked about the capabilities of 
witnesses with anxiety and depression, the most common response across all legal groups 
was that capabilities were moderately or slightly reduced with a similar response given for 
accuracy. This has significant implications for the CJS as such witnesses may be perceived 
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differently to typical witnesses even though they may be just as capable and accurate. The 
fact that professionals may have biased views of such witnesses could give rise to good 
quality evidence being deemed inadmissible which could ultimately lead to an unfair trial 
or even cases failing to get to trial. However, the legal professionals in Chapter 2 were 
asked about witnesses with a mental health ‘disorder’ rather than a sub-clinical mental 
health problem which may have affected their responses and therefore caution should be 
taken when extrapolating between the findings of Chapter 2 and Chapters 4, 5, and 6 which 
involved sub-clinical samples performing in a laboratory task. Nevertheless, the findings of 
Chapter 2 revealed that more than 80% of legal professionals may suspect that a witness 
has a mental health problem even if they have not been informed of a formal diagnosis 
which raises the question of whether such witnesses are treated fairly during the 
investigative process. Legal professionals need to be equipped with informed knowledge 
that a witness who has got anxiety and depression, or anxiety, but not a formal diagnosis, 
may be just as capable and accurate as a typical witness. Less than 55% of legal 
professionals across all groups in Chapter 2 were aware of mental health awareness 
training in their profession. It seems therefore that there is a need for further training to 
provide professionals with the knowledge and understanding of the eyewitness capabilities 
of such witnesses in order to reduce as much as possible prejudiced beliefs identified by 
previous research (e.g., Reavey et al., 2016). It is perhaps to be expected that legal 
professionals are not yet equipped with the appropriate knowledge given that there is no 
published research on the psychological functioning in witnesses with a combination of 
anxiety and depression, or anxiety on its own, during the investigative process. Further 
training will help to ensure that these witnesses are provided with the same opportunity as 
typical witnesses to give their best evidence. 
Furthermore, whilst this thesis has demonstrated that prior knowledge of a witness’s 
mental health problem influences legal professionals’ perceptions, in general, this was not 
found to be true for mock jurors’ perceptions (see Chapter 6). In real-life, jurors may or 
may not be aware that a witness has a mental health problem when asked to evaluate their 
evidence, particularly if the witness does not have a formal diagnosis as per the mock 
witnesses in this thesis. Yet, the findings in Chapter 6 suggest that this may not necessarily 
be an issue as the knowledge of a witness having anxiety and depression, or anxiety, did 
not affect how the credibility of their evidence was perceived. Similarly, it appears that 
jurors’ decisions with regard to whether they believe the defendant(s) to be guilty or not 
guilty are also unaffected by such knowledge. Additionally, as the witness with sub-clinical 
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anxiety and depression was perceived by mock jurors to be less credible than the typical 
witness, despite her evidence being just as accurate and reliable, one may argue that those 
working within the legal system need to be aware of the factors that may influence jurors’ 
perceptions of credibility (and ultimately their decision making) in order to ensure a fair 
trial. The non-verbal behaviour that the witness in this thesis displayed when giving 
evidence may have affected the mock jurors’ perceptions and consequently such behaviour 
may have been used instead of her actual testimony to form their decisions. This has 
implications for real-life cases as it means that witnesses who may not present themselves 
in a convincing manner may be disregarded when in fact their evidence may be crucial to 
the case. For example, previous research has demonstrated that witness confidence has a 
strong influence on mock jurors’ judgements, regardless of the consistency of the 
testimony (e.g., Brewer & Burke, 2002).  
7.3. Limitations and Future Research  
This thesis provides a preliminary investigation into the eyewitness performance of 
witnesses with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, and an insight 
into how mental health is perceived at different stages of the legal process. However, there 
are several limitations associated with the research. One such limitation relates to 
ecological validity. Regarding Chapter 4, the participants were mock witnesses and did not 
see a real crime. As such, they were not interviewed in an official interview room by a 
police officer and therefore the apprehension associated with a real-life interview could 
not be replicated. Similarly, regarding Chapter 5, the mock witnesses were not cross-
examined within the context of a real court which is likely to be more stressful. 
Nonetheless, efforts were made to make the cross-examinations as ecologically valid as 
possible by using practising barristers to question the witnesses, even though they would 
have appeared less intimidating than barristers in a real-life case as they were not in court 
dress. Furthermore, the crime event in Chapter 4 was shown to the mock witnesses on 
video. Watching a video event is different to witnessing a live event as it does not entail the 
degree of threat and alarm that a witness may experience during a real crime (Penrod, 
Fulero, & Cutler, 1995). The findings of eyewitness studies that have investigated the 
effects of stress on the encoding stage of memory are mixed with some suggesting that 
stress negatively affects eyewitness memory (e.g., Deffenbacher et al., 2004) and others 
suggesting that it enhances memory for emotional information (e.g., Payne et al., 2007). 
Yet, the crime event shown in this thesis was mild and consequently the findings in Chapter 
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4 may have been different if the mock witnesses had watched a more traumatic event. This 
limitation extends to the mock juror perception study in Chapter 6. The mock jurors were 
aware that the witness had observed a mild mock crime event which may have influenced 
their perceptions of witness credibility. Nevertheless, whilst this may have affected the 
ecological validity of the findings, it would not have been ethically appropriate to expose 
the mock witnesses to a traumatic event. 
A further limitation of this thesis is a lack of generalisability. As the mock witnesses in 
Chapters 4 and 5 did not have a mental health disorder as defined by the Mental Health Act 
(1983, as amended by the Mental Health Act, 2007), the findings of this thesis may not be 
generalisable to witnesses deemed ‘vulnerable’ by the CJS (Ministry of Justice, 2011). 
Consequently, caution must be taken before 1) concluding that eyewitnesses with a 
combination of anxiety and depression, or anxiety on its own, are just as capable as typical 
witnesses and 2) basing suggestions for education of practitioners in the CJS and jurors on 
these findings. The participants in Chapters 4 and 5 were sub-clinical samples performing in 
a laboratory task and therefore would not have shown the same levels of anxiety as those 
witnesses typically interviewed and seen at court who will 1) have experienced an incident 
with higher levels of trauma and 2) be giving evidence in the intimidating surroundings of a 
court room. Given that there is previous research to suggest that the general memory 
capabilities of adults with severe anxiety (e.g., Plana et al., 2014) and severe depression 
(e.g., Drakeford et al., 2010) are significantly impaired, it may be that their eyewitness 
memory is also diminished. Had the studies in Chapters 4 and 5 included participants with a 
diagnosed mental health disorder, different findings may have emerged and therefore 
research addressing the eyewitness capabilities of adults with a formal mental health 
diagnosis is essential. Nevertheless, the focus of this thesis was sub-clinical mental health 
due to the growing number of adults with undiagnosed mental health problems in the UK 
(Open Access Government, 2019). Also, mental health has become a topic of increasing 
focus in higher education in recent years (Office for National Statistics, 2018). Research has 
shown that the university student population commonly experience mental health related 
difficulties (e.g., Education Policy Institute, 2018) and it was therefore deemed appropriate 
to target this population in the present research.  
Furthermore, this thesis did not examine the capabilities of adult witnesses with depression 
on its own. This is because a depression only group did not emerge from the results of the 
psychometric measures in Chapter 3 which, on reflection, is perhaps unsurprising given 
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that depression is less prevalent within the general population than anxiety (Stansfeld et 
al., 2016). Whilst the findings of this thesis have shed light on how witnesses with sub-
clinical anxiety and depression perform at interview and cross-examination, such findings 
cannot be generalised to adults with sub-clinical depression as their eyewitness capabilities 
may be different in the absence of anxiety. Also, the samples in Chapters 4 and 5 
comprised largely female students studying at the University of Winchester which limits the 
generalisability of the findings to males and adults from different age groups and 
backgrounds. Nevertheless, the sample in this thesis was fairly representative as females 
are three times more likely than males to experience common mental health problems, 
such as anxiety and depression, and young females are more likely to experience anxiety 
related problems than any other group (Mental Health Foundation, 2019a).  
Additionally, care should be taken when extrapolating the findings in Chapter 2 as, 
previously stated, the legal professionals were asked to respond to questions about their 
perceptions and experiences of witnesses with a mental health ‘disorder’. The reason why 
this term was used in the questionnaire was because the severity of the mental health 
problems experienced by the mock witnesses in Chapters 4 and 5 was unknown at the 
point at which the questionnaire was administered to the legal professionals. Their 
responses may have been different had they been asked to provide information about 
witnesses with a sub-clinical mental health problem instead. However, one may argue that 
non-experts may not necessarily understand or appreciate the differences between the 
terms ‘sub-clinical mental health problem’ and ‘clinical disorder’. Moreover, the 
generalisability of the findings in Chapter 6 is limited as the mock jurors each viewed only 
one witness which means that it is difficult to generalise their perceptions to other 
witnesses with the same mental health status. Nevertheless, despite its limitations, this 
thesis does provide initial insight into how adults with a sub-clinical mental health problem 
may perform within an eyewitness context and therefore it is a starting point from which 
further research into more severe cases can develop. It has also contributed to our 
understanding of how such witnesses are perceived at various stages of the legal process.    
Based on the implications of the present thesis and its limitations, there are a number of 
issues to consider for future research. Further research examining the eyewitness 
performance of adults with a formal mental health diagnosis of anxiety and depression is 
essential as such individuals are considered ‘vulnerable’ by the CJS (Ministry of Justice, 
2011). This would provide legal professionals with the knowledge and understanding of the 
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eyewitness capabilities of witnesses with a formal diagnosis of anxiety and depression. This 
is crucial given that Chapter 2 revealed that legal professionals reported frequently 
encountering witnesses with these disorders. In addition, most of the literature on mental 
health and general memory has focused on severe cases but very little eyewitness 
literature has examined the capabilities associated with formal mental health diagnoses, 
providing further justification for additional research. It is also important that further 
investigation is conducted with adults who have depression (without anxiety) as the 
findings of this thesis only allow for inferences to be made about the eyewitness 
capabilities of adults with depression in combination with anxiety. It may be that their 
witness performance is entirely different in the absence of anxiety. Given that, within the 
literature, there is evidence that the cognitive functioning of depressed individuals is 
impaired (e.g., Drakeford et al., 2010; McDermott & Ebmeier, 2009; Williams et al., 2007), 
it is crucial that their capabilities as witnesses are understood. Moreover, further research 
on the interview and cross-examination performance of adult witnesses from different age 
cohorts and backgrounds is needed as the participants in this thesis largely comprised 
female undergraduate students in early adulthood.  
Additionally, it would be worthwhile carrying out more ecologically valid studies to build on 
the findings in Chapters 4 and 5. For example, the use of a real police officer to conduct the 
interviews in Chapter 4 would be closer to real-life practice even though the researcher in 
this thesis was trained to conduct an ABE compatible interview. Also, the contexts in which 
the studies were carried out in both chapters could be improved to approximate the real 
world by using an actual police interview room and a real or mock court setting to conduct 
the interviews and cross-examinations. To further improve the ecological validity, mock 
witnesses could view a live event that depicts a more serious crime than the mild event 
shown on video in this thesis. However, this may be difficult as it is ethically challenging to 
put participants through an unnecessary stressful experience. Furthermore, additional 
mock juror studies with a larger number of examples of witness evidence are necessary to 
strengthen the findings in Chapter 6. It is essential that mock jurors in future research view 
more than one mock witness with the same mental health status to provide us with a more 
thorough understanding of their perceptions and enable us to make generalisations about 
anxious or depressed witnesses as a group, rather than the performance of one single 





This thesis has sought to make a significant contribution to the limited literature on 
1) the eyewitness performance of witnesses with a sub-clinical mental health problem and 
2) the perceptions of such witnesses at different stages of the legal process. The present 
research is inconsistent with previous research which suggests that anxiety and depression 
are associated with deficits in general memory but is consistent to some extent with the 
eyewitness literature, particularly regarding the null effects of trait anxiety on identification 
accuracy. Whilst literature on the eyewitness capabilities of adults with anxiety and 
depression is extremely sparse and consequently there are very few studies with which to 
compare the present findings, this does mean that the present research makes a much-
needed contribution to the eyewitness literature regarding mental health. It also extends 
the limited literature on legal professionals’ perceptions of witnesses with anxiety and 
depression by obtaining information from professionals working at various stages of the 
legal process and highlighting the influence of prior mental health knowledge on 
perceptions. Furthermore, the present thesis builds on the existing literature on mock 
jurors’ perceptions by suggesting that witnesses with a mental health problem may be 
perceived to be less credible than typical witnesses even though their evidence may be just 
as accurate and reliable, and highlights that mental health knowledge may not necessarily 
be a determining factor in jurors’ decision-making. Given the prevalence of individuals with 
a mental health problem and therefore the likelihood of them coming into contact with the 
CJS, it has been vital that eyewitness research within the area of mental health has been 
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Online questionnaire (study 1) 
 
     Psychology Department 
Q1 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Exploring legal professionals’ perceptions of vulnerable eyewitnesses with anxiety 
and depression. 
To help you decide whether or not to take part in this questionnaire, please read the 
following information about why the research is being conducted.  
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The purpose of this study is to gain further insight into how legal professionals 
perceive vulnerable eyewitnesses with a mental health disorder in order to enhance 
the knowledge and understanding of the perceptions and attitudes held by those 
working within the legal system, specifically regarding witnesses with anxiety and 
depression.    
 
Who is eligible to take part in this study?  
Both males and females between the ages of 18 and 60 years working in legal 





What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you decide to take part, you will be asked to give informed consent. Once you 
have consented, you will then be required to simply complete the questionnaire, 
which will take approximately 15 – 20 minutes. Initially, you will be asked to 
provide some demographic details such as, age and gender. You will then be asked 
about your legal profession in terms of 1) your role and experience, 2) your contact 
with mental health witnesses, 3) your perceptions of mental health witness accuracy, 
4) support for mental health witnesses, 5) current guidelines and their suitability, and 
6) ideas for the future.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is your decision whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part, you will 
be asked to provide your consent. You are still free to withdraw within 14 days and 
without giving a reason, if you decide to participate.  
 
What are the possible benefits and risks of taking part?  
Your participation in this study will simply require you to complete a questionnaire 
so there are no risks to you if you agree to participate. Whilst there are no direct 
benefits to you from taking part, it is hoped that the information gained from this 
study will enable us to further understand the perceptions of legal professionals 
working within the Criminal Justice System of vulnerable eyewitnesses with anxiety 
and depression.  
 
Will my participation be kept confidential?  
It will be ensured that no names are attached to the data and only the researchers 
directly involved in the study will have access to the data. Participant details will be 





What should I do if I wish to take part? 
If you wish to take part in this study, you will be asked to provide your consent.  
 
What happens if I change my mind? 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may withdraw within 
14 days should you wish to do so without any consequences.  
 
What will happen to the results of this research study? 
It is hoped that the results of this study will be published in suitable professional 
journals. It will not be possible to identify any individuals from any of the data 
presented. 
 
Who has reviewed this study? 
This study has been approved by the University of Winchester RKE Ethics 
Committee. If you have any concerns about the way in which the study has been 
conducted, you can contact the Chair of RKE Ethics Committee, Dr Maru Mormina: 
Maru.Mormina@winchester.ac.uk  
 
Contact for Further Information 











I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary and that I may withdraw 
within 14 days, without penalty.  
 
I understand the arrangements that have been made to ensure my anonymity and 
privacy, and that my data will remain anonymised.   
 
Any risks which may be involved in my participation in the project have been outlined 
on the information sheet.   
 
By ticking this box, you are giving your consent to take part in this project. 
 





Q3: What is your age? (please circle) 
 
18 – 24 
 
25 – 34 
 
35 – 44 
 
45 – 54  
 










































Detective Inspector  
 
Chief Inspector and above 
 
Detective Chief Inspector and above  
 











Q7: If you have selected ‘Police Officer’, within which area of policing do you 
work? (please circle) 
 




Public Protection  
 
Child Abuse Investigation  
 







Q8: If you have selected ‘Barrister’ or ‘Judge’, which is your principle area(s) of 

















Q9: How many years have you worked within your profession? (please circle) 
 
Less than 1 year 
 
1 – 4 years 
 






9 – 12 years 
 
13 – 16 years 
 
17 – 20 years 
 





This questionnaire is concerned with anxiety and depression in vulnerable 
witnesses. Anxiety is marked by emotional distress, frequent fears, persistent 
worrying and avoidance behaviour displayed in the absence of any direct threat. 
There are five major types of anxiety disorders: generalised anxiety disorders, 
phobic anxiety disorders, panic disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorders, and 
post-traumatic stress disorder. Depression is a mood disorder that involves a 
prolonged and fundamental disturbance of mood and emotions, characterised by 
symptoms such as low mood, loss of energy, lack of concentration, feelings of 
restlessness, and sometimes suicidal thoughts. Both disorders are included in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). 
  
Please answer the following questions based on your own personal experience. 
 
  
 Q10: On average, how often do you come into contact with vulnerable witnesses 



















Q11: On average, how often do you come into contact with vulnerable witnesses 
























Not at all common 
 














Not at all common 
 


















Extremely difficult  
 


















Extremely difficult  
 








Q16: Are there occasions when you suspect that a witness has got a mental health 








Q17: If you have selected ‘yes’, how often do you suspect that a witness is 














Special measures are a range of measures that can be used to facilitate the 
gathering and giving of evidence by vulnerable and intimidated witnesses 




Special measures include:  
 
-  Screens 
-  Live link 
-  Evidence given in private 
-  Removal of wigs and gowns by judges and barristers 
-  Video-recorded interview 
-  Examination of the witness through an intermediary 







Q18: How appropriate is the 'Achieving Best Evidence' guidance for eliciting evidence 
from vulnerable witnesses with anxiety and/or depression? (please circle) 
 
Extremely appropriate  
 
Moderately appropriate  
 
Slightly appropriate  
 
Neither appropriate nor inappropriate  
 
Slightly inappropriate  
 
Moderately inappropriate  
 
Extremely inappropriate  
 




Q19: How effective are special measures at supporting vulnerable witnesses with 
anxiety and/or depression to give their best evidence? (please circle) 
 






Slightly effective  
 
Not effective at all 
 




Q20: If you have selected extremely, very, moderately or slightly effective, which 








Evidence given in private 
 




Examination of the witness through an intermediary 
 




Q21: What other types of support are available for witnesses with anxiety and/or 








Q22: Would you make any changes to how witnesses with anxiety and/or depression 








Q23: If you have selected ‘yes’, in what ways would you change the current support 















Q24: Is there mental health awareness training available within your profession for 










If you have selected ‘yes’, please continue. 






















If you have selected ‘yes’, please continue. 


































Q29: Apart from formal training, do you have any additional knowledge about 







If you have selected ‘yes’, please skip to Q31. 
If you have selected ‘no’, please skip to Q33. 
 
 







If you have selected ‘yes’, please continue. 




Q31: From where have you received this knowledge? (please circle as many or as 










Literature within the public domain 
 







Q32: To what extent does this knowledge affect your perceptions of witnesses with 
anxiety and/or depression? (please circle) 
 




A moderate amount  
 
A little   
 
Not at all 
 
 
Q33: How capable are witnesses with anxiety of providing witness evidence when 




Moderately capable  
 





Not capable at all 
 




Q34: How capable are witnesses with depression of providing witness evidence 




Moderately capable  
 
Slightly capable  
 
Not capable at all 
 








Moderately accurate  
 
Slightly accurate  
 
Not accurate at all 
 









Moderately accurate  
 




Not accurate at all 
 
I don’t know 
 
 
If you are a barrister or a judge, please skip to Q44.  
 
If you are a police officer, registered intermediary, or an employee of the CPS, 




Q37: What are the standard procedures for interviewing witnesses with anxiety 
and/or depression? (please circle) 
 
The same as for typical witnesses (with no mental health problems) 
 
Different from typical witnesses (with no mental health problems) 
 




If you have selected ‘Different from typical witnesses’, please continue. 
If you have selected ‘The same as for typical witnesses’, please skip to Q39. 




Q38: How do the interview procedures differ from those used with typical 









Q39: How effective are these interview procedures at obtaining useful information 













Not effective at all 
 




Q40: Would you make any changes to how witnesses with anxiety and/or depression 







If you have selected ‘yes’, please continue. 




Q41: How would you change the ways in which these witnesses are 


























Extremely difficult  
 


















Extremely difficult  
 
I don’t know 
 
 
Q44: With no additional support, how able are witnesses with anxiety to give 
evidence in court? (please circle) 
 






Not able at all 
 





Q45: With no additional support, how able are witnesses with depression to give 
evidence in court? (please circle) 
 






Not able at all 
 




Q46: How is it decided that a witness with anxiety and/or depression is sufficiently 
















Slightly credible  
 
Not credible at all 
 














Slightly credible  
 
Not credible at all 
 




Q49: Do you feel that prior knowledge of a witness's mental health problem (anxiety 










If you have selected ‘yes’, please continue. 




Q50: How does prior knowledge influence your perceptions of their evidence? 










Q51: If there is no other evidence, how often do cases involving a witness with 



















Q52: To what extent do you think jurors find witnesses with anxiety and/or 








Not credible at all 
 




Q53: To what extent do you feel that prior knowledge of a witness's mental health 
problem (anxiety and/or depression) could influence jurors' decision making? (please 
circle) 
 
A great deal  
 
A lot  
 




Not at all  
 






Q54: Is there anything that you feel could be changed in the future in order to 
improve the legal process involving witnesses with anxiety and/or 








If you have selected ‘yes’, please continue. 




Q55: Which of the following aspects could be changed? (please circle as many or as 
few as you wish) 
 
General training about mental health 
 
Specific training relating to individual mental health conditions 
 




General support for vulnerable witnesses 
 









Q56: Please circle the option in each demographic group that is most likely to 
















Q57:  Age 
 
18 – 24 
 
25 – 34 
 
35 – 44 
 
45 – 54  
 
55 – 64  
 
65 or older 
 








Black or African American 
 


























Q60: Please circle the option in each demographic group that is most likely to 













Q61:  Age 
 
18 – 24 
 
25 – 34 
 
35 – 44 
 
45 – 54  
 
55 – 64  
 
65 or older 
 










Black or African American 
 

























     Psychology Department 
Q64 
Participant Debriefing Sheet 
 
Thank you very much for taking part in this study. The aim of the research was to 
gain further insight into how legal professionals perceive vulnerable eyewitnesses 
with a mental health disorder in order to enhance the knowledge and understanding 
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of the perceptions and attitudes held by those working within the legal system, 
specifically regarding witnesses with anxiety and depression.  
It is hoped that the information gained from this study will enable us to further 
understand the perceptions of legal professionals working within the Criminal 
Justice System of vulnerable eyewitnesses with anxiety and depression. We expect to 
find that legal professionals’ perceptions of vulnerable eyewitnesses with mental 
health disorders will differ from the perceptions held of typical eyewitnesses.  
Thank you once again for taking part in this study. If you would like further 
information about the study, please do not hesitate to contact the researcher, Beth 




































Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-5 Disorders – Clinical Version (SCID-5-CV) 
(Adaptation) 
 
At the beginning:  
I am going to ask you some questions about anxiety and depression. I don’t want to 
keep you here for too long so I will be quite direct at times and interrupt you if we 
need to move onto a new question. Please don’t be offended if I do this. It is fine to 
give me one-word answers.  
 
Initial questions: 
1. Have you ever received a diagnosis for a mental health related difficulty and 
what was it? 
 






Lifetime Panic Disorder 
 
Have you ever had an intense rush of anxiety, or what someone might call a “panic 
attack”, when you suddenly feel very frightened or anxious or suddenly developed a 
lot of physical symptoms?  
 
If ‘no’, go to next section (Agoraphobia)  
 
Tell me about that. What was it like?  
During the attack: 
- Did your heart race, pound, or skip?  
- Did you sweat? 
- Did you tremble or shake?  
229 
 
- Did you feel as if you were choking?  
- Did you have chest pain or pressure?  
- Did you feel dizzy, unsteady, or like you might pass out?  
- Did you have tingling or numbness in parts of your body?  
- Were you afraid you were going crazy or might lose control?  
 
Besides the one you just described, have you had any other attacks?   
 
If ‘no’, go to next section (Agoraphobia) 
 
Did you do anything differently because of the attacks, like avoiding certain places 
or not going out alone, or avoiding exercise?   
 
If ‘no’, go to next section (Agoraphobia) 
 
When did your panic attacks start?  
 
During the past month, how many panic attacks have you had?  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Current Agoraphobia (past six months) 
 
Do you have a current diagnosis of agoraphobia?  
 
If ‘no’, go to next section (Social Anxiety Disorder) 
 
In the past 6 months, have you been very anxious about or afraid of situations, like:  
- going out of the house alone 
- being in crowds 
- being in enclosed spaces (e.g., shops, theatres, cinemas)   
- being in open spaces (e.g., big open carparks, marketplaces) 
- standing in queues, or  





Current Social Anxiety Disorder (past six months) 
 
In the past 6 months, have you been especially nervous or anxious in social 
situations, like having a conversation or meeting unfamiliar people, to a greater 
degree than other people might experience?  
 
Is there anything that you have been afraid to do or felt very uncomfortable doing in 
front of other people, like speaking, eating, writing, or using a public toilet? 
 
If ‘no’, go to next section (Generalized Anxiety Disorder) 
 
Is it something that you have been concerned about?  
 
Tell me about this situation. Give me one brief example of when this has happened.  
 
Have you almost always felt frightened when you would be in this situation?  
 
If ‘no’, go to next section (Generalized Anxiety Disorder) 
 
Have you gone out of your way to avoid this situation? 
  
If ‘no’, go to next section (Generalized Anxiety Disorder)   
 








Current Generalized Anxiety Disorder (past six months) 
 
Over the past 6 months, have you been feeling anxious and worried for a lot of the 
time?  
 
If ‘no’, go to next section (OCD) 
 
Tell me about this. What kinds of things have you worried about?  
- your job 
- your health 
- your family 
- your finances, or 
- smaller things, like being late for appointments   
 
Have you worried about this/these thing(s) even when there was no reason?  
 
Have you worried more than most people would in your circumstances?  
 
Has anyone else thought you worried too much?  
 
During the last 6 months, would you say that you have been worrying more days that 
not?  
 
When you’re worrying, have you found that it’s hard to stop yourself or to think 
about anything else?  
 
Now I am going to ask you some questions about symptoms that often go along with 
being nervous or worried.  
 
Thinking about when you have been feeling nervous, anxious, or worried:  
- Have you often felt physically restless or on edge, like you couldn’t sit still?  
- Have you often tired easily?  
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- Have you often had trouble concentrating or has your mind often gone blank? 
- Have you often been irritable?  
- Have your muscles often been tense?  
- Have you often had trouble falling or staying asleep?  
 
If ‘yes’ to 3 or more, continue 
 
If ‘yes’ to less than 3, go to next section (OCD) 
 
What effect have these symptoms had on your life?  
- your relationships or interactions with other people 
- your work/education, like your attendance, the quality of your work 
- your ability to take care of things in your home 
- your ability to do things that are important to you, like physical exercise, 
hobbies 
 
Have you avoided doing anything because you felt like you weren’t up to it?  
 
How much have you been bothered or upset by having these symptoms?  
 




In the past month, have you been bothered by thoughts that kept coming back to you 
even when you didn’t want them to, like being exposed to germs or dirt or needing 
everything to be lined up in a certain way?  
 
If ‘no’, go to next section (PTSD) 
 




In the past month, was there anything that you had to do over and over again and was 
hard to resist doing, like washing your hands again and again, repeating something 
over and over again until it “felt right”, counting up to a certain number, or checking 
something many times to make sure that you’d done it right?  
 
If ‘no’, go to next section (PTSD)   
 
Tell me about this.  
 
What did you have to do?  
 
What would happen if you didn’t do it?  
 
How many times would you do it?  
 




Do you have a current diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder? 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Depression 
Now I am going to ask you some questions about your mood. 
 
Current Major Depressive Episode 
 
In the past month, has there been a period of time when you were feeling depressed 
or down most of the day, nearly every day? Has anyone said that you look sad, 
down, or depressed?  
 




How about feeling sad, empty, or hopeless, most of the day nearly every day?  
 
If ‘no’, go to next section (Mania)  
 
If ‘yes’ to either of the above, ask…  
 
What has it been like?  
 
How long has it lasted? As long as 2 weeks?  
 
During that time, did you have less interest or pleasure in things you usually 
enjoyed? What has that been like?  
 
During that time, how has your appetite been compared to your usual appetite? Have 
you had to force yourself to eat? Eat less/more than usual? Has that been nearly 
every day? Have you lost or gained any weight?  
 
How have you been sleeping well? 
  
Have you been so fidgety or restless that you were unable to sit still?  
 
What has your energy been like?  
 
Have you been feeling worthless?  
 
Have you had trouble thinking or concentrating? Has it been hard to make decisions 
about everyday things?  
 





What effect have these symptoms had on your life?  
- your relationships or interactions with other people 
- your work/education, like your attendance, the quality of your work 
- your ability to take care of things in your home 
- your ability to get dressed, bathe, brush your teeth…  
- your ability to do things that are important to you, like physical exercise, 
hobbies 
 




Do you have a current diagnosis of mania?  
 
In the past month, has there been a period of time when you were feeling so good, 
“high”, excited, or “on top of the world” that other people thought you were not your 
normal self?  
 
If ‘no’, end of questions 
 
If ‘yes’, ask… 
 



































































































































































































Participant Information Sheet (study 2) 
     Psychology Department 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Researcher: Beth Parsons 
Email: B.Parsons1.15@unimail.winchester.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Dr Rachel Wilcock 
Email: Rachel.Wilcock@winchester.ac.uk 
Tel: 01962 624855 ext 4855  
 
Study Title: Exploring eyewitness performance of adult witnesses 
Ethics Code: RKEEC16002 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. To help you decide whether or 
not to take part, please read the following information about why the research is 
being done.  
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The purpose of this study is to investigate witness performance in individuals with 
and without anxiety and/or depression using a mock staged crime in order to enhance 




Who is eligible to take part in this study?  
Both males and females aged between 18 and 59 years with and without anxiety 
and/or depression are being invited to take part.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you decide to take part, you will be asked to give informed consent. Once you 
have consented, you will then witness a mock crime event which is mild in nature 
and be asked some questions relating to the event. You will then be asked some 
further questions approximately ten months later. Your participation in the 
interviews will be audio and video recorded and, with your permission, this material 
may be used in a future study exploring juror perceptions of witnesses. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is your decision whether or not to take part; you do not have to. If you do decide to 
take part, you will be asked to provide your consent. You are still free to withdraw at 
any point during the course of the study and up until 14 days after the final 
questioning phase without giving a reason.   
 
What are the possible benefits and risks of taking part?  
There is a possibility that you might experience some emotional distress. However, 
this potential risk will be no greater than what may be experienced in everyday life. 
Nevertheless, you will be referred to sources of support if this does occur. Whilst 
there are no direct benefits to you from taking part, it is hoped that the information 
gained from this study will enable us to form an understanding of the capabilities of 
eyewitnesses with anxiety or depression, or both, of recalling details about an event 






Will my participation be kept confidential?  
It will be ensured that no names are attached to the data and only my supervisors and 
I will have access to the data. Participant details will be coded and no identifiable 
personal information will be stored on the computer. Participant names will not be 
audio recorded.   
 
What should I do if I wish to take part? 
If you wish to take part in this study, you will be asked to provide your consent.  
 
What happens if I change my mind? 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may withdraw at any 
point during the course of the study and up until 14 days after the final questioning 
phase without any consequences.  
 
What will happen to the results of this research study? 
It is hoped that the results of this study will be published in suitable professional 
journals. It will not be possible to identify any individuals from any of the data 
presented. 
 
Who has reviewed this study? 
This study has been approved by the University of Winchester RKE Ethics 
Committee. If you have any concerns about the way in which the study has been 







Contact for Further Information 
For further information regarding this study, please contact me or my supervisor; our 
contact details can be found above. 
 





















Consent Forms (study 2) 
Researcher Copy 
                                                  Psychology Department 
 
CONSENT FORM (RESEARCHER COPY)  
 
Exploring eyewitness performance of adult witnesses 
 
Gender (please circle)  Male / Female 
 
Age (please state)   ______   years 
 
I confirm that I have read and understood the participant information sheet about  
this study 
 
I have been informed of the purpose of taking part and the researcher has made  
clear to me any risks which may be involved in my participation in the project 
 
I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary and that I may withdraw  
from the study at any time up until 14 days after the final questioning phase  
without penalty  
 
I understand the arrangements that have been made to ensure my anonymity  
and privacy, and that my data will remain anonymised  
 









I agree for my participation in the interviews to be video recorded 
 
I agree for my audio and video recordings to be used in future research  
 
I consent to take part in this study 
 
Signed Participant:                                                             Date: 
 
Signed Researcher:                                                             Date: 
 
Please return this copy to the researcher 
 
Participant Copy 
                                                  Psychology Department 
 
CONSENT FORM (PARTICIPANT COPY)  
 
Exploring eyewitness performance of adult witnesses 
 
Gender (please circle)  Male / Female 
 
Age (please state)   ______   years 
 
I confirm that I have read and understood the participant information sheet about  
this study 
 







clear to me any risks which may be involved in my participation in the project 
 
I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary and that I may withdraw  
from the study at any time up until 14 days after the final questioning phase  
without penalty  
 
I understand the arrangements that have been made to ensure my anonymity  
and privacy, and that my data will remain anonymised  
 
I agree for my participation in the interviews to be audio recorded  
 
I agree for my participation in the interviews to be video recorded 
 
I agree for my audio and video recordings to be used in future research  
 
I consent to take part in this study 
 
Signed Participant:                                                             Date: 
 
Signed Researcher:                                                             Date: 
 


















Debriefing Sheet (study 2) 
 
     Psychology Department 
 
Participant Debriefing Sheet 
 
Study Title: Exploring eyewitness performance of adult witnesses 
 
Thank you very much for taking part in this study. The aim of the research was to 
investigate the witness performance of typical and vulnerable persons exposed to a 
mock staged crime in order to enhance our understanding of the credibility and 
reliability of their evidence. While previous research has explored eyewitness 
memory accuracy with certain groups deemed vulnerable such as those with an 
intellectual disability (Kebbell et al., 2004; Ternes & Yuille, 2008), very little 
research to date has looked at witness memory in individuals with a mental health 
problem. Based on the findings of previous literature demonstrating a relationship 
between mental health and deficits in cognition and memory (Austin, Mitchell & 
Goodwin, 2001; Tallis, Eysenck & Matthews, 1991), we expect to find that the 
accuracy of witness memory in individuals with anxiety and/or depression in this 
study will be significantly affected.   
It is hoped that the information gained from this study will enable us to develop our 
understanding of the capabilities of eyewitnesses with anxiety or depression, or both, 
of recalling details about an event and identifying the perpetrators. I, as the 
researcher, am not qualified to diagnose or treat mental illness or make diagnoses. If 
you need support, please refer to a support organisation (listed below) or seek 
medical support from your GP.  
259 
 
Thank you once again for taking part in this study. If you would like further 
information about the study, please do not hesitate to contact me or my supervisor 
(contact details can be found on the participant information sheet). 
 
Mental Health Support Organisations 
Samaritans 









Rethink Mental Illness Advice Line 





Telephone: 0300 304 7000 (6pm-11pm) 
Website: www.sane.org.uk/what_we_do/support/helpline 
 






Interview protocol (study 2) 
 
Initial statement taking interview: 
“Hello, thank you very much for attending” 
Take participant into testing room 
…… 
“I am going to give you a copy of the information sheet to read again. Once you 
have read this document, please sign the consent form”  
..…. 
“Do you have any questions at this point?”  
…... 
“You are now going to view a video clip lasting approximately 3 minutes” 
Play the video clip 
..…. 
“You are now going to be asked some questions about the video clip that you have 
just seen”  
Switch on the audio and video equipment  
…... 
“Tell me what you remember about what you have just seen on the video clip. Please 




Ask these follow up questions in order of participant memory depending upon what 
was said 
“Who was there?” 
“What did they do?” 
“What did they look like?” 
“When did it happen?” 
“Where did it happen?” 
“How did it happen?” 
..…. 
“OK. Thank you” 
Switch off the audio and video equipment  
…... 
“I am now going to give you some questionnaires to complete”  
Give participant the BDI-2 and STAI (Y-1 first), followed by the SCID-5-CV 
…… 
If participant asks about these tests, I will make it clear that I am using the tests for 
research purposes and that I am not qualified to make diagnoses. If s/he has any 
concerns, s/he should seek help from his/her GP 
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Once tests have been completed, arrange with participant a date and time for phase 2 
of study (5-9 days later) 
 
Full investigative interview: 
Greet (phase 1) 
“Hello again, how are you? Thank you very much for attending the second session” 
Take participant into testing room 
…… 
Rapport (Phase 2) 







“You will shortly be taking part in an investigative interview but firstly you will be 
given a short activity”  
Give the Memory For Stories (MFS) subtest of the TOMAL-2 
..…. 
“I would like to remind you that you have signed a form giving your consent for the 
interview to be audio and video recorded. Are you still happy for this to happen?” 
263 
 
Switch on audio and video equipment  
…… 
Explain the purpose of the interview (Phase 3) 
“What I would like to do now is to ask you about the video clip that you saw last 
week” 
…… 
Free recall + Mental Context Reinstatement (Phase 4 – Recall attempt 1) 
“In a moment I am going to ask you to begin and to tell me what you remember 
about the video clip, but before we start I would like to try and help you to remember 
as much as you can” 
“As I talk to you I would like you to silently think about each of the things I say, as I 
say them” 
“Closing your eyes or looking at a blank wall may help you to think about each of 
the things I say to you”  
“To begin I would like you to try to think back to the day that you saw the video 
clip… as you would do if you had lost something and were trying to remember the 
last time you saw it” 
“ Think about that day… what had you been doing that morning… what was the 
weather like… who had you seen or spoken to that day” 
“Think about what you had been doing immediately before coming in to see the 
video clip”  
“Now I would like you to think about the room in which you saw the video clip” 
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“Try and get a picture of that room in your mind” 
“What did that room look like? Did you smell anything as you entered the room? 
Did you notice anything in particular?”  
“Think about the layout of that room… where the screen was… where you sat to 
watch the video clip” 
“Try to remember if anyone else was in that room with you… where they were 
sitting… what they were doing… did you speak to anyone?” 
“Now, if you’ve got a good picture of that room in your mind I would like you to 
picture the screen” 
“Now think about how you felt as the video clip started… what you thought might 
happen…” 
“Now focus on the actual video clip from the very beginning… think about what you 
saw… what did you hear as you were watching the video clip? When you have a 
clear picture in your mind I would like you to tell me everything you can remember 
about that video clip. Remember that it is important that you never guess or make 
anything up. If you can’t remember or don’t know please just say so” 
…… 
When participant has stopped talking, pause for 10 seconds 
…... 
Questioning (Phase 5 – Recall attempt 2) 




Ask one question about each main topic mentioned by the participant during free 
recall in order of participant memory  
Start with open-ended questions and then proceed to specific-closed questions, if 
necessary 
…… 
Closure (Phase 6) 
“Just before we finish, is there anything else that you wish to add or change?” 
“Do you have any questions?” 














Lineup instructions (study 2) 
 
“You will now view a number of video identification lineups relating to the video 
clip you saw last week”   
“You will see a series of images” 
“The person you saw on the video clip may or may not appear in the images” 
“If you cannot make an identification, you should say so” 
“You may ask to see all of the images or a particular image again” 
“There is no limit on how many times you can view the whole set of images or any 
part of them” 
“Please do not make any decision as to whether the individual you saw on the video 
clip is on the set of images until you have seen the whole set at least twice” 
“You will be asked to identify the individual by number of the image” 
Show whole set of images twice 
..…. 
“Do you wish to view the images or any part of them again?” 
..…. 
“Please state whether the individual you saw on the video clip has been shown” 




Show participant that image 
“Please confirm that this is the individual you identified”  
…… 
“Please indicate how confident you are in your response on a 10-point scale with 1 
indicating not at all confident and 10 indicating completely confident” 
















Identification lineups (study 2)  Perpetrator 1 (perpetrator present)  















Perpetrator 1 (perpetrator absent)  















Perpetrator 2 (perpetrator present)  















Perpetrator 2 (perpetrator absent)  


























































































MANOVAs (study 2) 
MANOVA between condition and correct recall, incorrect recall, confabulations, and 











MANOVA between condition and total correct recall, total incorrect recall, total 











MANOVA between condition and repeated correct recall, new correct recall, repeated 













Accuracy frequencies across groups for PP/PA lineups for perpetrator 1 and perpetrator 2 






















































































Defence Statement (study 3) 
Statement of Offence 
Theft contrary to s.1(1) of the Theft Act 1968. 
Particulars of Offence 
Paul Mattison and David Clark, on or about the 1st March 2017, stole a mobile phone, 
car keys, cash in the form of notes and loose coins to the value of £32.40, sunglasses 
and case and a laptop computer. 
  










This defence statement is duly served on behalf of Mr Mattison and Mr Clark. 
1. We are not guilty of the charges alleged, namely burglary and theft. 
2. We did not go to the Psychology Department at the University of Winchester 
on 1st March 2017 as alleged. Indeed, so far as we can recall, neither of us have 
ever been there. The witness is mistaken in identifying us. 
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3. We work together at a local scrap yard and had been given the afternoon off 
by our boss Mr Smith. He will be able to confirm this. 
4. We both drove to our respective homes and remained there for the rest of the 
day. Our wives will be able to confirm this. 
 





















Cross-examination instructions for advocates (study 3) 
• The aim of this process is to test the performance of different groups of 
witnesses under the pressure of cross-examination. 
• Approximately one year ago, witnesses were shown a video clip of a 
distraction burglary at the University of Winchester during which two men 
entered the psychology department and entered a classroom under false 
pretences (pretending to be there to fix an electrical fault). While the lady 
inside the classroom went to find help, the men entered the classroom. Once 
inside the classroom, they stole a mobile phone, car keys, cash (notes), loose 
coins, a laptop, and sunglasses with a case. 
• Witnesses were interviewed immediately after the event (to gather their initial 
evidence) and received an ABE interview 5-9 days later, including a number 
of identification lineups. 
• Now, one year later, we would like you to challenge the witnesses on the 
testimony they gave.  
• You will be the defense barrister representing the two men and you will be 
provided with their defence statement. Prior to the cross-examination, you will 
also be provided with the transcript of the witness’s interview and this can be 
utilised in the same way as a witness statement / interview transcript would be 
in court.  
• I, the researcher, will be present in the room with the participant during the 
cross-examination. The way the exercise is to work is that you will firstly ask 
a few pre-set questions to ensure that all participants are starting at the same 
point before the questioning phase. For this initial phase, please ask the 
following questions: “Did you view the video approximately ten months ago? 
Were there three people in the video? None of whom you’d seen before? So, 
their appearance was not familiar to you before you watched the video? Aside 
from the identification lineups, so far as you’re aware; you haven’t seen any 
297 
 
of them since? So, your only sight of the individuals was a three-minute video 
clip, approximately ten months ago? It is presumably difficult to recall such a 
short clip after all this time?” 
• After these opening questions, you will challenge the witnesses on 6 topics 
relating to the evidence.  
• Regarding the actual questioning on the 6 topics, this will be unlike a real life 
cross-examination. For each topic, you have THREE attempts to get the 
witness to cede to your challenge. In other words, to accept that they are wrong 
or not sure about their evidence on the point. Please stick to a maximum of 
THREE attempts per point. This procedure is so that we have a reliable way of 
measuring whether the witness ceded to the challenge, and at what point they 
did so (and to enable this to be comparable across witnesses). The actual 
questions you pose to the witness will be entirely your choice.  
• At the end of the cross-examination, please read the following closing 
statement: “Thank you for your time, you responded well to my questions. I 













Consent Forms (study 3) 
Researcher Copy 
                                                  Psychology Department 
 
CONSENT FORM (RESEARCHER COPY)  
 
Exploring cross-examination performance of adult witnesses 
 
Gender (please circle)  Male / Female 
 
Age (please state)   ______   years 
 
 
I confirm that I have read and understood the participant information sheet from  
the earlier study which outlined that I would be asked some further questions  
approximately ten months later 
 
I have been informed of the purpose of taking part and the researcher has made  
clear to me any risks which may be involved in my participation in the project 
 
I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary and that I may withdraw  
from the study at any time up until 14 days after the study without penalty  
 
I understand the arrangements that have been made to ensure my anonymity  








I agree for my participation in the cross-examination to be audio recorded  
 
I agree for my participation in the cross-examination to be video recorded 
 
I agree for my audio and video recordings to be used in future research  
 
I consent to take part in this study 
 
 
Signed Participant:                                                             Date: 
 
Signed Researcher:                                                             Date: 
 
 
Please return this copy to the researcher 
 
Participant Copy 
                                                  Psychology Department 
 
CONSENT FORM (PARTICIPANT COPY)  
 
Exploring cross-examination performance of adult witnesses 
 
Gender (please circle)  Male / Female 
 









I confirm that I have read and understood the participant information sheet from  
the earlier study which outlined that I would be asked some further questions  
approximately ten months later 
 
I have been informed of the purpose of taking part and the researcher has made  
clear to me any risks which may be involved in my participation in the project 
 
I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary and that I may withdraw  
from the study at any time up until 14 days after the study without penalty  
 
I understand the arrangements that have been made to ensure my anonymity  
and privacy, and that my data will remain anonymised  
 
I agree for my participation in the cross-examination to be audio recorded  
 
I agree for my participation in the cross-examination to be video recorded 
 
I agree for my audio and video recordings to be used in future research  
 
I consent to take part in this study 
 
 
Signed Participant:                                                             Date: 
 
Signed Researcher:                                                             Date: 
 
 













Debriefing Sheet (study 3) 
 
      Psychology Department 
 
Participant Debriefing Sheet 
 
Study Title: Exploring cross-examination performance of adult witnesses 
 
Thank you very much for taking part in this study. The aim of the research was to 
investigate the cross-examination performance of typical adults (with no mental 
health problems) and adults with sub-clinical anxiety and depression, and sub-
clinical anxiety, after being exposed to a mock staged crime in order to enhance our 
understanding of the accuracy of their memory at cross-examination. While previous 
research has explored the cross-examination performance of certain groups deemed 
vulnerable such as those with a learning disability (e.g., Kebbell, Hatton, Johnson & 
O’Kelly, 2001) and children (e.g., Zajac, Gross & Hayne, 2003), no research to date 
has looked at witness memory at cross-examination in individuals with a mental 
health problem. Based on the findings of previous literature demonstrating a 
relationship between mental health and deficits in cognition and memory (e.g., 
Austin, Mitchell & Goodwin, 2001; Tallis, Eysenck & Matthews, 1991) as well as 
research findings on impaired delayed memory recall in individuals with anxiety and 
depression (e.g., Butters et al., 2011; Ramponi, Murphy, Calder & Barnard, 2010), 
we expect to find that the cross-examination performance of individuals with a 
combination of anxiety and depression, or anxiety on its own, in this study will be 
significantly affected.   
It is hoped that the information gained from this study will enable us to develop our 
understanding of the capabilities of eyewitnesses with sub-clinical anxiety and 
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depression, and sub-clinical anxiety, of recalling details about an event at cross-



























Correlations between memory trace strength and cede performance (study 3) 
 
Correlation between overall memory trace strength and overall cede performance  
 
 



























ANCOVA: effect of condition on overall cede performance with overall memory trace 
















































Study Title: Exploring mock jurors’ perceptions of adult eyewitnesses 
 
To take part in this research study, you must be eligible for jury service in the UK. 
To be eligible for jury service, you must meet the criteria listed below. 
 
Eligibility for jury service:  
You could be selected to serve on a jury in the UK if you: 
• Are aged between 18 and 75 years; 
• Are registered on your local government’s electoral register; 
• Have lived in the UK, the Channel Isles or the Isle of Man for the last five 
years since you were 13 years old. 
You are disqualified from jury service if:  
• You lack the mental capacity to do so. Mental capacity is the ability to make 
a decision for yourself. People who cannot do this are said to ‘lack capacity’ 
under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. This must be due to an impairment of 
or disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain which may be due to 
illness, injury, learning disability, or mental health problems.  
• To have capacity, a person must be able to:  
o Understand the information that is relevant to the decision they want 
to make; 
o Retain the information long enough to be able to make the decision; 
o Weigh up the information available to make the decision; 
o Communicate the decision by any means.  
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You are disqualified from jury service if you are currently on bail in criminal 
proceedings. You are also disqualified if: 
• you have ever been sentenced to imprisonment for five years or more; 
• you have been imprisoned at all in the last 10 years. 
 
 
Do you meet the criteria for serving on a jury (please circle)? 
 
 Yes    No 
 
Now we would like to ask some more questions about you… 
 
What is your age?  
____ years 
 
What is your gender? 
 Male   
 Female 
 Other (please specify):  
 
What is your ethnicity? 
 White British 
 White Irish 
 Any other White background 
 Black or Black British 
 Black Caribbean 
 Asian Indian 
 Asian Pakistani 
 Asian Bangladeshi 
 Any other Asian background 
 Mixed White and Black 
Caribbean 
 Black African   Mixed White and Black African 
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 Any other Black background  
 Chinese 
 Asian or Asian British  
 
 Mixed White and Asian 
 Any other Mixed background 





NOW WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO WATCH A SHORT VIDEO CLIP OF A 
WITNESS BEING INTERVIEWED ABOUT AN EVENT THEY HAVE SEEN.  
 









































1) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how accurate the 
witness’s account was: 
Not at all 
accurate 
     Extremely 
accurate 





2) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how convincing the 
witness was in their account: 
Not at all 
convincing 
     Extremely 
convincing 





3) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how confident the 
witness appeared in what they said in their account:  
Not at all 
confident 
     Extremely 
confident 





4) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how confident the 
witness appeared in general in their demeanour:  
Not at all 
confident 
     Extremely 
confident 










5) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how competent the 
witness appeared in their account: 
Not at all 
competent 
     Extremely 
competent 





6) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how honest the witness 
appeared:  
Not at all 
honest 
     Extremely 
honest 





7) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how believable the 
witness appeared: 
Not at all 
believable 
     Extremely 
believable 





8) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how complete the 
witness’s account appeared: 
Not at all 
complete 
     Very 
complete 





9) Please circle the number that you feel best represents the witness’s overall 





     Excellent 
cognitive 
functioning 










to testify  
     Excellent 
capability 
to testify 




OPTIONAL: If you wish, please let us know how you think the witness’s 











NOW WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO WATCH A SHORT VIDEO CLIP OF 



















1) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how accurate the 
witness’s account was: 
Not at all 
accurate 
     Extremely 
accurate 





2) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how convincing the 
witness was in their account: 
Not at all 
convincing 
     Extremely 
convincing 





3) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how confident the 
witness appeared in what they said in their account:  
Not at all 
confident 
     Extremely 
confident 





4) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how confident the 
witness appeared in general in their demeanour:  
Not at all 
confident 
     Extremely 
confident 










5) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how competent the 
witness appeared in their account: 
 
Not at all 
competent 
     Extremely 
competent 





6) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how honest the witness 
appeared:  
Not at all 
honest 
     Extremely 
honest 





7) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how believable the 
witness appeared: 
Not at all 
believable 
     Extremely 
believable 






8) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how complete the 
witness’s account appeared: 
Not at all 
complete 
     Very 
complete 





9) Please circle the number that you feel best represents the witness’s overall 





     Excellent 
cognitive 
functioning 






10)   Please circle the number that you feel best represents the witness’s 
capability to testify: 
Very poor 
capability 
to testify  
     Excellent 
capability 
to testify 




OPTIONAL: If you wish, please let us know how you think the witness’s 










1) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how credible this 
person was as a witness during the first video (interview): 
Not at all 
credible 
     Extremely 
credible 




2) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how credible this 
person was as a witness during the second video (cross-examination): 
Not at all 
credible 
     Extremely 
credible 





3) Taking everything into account, please circle the number that you feel best 
represents how credible this person was as a witness OVERALL (taking into 
account both videos): 
Not at all 
credible 
     Extremely 
credible 





OPTIONAL: If you wish, please let us know how you think the witness’s 







4) If all other evidence is equal; on the basis of this witness testimony, do you 
think the defendants are guilty or not guilty?  
 
 
 Guilty    Not guilty  
 
 
Do you remember that the witness has anxiety and depression? 
 
 







Study Title: Exploring mock jurors’ perceptions of adult eyewitnesses 
 
To take part in this research study, you must be eligible for jury service in the UK. 
To be eligible for jury service, you must meet the criteria listed below. 
 
Eligibility for jury service: 
You could be selected to serve on a jury in the UK if you: 
• Are aged between 18 and 75 years; 
• Are registered on your local government’s electoral register; 
• Have lived in the UK, the Channel Isles or the Isle of Man for the last five 
years since you were 13 years old. 
You are disqualified from jury service if:  
• You lack the mental capacity to do so. Mental capacity is the ability to make 
a decision for yourself. People who cannot do this are said to ‘lack capacity’ 
under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. This must be due to an impairment of 
or disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain which may be due to 
illness, injury, learning disability, or mental health problems.  
• To have capacity, a person must be able to:  
o Understand the information that is relevant to the decision they want 
to make; 
o Retain the information long enough to be able to make the decision; 
o Weigh up the information available to make the decision; 
o Communicate the decision by any means.  
You are disqualified from jury service if you are currently on bail in criminal 
proceedings. You are also disqualified if: 
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• you have ever been sentenced to imprisonment for five years or more; 
• you have been imprisoned at all in the last 10 years. 
 
 
Do you meet the criteria for serving on a jury (please circle)? 
 
 Yes    No 
 
Now we would like to ask some more questions about you… 
 
What is your age?  
____ years 
 
What is your gender? 
 Male   
 Female 
 Other (please specify):  
 
What is your ethnicity? 
 White British 
 White Irish 
 Any other White background 
 Black or Black British 
 Black Caribbean 
 Asian Indian 
 Asian Pakistani 
 Asian Bangladeshi 
 Any other Asian background 
 Mixed White and Black 
Caribbean 
 Black African  
 Any other Black background  
 Chinese 
 Mixed White and Black African 
 Mixed White and Asian 
 Any other Mixed background 
319 
 
 Asian or Asian British   Any other Ethnic group 
 
NOW WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO WATCH A SHORT VIDEO CLIP OF A 
WITNESS BEING INTERVIEWED ABOUT AN EVENT THEY HAVE SEEN.  
 

















































1) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how accurate the 
witness’s account was: 
Not at all 
accurate 
     Extremely 
accurate 





2) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how convincing the 
witness was in their account: 
Not at all 
convincing 
     Extremely 
convincing 





3) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how confident the 
witness appeared in what they said in their account:  
Not at all 
confident 
     Extremely 
confident 





4) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how confident the 
witness appeared in general in their demeanour:  
Not at all 
confident 
     Extremely 
confident 










5) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how competent the 
witness appeared in their account: 
Not at all 
competent 
     Extremely 
competent 





6) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how honest the witness 
appeared:  
Not at all 
honest 
     Extremely 
honest 





7) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how believable the 
witness appeared: 
Not at all 
believable 
     Extremely 
believable 





8) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how complete the 
witness’s account appeared: 
Not at all 
complete 
     Very 
complete 





9) Please circle the number that you feel best represents the witness’s overall 





     Excellent 
cognitive 
functioning 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 










to testify  
     Excellent 
capability 
to testify 




OPTIONAL: If you wish, please let us know how you think the witness’s 











NOW WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO WATCH A SHORT VIDEO CLIP OF 


















1) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how accurate the 
witness’s account was: 
Not at all 
accurate 
     Extremely 
accurate 





2) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how convincing the 
witness was in their account: 
Not at all 
convincing 
     Extremely 
convincing 





3) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how confident the 
witness appeared in what they said in their account:  
Not at all 
confident 
     Extremely 
confident 





4) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how confident the 
witness appeared in general in their demeanour:  
Not at all 
confident 
     Extremely 
confident 










5) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how competent the 
witness appeared in their account: 
Not at all 
competent 
     Extremely 
competent 





6) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how honest the witness 
appeared:  
Not at all 
honest 
     Extremely 
honest 





7) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how believable the 
witness appeared: 
Not at all 
believable 
     Extremely 
believable 






8) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how complete the 
witness’s account appeared: 
Not at all 
complete 
     Very 
complete 





9) Please circle the number that you feel best represents the witness’s overall 





     Excellent 
cognitive 
functioning 










to testify  
     Excellent 
capability 
to testify 




OPTIONAL: If you wish, please let us know how you think the witness’s 












1) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how credible this 
person was as a witness during the first video (interview): 
Not at all 
credible 
     Extremely 
credible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
2) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how credible this 
person was as a witness during the second video (cross-examination): 
Not at all 
credible 
     Extremely 
credible 





3) Taking everything into account, please circle the number that you feel best 
represents how credible this person was as a witness OVERALL (taking into 
account both videos): 
Not at all 
credible 
     Extremely 
credible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
OPTIONAL: If you wish, please let us know how you think the witness’s 







4) If all other evidence is equal; on the basis of this witness testimony, do you 
think the defendants are guilty or not guilty?  
 
 




Do you remember that the witness has anxiety? 
 
 









Study Title: Exploring mock jurors’ perceptions of adult eyewitnesses 
 
To take part in this research study, you must be eligible for jury service in the UK. 
To be eligible for jury service, you must meet the criteria listed below. 
 
Eligibility for jury service: 
You could be selected to serve on a jury in the UK if you: 
• Are aged between 18 and 75 years; 
• Are registered on your local government’s electoral register; 
• Have lived in the UK, the Channel Isles or the Isle of Man for the last five 
years since you were 13 years old. 
You are disqualified from jury service if:  
• You lack the mental capacity to do so. Mental capacity is the ability to make 
a decision for yourself. People who cannot do this are said to ‘lack capacity’ 
under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. This must be due to an impairment of 
or disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain which may be due to 
illness, injury, learning disability, or mental health problems.  
• To have capacity, a person must be able to:  
o Understand the information that is relevant to the decision they want 
to make; 
o Retain the information long enough to be able to make the decision; 
o Weigh up the information available to make the decision; 
o Communicate the decision by any means.  
You are disqualified from jury service if you are currently on bail in criminal 
proceedings. You are also disqualified if: 
328 
 
• you have ever been sentenced to imprisonment for five years or more; 
• you have been imprisoned at all in the last 10 years. 
 
 
Do you meet the criteria for serving on a jury (please circle)? 
 
 Yes    No 
 
Now we would like to ask some more questions about you… 
 
What is your age?  
____ years 
 
What is your gender? 
 Male   
 Female 
 Other (please specify):  
 
What is your ethnicity? 
 White British 
 White Irish 
 Any other White background 
 Black or Black British 
 Black Caribbean 
 Asian Indian 
 Asian Pakistani 
 Asian Bangladeshi 
 Any other Asian background 
 Mixed White and Black 
Caribbean 
 Black African  
 Any other Black background  
 Chinese 
 Mixed White and Black African 
 Mixed White and Asian 
 Any other Mixed background 
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NOW WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO WATCH A SHORT VIDEO CLIP OF A 
WITNESS BEING INTERVIEWED ABOUT AN EVENT THEY HAVE SEEN.  
 














































1) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how accurate the 
witness’s account was: 
Not at all 
accurate 
     Extremely 
accurate 





2) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how convincing the 
witness was in their account: 
Not at all 
convincing 
     Extremely 
convincing 





3) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how confident the 
witness appeared in what they said in their account:  
Not at all 
confident 
     Extremely 
confident 





4) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how confident the 
witness appeared in general in their demeanour:  
Not at all 
confident 
     Extremely 
confident 










5) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how competent the 
witness appeared in their account: 
Not at all 
competent 
     Extremely 
competent 





6) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how honest the witness 
appeared:  
Not at all 
honest 
     Extremely 
honest 





7) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how believable the 
witness appeared: 
Not at all 
believable 
     Extremely 
believable 





8) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how complete the 
witness’s account appeared: 
Not at all 
complete 
     Very 
complete 





9) Please circle the number that you feel best represents the witness’s overall 





     Excellent 
cognitive 
functioning 






10)  Please circle the number that you feel best represents the witness’s 
capability to testify: 
Very poor 
capability 
to testify  
     Excellent 
capability 
to testify 




OPTIONAL: If you wish, please let us know how you think the witness’s 











NOW WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO WATCH A SHORT VIDEO CLIP OF 




















1) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how accurate the 
witness’s account was: 
Not at all 
accurate 
     Extremely 
accurate 





2) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how convincing the 
witness was in their account: 
Not at all 
convincing 
     Extremely 
convincing 





3) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how confident the 
witness appeared in what they said in their account:  
Not at all 
confident 
     Extremely 
confident 





4) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how confident the 
witness appeared in general in their demeanour:  
Not at all 
confident 
     Extremely 
confident 










5) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how competent the 
witness appeared in their account: 
Not at all 
competent 
     Extremely 
competent 





6) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how honest the witness 
appeared:  
Not at all 
honest 
     Extremely 
honest 





7) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how believable the 
witness appeared: 
Not at all 
believable 
     Extremely 
believable 






8) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how complete the 
witness’s account appeared: 
Not at all 
complete 
     Very 
complete 





9) Please circle the number that you feel best represents the witness’s overall 





     Excellent 
cognitive 
functioning 









to testify  
     Excellent 
capability 
to testify 




OPTIONAL: If you wish, please let us know how you think the witness’s 












1) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how credible this 
person was as a witness during the first video (interview): 
Not at all 
credible 
     Extremely 
credible 




2) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how credible this 
person was as a witness during the second video (cross-examination): 
Not at all 
credible 
     Extremely 
credible 






3) Taking everything into account, please circle the number that you feel best 
represents how credible this person was as a witness OVERALL (taking into 
account both videos): 
Not at all 
credible 
     Extremely 
credible 




OPTIONAL: If you wish, please let us know how you think the witness’s 








4) If all other evidence is equal; on the basis of this witness testimony, do you 
think the defendants are guilty or not guilty?  
 
 












Study Title: Exploring mock jurors’ perceptions of adult eyewitnesses 
 
To take part in this research study, you must be eligible for jury service in the UK. 
To be eligible for jury service, you must meet the criteria listed below. 
 
Eligibility for jury service: 
You could be selected to serve on a jury in the UK if you: 
• Are aged between 18 and 75 years; 
• Are registered on your local government’s electoral register; 
• Have lived in the UK, the Channel Isles or the Isle of Man for the last five 
years since you were 13 years old. 
You are disqualified from jury service if:  
• You lack the mental capacity to do so. Mental capacity is the ability to make 
a decision for yourself. People who cannot do this are said to ‘lack capacity’ 
under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. This must be due to an impairment of 
or disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain which may be due to 
illness, injury, learning disability, or mental health problems.  
• To have capacity, a person must be able to:  
o Understand the information that is relevant to the decision they want 
to make; 
o Retain the information long enough to be able to make the decision; 
o Weigh up the information available to make the decision; 
o Communicate the decision by any means.  
You are disqualified from jury service if you are currently on bail in criminal 
proceedings. You are also disqualified if: 
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• you have ever been sentenced to imprisonment for five years or more; 
• you have been imprisoned at all in the last 10 years. 
 
 
Do you meet the criteria for serving on a jury (please circle)? 
 
 Yes    No 
 
Now we would like to ask some more questions about you… 
 
What is your age?  
____ years 
 
What is your gender? 
 Male   
 Female 
 Other (please specify):  
 
What is your ethnicity? 
 White British 
 White Irish 
 Any other White background 
 Black or Black British 
 Black Caribbean 
 Asian Indian 
 Asian Pakistani 
 Asian Bangladeshi 
 Any other Asian background 
 Mixed White and Black 
Caribbean 
 Black African  
 Any other Black background  
 Chinese 
 Mixed White and Black African 
 Mixed White and Asian 
 Any other Mixed background 
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 Asian or Asian British  
 
 
 Any other Ethnic group 
NOW WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO WATCH A SHORT VIDEO CLIP OF A 

















































1) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how accurate the 
witness’s account was: 
Not at all 
accurate 
     Extremely 
accurate 





2) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how convincing the 
witness was in their account: 
Not at all 
convincing 
     Extremely 
convincing 





3) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how confident the 
witness appeared in what they said in their account:  
Not at all 
confident 
     Extremely 
confident 





4) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how confident the 
witness appeared in general in their demeanour:  
Not at all 
confident 
     Extremely 
confident 











5) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how competent the 
witness appeared in their account: 
Not at all 
competent 
     Extremely 
competent 





6) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how honest the witness 
appeared:  
Not at all 
honest 
     Extremely 
honest 





7) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how believable the 
witness appeared: 
Not at all 
believable 
     Extremely 
believable 





8) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how complete the 
witness’s account appeared: 
Not at all 
complete 
     Very 
complete 





9) Please circle the number that you feel best represents the witness’s overall 





     Excellent 
cognitive 
functioning 









to testify  
     Excellent 
capability 
to testify 




OPTIONAL: If you wish, please let us know how you think the witness’s 











NOW WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO WATCH A SHORT VIDEO CLIP OF 




















1) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how accurate the 
witness’s account was: 
Not at all 
accurate 
     Extremely 
accurate 





2) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how convincing the 
witness was in their account: 
Not at all 
convincing 
     Extremely 
convincing 





3) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how confident the 
witness appeared in what they said in their account:  
Not at all 
confident 
     Extremely 
confident 





4) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how confident the 
witness appeared in general in their demeanour:  
Not at all 
confident 
     Extremely 
confident 










5) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how competent the 
witness appeared in their account: 
Not at all 
competent 
     Extremely 
competent 





6) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how honest the witness 
appeared:  
Not at all 
honest 
     Extremely 
honest 





7) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how believable the 
witness appeared: 
Not at all 
believable 
     Extremely 
believable 





8) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how complete the 
witness’s account appeared: 
Not at all 
complete 
     Very 
complete 





9) Please circle the number that you feel best represents the witness’s overall 





     Excellent 
cognitive 
functioning 





10)   Please circle the number that you feel best represents the witness’s 
capability to testify: 
Very poor 
capability 
to testify  
     Excellent 
capability 
to testify 




OPTIONAL: If you wish, please let us know how you think the witness’s 











1) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how credible this 
person was as a witness during the first video (interview): 
Not at all 
credible 
     Extremely 
credible 




2) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how credible this 
person was as a witness during the second video (cross-examination): 
Not at all 
credible 
     Extremely 
credible 





3) Taking everything into account, please circle the number that you feel best 
represents how credible this person was as a witness OVERALL (taking into 
account both videos): 
Not at all 
credible 
     Extremely 
credible 





OPTIONAL: If you wish, please let us know how you think the witness’s 








4) If all other evidence is equal; on the basis of this witness testimony, do you 
think the defendants are guilty or not guilty?  
 
 









Participant Information Sheet (study 4) 
     Psychology Department 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
Researcher: Beth Parsons 
Email: B.Parsons1.15@unimail.winchester.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Dr Rachel Wilcock 
Email: Rachel.Wilcock@winchester.ac.uk 
Tel: 01962 624855 ext 4855  
 
Study Title: Exploring mock jurors’ perceptions of adult eyewitnesses 
Ethics number: HSSE16046 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. To help you decide whether or 
not to take part, please read the following information about why the research is 
being done.  
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The purpose of this study is to gain further insight into how mock jurors perceive 
adult eyewitnesses in order to enhance the knowledge and understanding of the 




Who is eligible to take part in this study?  
Both males and females between the ages of 18 and 75 years who are jury eligible 
are being invited to take part. If you are a student at the University of Winchester, 
you will take part in the study in a quiet room on the university premises. If you are a 
member of the local community, you will take part in the study in a quiet, convenient 
location.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you decide to take part, you will be asked to give informed consent. Once you 
have consented, you will view two video clips: one of an interview and one of a 
cross-examination provided by a witness, and be asked some questions about the 
accuracy and reliability of their evidence.   
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is your decision whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part, you will 
be asked to provide your consent. You are still free to withdraw within 14 days of 
taking part and without giving a reason, if you decide to participate.  
 
What are the possible benefits and risks of taking part?  
Your participation in this study will require you to view a video interview and a 
video cross-examination provided by a witness to a mild mock crime event and 
answer some simple questions so there are no risks to you if you agree to participate. 
Whilst there are no direct benefits to you from taking part, it is hoped that the 
information gained from this study will enable us to further understand jurors’ 






Will my participation be kept confidential?  
It will be ensured that no names are attached to the data and the data will be securely 
stored on the computer to which only the researcher has access. Participant details 
will be coded and no identifiable personal information will be stored on the 
computer.    
 
What should I do if I wish to take part? 
If you wish to take part in this study, you will be asked to provide your consent.  
 
What happens if I change my mind? 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may withdraw within 
14 days of taking part should you wish to do so without any consequences.  
 
What will happen to the results of this research study? 
The results of this study are primarily for a PhD. It is hoped that the results will also 
be published in suitable professional journals. It will not be possible to identify any 
individuals from any of the data presented. 
 
Who has reviewed this study? 
This study has been approved by the University of Winchester Faculty of 
Humanities and Social Sciences RKE Ethics Committee. If you have any concerns 
about the way in which the study has been conducted, you can contact the University 







Contact for Further Information 
For further information, please contact me or my supervisor; our contact details can 
be found above. 
 























Consent Forms (study 4) 
 




CONSENT FORM (RESEARCHER COPY)  
 
Study Title: Exploring mock jurors’ perceptions of adult eyewitnesses  
 
 
Gender (please circle)  Male / Female 
 
Age (please state)   ______   years 
 
 
I confirm that I have read and understood the participant information sheet 
about  
this study  
 
I have been informed of the purpose of taking part and the researcher has made  
clear to me any risks which may be involved in my participation in the project 
 
I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary and that I may withdraw  
from the study at any time up until 14 days after I have completed the questionnaire    
 






and privacy, and that my data will remain anonymised  
 
I consent to take part in this study 
 
 
Signed Participant:                                                             Date: 
 
Signed Researcher:                                                             Date: 
 
 
Please return this copy to the researcher 
 
 




CONSENT FORM (PARTICIPANT COPY)  
 
Study Title: Exploring mock jurors’ perceptions of adult eyewitnesses  
 
 
Gender (please circle)  Male / Female 
 
Age (please state)   ______   years 
 








I have been informed of the purpose of taking part and the researcher has made  
clear to me any risks which may be involved in my participation in the project 
 
I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary and that I may withdraw  
from the study at any time up until 14 days after I have completed the questionnaire   
 
I understand the arrangements that have been made to ensure my anonymity  
and privacy, and that my data will remain anonymised  
 
I consent to take part in this study 
 
Signed Participant:                                                             Date: 
 
Signed Researcher:                                                             Date: 
 
 


















Debriefing Sheet (study 4) 
      Psychology Department 
 
Participant Debriefing Sheet 
 
Study Title: Exploring mock jurors’ perceptions of adult eyewitnesses 
 
Thank you very much for taking part in this study. The aim of the research was to 
explore mock jurors’ perceptions of the accuracy and reliability of witnesses with a 
mental health problem and typical witnesses with no mental health problems in order 
to enhance our understanding of how such witnesses are regarded by jurors during 
the criminal justice process.  
Whilst there has been some effort within the literature to explore juror perceptions of 
vulnerability, the literature base is limited. To our knowledge, there has been no 
research to date that has looked at juror perceptions of witnesses with a mental health 
problem. Based on previous findings suggesting that jurors perceive the evidence of 
vulnerable witnesses to be less reliable than the evidence of typical witnesses (e.g., 
Allison, Brimacombe, Hunter & Kadlec, 2006; Henry, Ridley, Perry & Crane, 2011; 
Peled, Iarocci & Connolly, 2004), we expect to find that jurors will perceive 
witnesses with a mental health problem to be less credible than their typical 
counterparts. It is hoped that the information gained from this study will enable us to 
develop our understanding of juror perceptions regarding witnesses with sub-clinical 
anxiety and depression, and sub-clinical anxiety.  
Thank you once again for taking part in this study. If you would like further 
information about the study, please do not hesitate to contact me or my supervisor 






Allison, M., Brimacombe, C. A., Hunter, M. A., & Kadlec, H. (2006). Young and 
Older Adult Eyewitnesses’ Use of Narrative Features in Testimony. 
Discourse Processes, 41, 289-314. 
Henry, L., Ridley, A., Perry, J., & Crane, L. (2011). Perceived Credibility and 
Eyewitness Testimony of Children With Intellectual Disabilities. Journal of 
Intellectual Disability Research, 55, 385-391.  
Peled, M., Iarocci, G., & Connolly, D. A. (2004). Eyewitness Testimony and 
Perceived Credibility of Youth With Mild Intellectual Disability. Journal of 



















MANOVAs (study 4) 
MANOVA (effect of mental health status and knowledge on mock jurors’ perceptions of the 


















































































































































































MANOVA (effect of mental health status and knowledge on mock jurors’ perceptions of the 
































































































































































































ANOVA: effect of mental health status and knowledge on mock jurors’ perceptions of 











































































































































Chi-square test: association between mental health status and verdict (study 4) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
